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CVE-2026-72455

apparmor: fix uninitialised pointer passed to audit_log_untrustedstring()

7.1 EPSS 0.2% AV:L

Published 2026-08-15 (2 months ago) by the Linux kernel CNA. Subsystem security/apparmor. Debian urgency: unimportant.

What to do, per Debian release

Debian's own status for CVE-2026-72455 in every release this site tracks, and what each one means in practice. Every status below is the one the Debian Security Team publishes for this CVE. source

ReleaseStatus VersionWhat this means
Debian 12bookwormnot affected6.1.190-1Nothing to do. bookworm never shipped the vulnerable code.
Debian 13trixienot affected6.12.113-1Nothing to do. trixie never shipped the vulnerable code.
Debian 14forkyfixed7.1.5-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.1.5-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian unstablesidfixed7.1.5-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.1.5-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.

The vulnerability

What the bug is

Commit 4a134723f9f1 ("apparmor: move check for aa_null file to cover all cases") intrdouced a small bug, where path_name() may pass a potentially uninitialized *name to aa_audit_file() if the path->dentry had been replaced with aa_null.dentry earlier on. This can lead to page fault like one observed on 7.0.2 openSUSE Tumbleweed kernel: [51692.242756] [ T24690] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 0000000f00000003 [51692.242762] [ T24690] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [51692.242763] [ T24690] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [51692.242765] [ T24690] PGD 0 P4D 0 [51692.242768] [ T24690] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI [51692.242772] [ T24690] CPU: 3 UID: 1020 PID: 24690 Comm: snap-confine Tainted: G O 7.0.2-1-default #1 PREEMPT(full) openSUSE Tumbleweed ab90b4c9940707f9cafa19bdad80b2cec52dbe51 [51692.242775] [ T24690] Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE [51692.242777] [ T24690] Hardware name: Framework Laptop 13 (AMD Ryzen 7040Series)/FRANMDCP05, BIOS 03.18 01/08/2026 [51692.242778] [ T24690] RIP: 0010:strlen+0x4/0x30 [51692.242783] [ T24690] Code: f7 75 ec 31 c0 e9 17 9f 00 ff 48 89 f8 e9 0f 9f 00 ff 0f 1f 40 00 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 f3 0f 1e fa <80> 3f 00 74 18 48 89 f8 0f 1f 40 00 48 83 c0 01 80 38 00 75 f7 48 [51692.242785] [ T24690] RSP: 0018:ffffd015eb1e3608 EFLAGS: 00010282 [51692.242787] [ T24690] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff89796198a360 RCX: 0000000000000000 [51692.242788] [ T24690] RDX: 00000000000000d1 RSI: 0000000f00000003 RDI: 0000000f00000003 [51692.242790] [ T24690] RBP: ffffffffb7ede090 R08: 00000000000005f5 R09: 0000000000000000 [51692.242791] [ T24690] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffd015eb1e3700 [51692.242792] [ T24690] R13: ffff8977a22bc380 R14: ffffffffb7ec5190 R15: ffff8977a0c8aa80 [51692.242794] [ T24690] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff897f640d8000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [51692.242796] [ T24690] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [51692.242797] [ T24690] CR2: 0000000f00000003 CR3: 00000006ad15f000 CR4: 0000000000f50ef0 [51692.242799] [ T24690] PKRU: 55555554 [51692.242800] [ T24690] Call Trace: [51692.242802] [ T24690] <TASK> [51692.242804] [ T24690] audit_log_untrustedstring+0x1d/0x40 [51692.242811] [ T24690] common_lsm_audit+0x71/0x1d0 [51692.242816] [ T24690] aa_audit+0x5a/0x170 [51692.242819] [ T24690] aa_audit_file+0x18a/0x1b0 [51692.242825] [ T24690] path_name+0xd2/0x100 [51692.242829] [ T24690] profile_path_perm.part.0+0x58/0xb0 [51692.242832] [ T24690] aa_path_perm+0xef/0x150 [51692.242837] [ T24690] apparmor_file_open+0x153/0x2e0 [51692.242840] [ T24690] security_file_open+0x46/0xd0 [51692.242844] [ T24690] do_dentry_open+0xe9/0x4d0 [51692.242848] [ T24690] vfs_open+0x30/0x100 While here, initialise variables which are passed down to path_name().

Where it lives

The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.

security/apparmor/file.c

What this is
APPARMOR SECURITY MODULEMAINTAINERS section matched on security/apparmor/ · apparmor@lists.ubuntu.com · Supported

Check it on the machine

grep -w CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR /boot/config-$(uname -r)

Reads the booted kernel's own configuration, on the machine and nowhere else. =y is built in, =m is a module, and an is not set line means the code is not there.

Show whether Debian builds this, per release

Debian builds this code. Every release below compiles the affected file into the kernels it ships.

  • bookworm, trixie, forky, sidy
y
built into the kernel image on every flavour - only a patch removes it
Build switch
CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR

From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS kbuild Makefiles Debian linux-config packages

Signals

Published
2026-08-15 (2 months ago)source
CVSS
7.1 high
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:Hsource recompute it
Attack vector
local (AV:L)source
EPSS
0.16%, higher than 5.3% of all CVEssource
CISA KEV
not listedthe KEV catalogue
Debian urgency
unimportantsource
Subsystem
security/apparmor

Upstream fixes

The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source

IntroducedFixed inCommit
6.18.146.18.402791dd42d41e
7.07.1.5a5c79d44ef19
7.07.2bcd1b34c2174
6.19.400

Why the CNA scored it this way

Quoted from the kernel CNA's own scoring file, word for word. A highlighted metric carries the most severe value CVSS v3.1 defines for it, which is what pushes the score up. source

AV:LAttack vector, local
Exploitation requires local syscalls that invoke AppArmor LSM file/path hooks (e.g. open on an inherited fd replaced with aa_null.dentry during exec); there is no network, adjacent-wireless, or physical-device entry point to this audit code path.
AC:LAttack complexity, low
An unprivileged attacker can reliably trigger the bug by execing into a confined AppArmor profile with disallowed inherited fds (aa_inherit_files replaces them with aa_null) and then opening or linking those paths; this was reproduced in production by snap-confine without rare timing or layout dependencies.
PR:LPrivileges required, low
The observed crash was from snap-confine running as UID 1020 under AppArmor confinement; triggering the aa_null inheritance-and-reopen sequence requires only a normal unprivileged local account on an AppArmor-enabled system, not real init-namespace root or special capabilities.
UI:NUser interaction, none
No victim interaction is required beyond the attacker performing their own exec and subsequent file operations to hit the vulnerable audit path on aa_null-replaced file descriptors.
S:UScope, unchanged
Impact is a kernel oops/panic from the LSM audit path within the same kernel security domain; it is not a cross-boundary escape such as KVM guest-to-host or IOMMU bypass.
C:HConfidentiality impact, high
The uninitialized name pointer is passed to audit_log_untrustedstring(), which calls strlen() and performs an uncontrolled kernel memory read; if the stack value were valid, leaked bytes could be written to the audit log, and even the faulting read is an out-of-bounds-style disclosure primitive.
I:NIntegrity impact, none
The flaw is an uninitialized-pointer read in strlen during audit formatting; it does not corrupt or modify kernel or user data, and observed impact is a crash rather than an arbitrary write or code-execution primitive.
A:HAvailability impact, high
Triggering the uninitialized pointer in audit_log_untrustedstring() causes a supervisor page fault and kernel oops, as demonstrated on openSUSE Tumbleweed 7.0.2, denying service to the local system and potentially all users on the host.