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CVE-2026-72400
seg6: validate SRH length before reading fixed fields
Published 2026-08-15 (2 months ago) by the Linux kernel CNA. Subsystem net/ipv6. Debian urgency: not yet assigned.
What to do, per Debian release
Debian's own status for CVE-2026-72400 in every release this site tracks, and what each one means in practice. Every status below is the one the Debian Security Team publishes for this CVE. source
| Release | Status | Version | What this means |
|---|---|---|---|
| Debian 12bookworm | fixed | 6.1.180-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 6.1.180-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
| Debian 13trixie | fixed | 6.12.100-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 6.12.100-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
| Debian 14forky | fixed | 7.1.5-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.1.5-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
| Debian unstablesid | fixed | 7.1.5-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.1.5-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
The vulnerability
What the bug is
seg6_validate_srh() reads fixed SRH fields such as srh->type and srh->hdrlen before checking that the supplied length covers the fixed struct ipv6_sr_hdr fields. The BPF SEG6 encap path reaches this with a BPF program-supplied pointer and length: bpf_lwt_push_encap() and the SEG6 local BPF END_B6 and END_B6_ENCAP actions call bpf_push_seg6_encap(), which forwards the length to seg6_validate_srh() with no minimum-size guard. A 2-byte SEG6 encap header can therefore make the validator read srh->type at offset 2 beyond the caller-supplied buffer. Reject lengths shorter than the fixed SRH at the top of seg6_validate_srh(), before any field is read. This fixes the BPF helper path and keeps the common validator robust.
Where it lives
The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.
net/ipv6/seg6.c
- What this is
- NETWORKING [SRv6]MAINTAINERS section matched on net/ipv6/seg6* · netdev@vger.kernel.org · Maintained
Check it on the machine
grep -w CONFIG_IPV6 /boot/config-$(uname -r)Reads the booted kernel's own configuration, on the machine and nowhere else. =y is built in, =m is a module, and an is not set line means the code is not there.
Show whether Debian builds this, per release
Debian builds this code. Every release below compiles the affected file into the kernels it ships.
- bookworm, trixie, forky, sidy
- y
- built into the kernel image on every flavour - only a patch removes it
- Build switch
- CONFIG_IPV6
From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS kbuild Makefiles Debian linux-config packages
Signals
- Published
- 2026-08-15 (2 months ago)source
- CVSS
- 7.8 high
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hsource recompute it - Attack vector
- local (AV:L)source
- EPSS
- 0.18%, higher than 6.6% of all CVEssource
- CISA KEV
- not listedthe KEV catalogue
- Debian urgency
- not yet assignedsource
- Subsystem
- net/ipv6
Upstream fixes
The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source
| Introduced | Fixed in | Commit |
|---|---|---|
| 4.18 | 5.10.261 | 715eb12e453d |
| 4.18 | 5.15.212 | 7247d05c987c |
| 4.18 | 6.1.178 | 071f1a38d7dd |
| 4.18 | 6.6.145 | 804bb969f194 |
| 4.18 | 6.12.97 | 0fc7069d3923 |
| 4.18 | 6.18.40 | 8dba7a94a269 |
| 4.18 | 7.1.5 | c9961336aa5f |
| 4.18 | 7.2 | a75d99f46bf2 |
Why the CNA scored it this way
Quoted from the kernel CNA's own scoring file, word for word. A highlighted metric carries the most severe value CVSS v3.1 defines for it, which is what pushes the score up. source
- AV:LAttack vector, local
- Exploitation requires loading BPF LWT SEG6 programs and attaching SRv6 routes via bpf() and RTNETLINK; the OOB read is triggered through bpf_lwt_push_encap/bpf_lwt_seg6_action helpers, not by remote IPv6 packet parsing alone.
- AC:LAttack complexity, low
- An attacker with route/BPF setup privileges can deterministically call bpf_push_seg6_encap() or bpf_lwt_seg6_action(END_B6/END_B6_ENCAP) with a 2-byte buffer, immediately forcing seg6_validate_srh() to read fixed SRH fields past the buffer end.
- PR:LPrivileges required, low
- Loading BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_IN/LWT_SEG6LOCAL and installing SRv6 LWT routes requires CAP_NET_ADMIN, obtainable by unprivileged users inside user/network namespaces (unshare -Urn), not only init-namespace root.
- UI:NUser interaction, none
- No victim interaction is required; triggering the bug needs only attacker-controlled BPF execution during SRv6/LWT packet processing after the attacker configures routes and programs.
- S:UScope, unchanged
- Impact is confined to kernel memory safety within the same host security boundary; there is no VM escape, sandbox breakout, or cross-authority scope change beyond standard local kernel compromise.
- C:HConfidentiality impact, high
- seg6_validate_srh() performs out-of-bounds reads of SRH header bytes (e.g., srh->type at offset 2) beyond the attacker-supplied length, disclosing adjacent kernel/BPF stack memory that may include pointers and sensitive metadata.
- I:HIntegrity impact, high
- Kernel out-of-bounds reads in this validation path constitute memory-safety corruption that can be chained with disclosed pointers and heap/stack layout control from BPF context to obtain arbitrary write or code-execution primitives.
- A:HAvailability impact, high
- Undersized SRH buffers can cause seg6_validate_srh() to read past mapped BPF/kernel memory and trigger kernel faults, oops, or panic on SRv6 routers processing attacker-driven BPF SEG6 encap traffic.