data built 2026-10-19T13:16:53Z

Look up another CVE · open CVE-2026-72390 in the interactive tracker

CVE-2026-72390

net/sched: sch_teql: Introduce slaves_lock to avoid race condition and UAF

7.8 EPSS 0.2% AV:L

Published 2026-08-15 (2 months ago) by the Linux kernel CNA. Subsystem net/sched. Debian urgency: not yet assigned.

What to do, per Debian release

Debian's own status for CVE-2026-72390 in every release this site tracks, and what each one means in practice. Every status below is the one the Debian Security Team publishes for this CVE. source

ReleaseStatus VersionWhat this means
Debian 12bookwormfixed6.1.180-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 6.1.180-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian 13trixiefixed6.12.100-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 6.12.100-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian 14forkyfixed7.1.5-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.1.5-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian unstablesidfixed7.1.5-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.1.5-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.

The vulnerability

What the bug is

The teql master->slaves singly linked list is not protected against multiple writes. It can be mod'ed concurently from teql_master_xmit(), teql_dequeue(), teql_init() and teql_destroy() without holding any list lock or RCU protection. zdi-disclosures@trendmicro.com has demonstrated that the qdisc is freed after an RCU grace period, but teql_master_xmit() running on another CPU can still hold a stale pointer into the list, resulting in a slab-use-after-free: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in teql_master_xmit+0xf0f/0x16b0 Read of size 8 at addr ffff888013fb0440 by task poc/332 Freed 512-byte region [ffff888013fb0400, ffff888013fb0600) (kmalloc-512) The fix? Add a per-master slaves_lock spinlock that serializes all mutations of master->slaves and the NEXT_SLAVE() links in teql_destroy() and teql_qdisc_init(). teql_master_xmit() also takes the same slaves_lock around those updates. Annotate master->slaves and the per-slave ->next pointer with __rcu and use the appropriate RCU accessors everywhere they are touched: rcu_assign_pointer() on the writer side (under slaves_lock), rcu_dereference_protected() for the writer-side loads (also under slaves_lock), rcu_dereference_bh() for the loads in teql_master_xmit() and rtnl_dereference() for the loads in teql_master_open()/teql_master_mtu(), which run under RTNL. Pair this with rcu_read_lock_bh()/rcu_read_unlock_bh() around the list traversal in teql_master_xmit(), so that readers either observe a fully linked list or are deferred until the in-flight mutation completes. The two early-return paths in teql_master_xmit() are updated to release the RCU-bh read-side critical section before returning, since leaving it held would disable BH on that CPU for good.

Where it lives

The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.

net/sched/sch_teql.c

What this is
TC subsystemMAINTAINERS section matched on net/sched/ · netdev@vger.kernel.org · Maintained
Kernel module
sch_teql

Check it on the machine

grep -w CONFIG_NET_SCH_TEQL /boot/config-$(uname -r)

Reads the booted kernel's own configuration, on the machine and nowhere else. =y is built in, =m is a module, and an is not set line means the code is not there.

lsmod | grep -w sch_teql

Prints a line if that module is loaded right now, and nothing if it is not. One that is not loaded can still be loaded later by anything that needs it.

Show whether Debian builds this, per release

Debian builds this as a loadable module. Every release below compiles it as a module on every flavour, so whether the code is in the running kernel depends on whether that module is loaded.

  • bookworm, trixie, forky, sidm
m
a loadable module on every flavour - check lsmod, can be blacklisted
Build switch
CONFIG_NET_SCH_TEQL

From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS kbuild Makefiles Debian linux-config packages

Signals

Published
2026-08-15 (2 months ago)source
CVSS
7.8 high
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hsource recompute it
Attack vector
local (AV:L)source
EPSS
0.17%, higher than 6.4% of all CVEssource
CISA KEV
not listedthe KEV catalogue
Debian urgency
not yet assignedsource
Subsystem
net/sched

Upstream fixes

The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source

IntroducedFixed inCommit
2.6.126.1.17803c67781254c
2.6.126.6.145735567bde740
2.6.126.12.9711402e6e18e9
2.6.126.18.409b7d05cbaa60
2.6.127.1.5b26aa9d99353
2.6.127.2e5b811fe7931

Why the CNA scored it this way

Quoted from the kernel CNA's own scoring file, word for word. A highlighted metric carries the most severe value CVSS v3.1 defines for it, which is what pushes the score up. source

AV:LAttack vector, local
Exploitation requires local rtnetlink tc/qdisc operations (RTM_NEWQDISC/RTM_DELQDISC) to attach or tear down TEQL slaves and local packet injection through teql0 to drive teql_master_xmit/teql_dequeue; remote peers cannot reach these control paths without prior CAP_NET_ADMIN setup.
AC:LAttack complexity, low
The attacker controls both sides of the race by concurrently churning TEQL slave qdiscs via netlink teardown/re-add while flooding teql0 to keep teql_master_xmit traversing master->slaves; Trend Micro demonstrated reliable slab-use-after-free under this attacker-driven timing.
PR:LPrivileges required, low
Configuring and deleting qdiscs requires CAP_NET_ADMIN, but rtnetlink checks netlink_net_capable() against the network namespace user_ns, so an unprivileged local user can obtain CAP_NET_ADMIN via user/network namespaces (unshare -Urn) without init-namespace root.
UI:NUser interaction, none
No victim interaction is required; the attacker programmatically loads/configures TEQL, starts transmit workers, and races qdisc deletion in parallel to trigger the use-after-free.
S:UScope, unchanged
Impact is kernel memory corruption and potential privilege escalation within the same kernel security domain; it does not inherently cross VM, container host, or IOMMU boundaries without separate further exploitation.
C:HConfidentiality impact, high
Demonstrated slab-use-after-free reads through a stale Qdisc pointer in teql_master_xmit (8-byte read from a freed kmalloc-512 object); UAF on Qdisc structures enables heap spraying and arbitrary kernel memory disclosure.
I:HIntegrity impact, high
Use-after-free of the Qdisc object allows reallocating attacker-controlled data into the freed slab, corrupting list traversal and adjacent qdisc fields to obtain arbitrary kernel write primitives and potential code execution.
A:HAvailability impact, high
The bug causes kernel oops/panic from dereferencing freed Qdisc memory during teql_master_xmit list walks; KASAN confirmed slab-use-after-free, and repeated triggering can deny service on affected systems.