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CVE-2026-72340

net: microchip: vcap: fix races on the shared Super VCAP block

7.8 EPSS 0.2% AV:L

Published 2026-08-15 (2 months ago) by the Linux kernel CNA. Subsystem drivers/net. Debian urgency: unimportant.

What to do, per Debian release

Debian's own status for CVE-2026-72340 in every release this site tracks, and what each one means in practice. Every status below is the one the Debian Security Team publishes for this CVE. source

ReleaseStatus VersionWhat this means
Debian 12bookwormnot affected6.1.190-1Nothing to do. bookworm never shipped the vulnerable code.
Debian 13trixiefixed6.12.100-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 6.12.100-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian 14forkyfixed7.1.5-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.1.5-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian unstablesidfixed7.1.5-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.1.5-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.

The vulnerability

What the bug is

The VCAP instances on a chip are not independent, yet they are locked independently. On sparx5 and lan969x the IS0 and IS2 instances are backed by the same Super VCAP hardware block and share its cache and command registers: every access drives the shared VCAP_SUPER_CTRL register and moves data through the shared cache registers. Accessing one instance therefore races with accessing another. The per-instance admin->lock cannot prevent this, as each instance takes a different lock. The locking issue is mostly disguised by the fact that the core usage of the vcap api runs under rtnl. However, the full rule dump in debugfs decodes rules straight from hardware (a READ command followed by a cache read) and runs outside rtnl, so it races a concurrent tc-flower rule write to another Super VCAP instance. Besides corrupting the dump, the read repopulates the shared cache between the writers cache fill and its write command, so the writer commits the wrong data and corrupts the hardware entry. Introduce vcap_lock() and vcap_unlock() helpers and route every rule lock site in the VCAP API and its debugfs code through them. Replace the per-instance admin->lock with a single mutex in struct vcap_control that serializes access to all instances. The helpers reach it through a new admin->vctrl back-pointer, and the clients initialise and destroy the control lock instead of a per-instance one. No path holds more than one instance lock, so collapsing them onto a single mutex cannot self-deadlock.

Where it lives

The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.

drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/lan966x/lan966x_vcap_impl.c
drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/sparx5/sparx5_vcap_impl.c
drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/vcap/vcap_api.c
drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/vcap/vcap_api.h
drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/vcap/vcap_api_debugfs.c
drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/vcap/vcap_api_debugfs_kunit.c
drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/vcap/vcap_api_kunit.c
drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/vcap/vcap_api_private.h

What this is
MICROCHIP LAN966X ETHERNET DRIVERMAINTAINERS section matched on drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/lan966x/* · netdev@vger.kernel.org · Maintained

Check it on the machine

grep -wE 'CONFIG_ETHERNET|CONFIG_LAN966X_SWITCH|CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_MICROCHIP' /boot/config-$(uname -r)

Reads the booted kernel's own configuration, on the machine and nowhere else. =y is built in, =m is a module, and an is not set line means the code is not there.

Show whether Debian builds this, per release

Debian does not build this code in 3 releases. The build rule could not be established for 1 release, so nothing is claimed about those.

  • bookworm?
  • trixie, forky, sidn
?
not established - no Makefile entry for the affected file
n
not enabled on any flavour - this release does not build the code

Where a release above reads "not established", no build rule for the affected file was found in that release's kernel tree. That is a gap in this lookup, not a finding that the code is absent.

Build switches
CONFIG_ETHERNET, CONFIG_LAN966X_SWITCH, CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_MICROCHIP
Reads as
all on means the file is compiled; any one off means it is not.

From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS kbuild Makefiles Debian linux-config packages

Signals

Published
2026-08-15 (2 months ago)source
CVSS
7.8 high
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hsource recompute it
Attack vector
local (AV:L)source
EPSS
0.18%, higher than 6.6% of all CVEssource
CISA KEV
not listedthe KEV catalogue
Debian urgency
unimportantsource
Subsystem
drivers/net

Upstream fixes

The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source

IntroducedFixed inCommit
6.26.6.145786456d0a244
6.26.12.9749806bef9572
6.26.18.401e71a40d1015
6.27.1.5952928564cc5
6.27.2d7a8d500d7e4

Why the CNA scored it this way

Quoted from the kernel CNA's own scoring file, word for word. A highlighted metric carries the most severe value CVSS v3.1 defines for it, which is what pushes the score up. source

AV:LAttack vector, local
Exploitation requires local kernel interfaces: tc-flower netlink/offload (ndo_setup_tc) to program VCAP rules and debugfs reads that issue hardware READs; remote packets do not reach this code path.
AC:LAttack complexity, low
An attacker can reliably win the race by running concurrent threads—one repeatedly reading VCAP debugfs dumps while another issues tc-flower add/modify/delete operations on a different Super VCAP instance (IS0 vs IS2).
PR:LPrivileges required, low
The tc-flower write path requires CAP_NET_ADMIN, reachable by an unprivileged local user via user namespaces (unshare -Ur); debugfs VCAP dumps are readable with CAP_SYS_ADMIN, likewise obtainable in a user namespace.
UI:NUser interaction, none
No victim interaction is required; the attacker self-triggers the race with automated concurrent debugfs reads and tc-flower netlink operations.
S:UScope, unchanged
Impact stays within the kernel/switch management security boundary—corrupting on-chip TCAM ACL entries and forwarding policy—not a VM escape, IOMMU bypass, or cross-authority sandbox breakout.
C:HConfidentiality impact, high
Corrupted Super VCAP TCAM entries can alter match/action fields to redirect or CPU-copy traffic to attacker-chosen ports, enabling interception of confidential traffic traversing the switch.
I:HIntegrity impact, high
The race causes arbitrary wrong key/mask/action data to be committed to hardware ACL entries, enabling unauthorized modification of line-rate switching policy including redirects, drops, and policing bypass.
A:HAvailability impact, high
Corrupted TCAM rules can black-hole, misroute, or otherwise disable forwarding for arbitrary ports/VLANs on production SparX5/LAN969x switches, causing repeated high-impact network availability loss.