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CVE-2026-72319

ipvs: ensure inner headers in ICMP errors are in headroom

9.8 EPSS 0.8% AV:N

Published 2026-08-15 (2 months ago) by the Linux kernel CNA. Subsystem net/netfilter. Debian urgency: not yet assigned.

What to do, per Debian release

Debian's own status for CVE-2026-72319 in every release this site tracks, and what each one means in practice. Every status below is the one the Debian Security Team publishes for this CVE. source

ReleaseStatus VersionWhat this means
Debian 12bookwormfixed6.1.180-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 6.1.180-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian 13trixiefixed6.12.100-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 6.12.100-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian 14forkyfixed7.1.5-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.1.5-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian unstablesidfixed7.1.5-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.1.5-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.

The vulnerability

What the bug is

Sashiko points out that after stripping the outer headers with pskb_pull() we should ensure the inner IP headers in ICMP errors from tunnels are present in the skb headroom for functions like ipv4_update_pmtu(), icmp_send() and IP_VS_DBG(). Also, add more checks for the length of the inner headers.

Where it lives

The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.

net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_core.c

What this is
IPVSMAINTAINERS section matched on net/netfilter/ipvs/ · netdev@vger.kernel.org · Maintained
Kernel module
ip_vs

Check it on the machine

grep -wE 'CONFIG_IP_VS|CONFIG_NETFILTER' /boot/config-$(uname -r)

Reads the booted kernel's own configuration, on the machine and nowhere else. =y is built in, =m is a module, and an is not set line means the code is not there.

lsmod | grep -w ip_vs

Prints a line if that module is loaded right now, and nothing if it is not. One that is not loaded can still be loaded later by anything that needs it.

Show whether Debian builds this, per release

Debian builds this as a loadable module. Every release below compiles it as a module on every flavour, so whether the code is in the running kernel depends on whether that module is loaded.

  • bookworm, trixie, forky, sidm
m
a loadable module on every flavour - check lsmod, can be blacklisted
Build switches
CONFIG_IP_VS, CONFIG_NETFILTER
Reads as
all on means the file is compiled; any one off means it is not.

From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS kbuild Makefiles Debian linux-config packages

Signals

Published
2026-08-15 (2 months ago)source
CVSS
9.8 critical
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hsource recompute it
Attack vector
network (AV:N)source
EPSS
0.76%, higher than 54.2% of all CVEssource
CISA KEV
not listedthe KEV catalogue
Debian urgency
not yet assignedsource
Subsystem
net/netfilter

Upstream fixes

The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source

IntroducedFixed inCommit
3.75.10.26119657b3a17b7
3.75.15.212dac813101914
3.76.1.178dd22f74a09e2
3.76.6.1459bc9b95aee2b
3.76.12.97a735f9964a3d
3.76.18.408f48cfe65740
3.77.1.592185d6f7819
3.77.23f7a535ff0fa

Why the CNA scored it this way

Quoted from the kernel CNA's own scoring file, word for word. A highlighted metric carries the most severe value CVSS v3.1 defines for it, which is what pushes the score up. source

AV:NAttack vector, network
Crafted IPv4 ICMP error packets reach ip_vs_in_icmp() through IPVS netfilter LOCAL_IN and FORWARD hooks on internet-facing load balancers and Kubernetes kube-proxy IPVS nodes; remote senders trigger the tunnel PMTUD handler without local access.
AC:LAttack complexity, low
An attacker controls ICMP nesting, IPIP/UDP/GRE encapsulation, skb fragmentation/non-linear layout, and can establish matching IPVS TUN connections through the VIP; no race or condition outside attacker control is required once IPVS tunnel mode is deployed.
PR:NPrivileges required, none
IPVS configuration is an administrator deployment prerequisite; a remote attacker sending ICMP errors to an already-configured load balancer needs no credentials or host capabilities on the victim.
UI:NUser interaction, none
Exploitation is driven entirely by network packets processed automatically in softirq; no victim user action beyond normal traffic through the load balancer is required.
S:UScope, unchanged
Out-of-bounds kernel skb header access and route PMTU corruption remain within the host kernel authority; this is standard kernel compromise, not VM escape or sandbox crossing.
C:HConfidentiality impact, high
After pskb_pull() without pskb_may_pull(), ipv4_update_pmtu() and ip_hdr() dereference skb->data that may lie past skb_tail_pointer or hold non-linear fragment data, constituting an out-of-bounds kernel read per CNA guidance.
I:HIntegrity impact, high
Mis-parsed inner IP header fields from unchecked skb->data drive ipv4_update_pmtu() route lookups and FNHE/PMTU updates with attacker-influenced saddr/daddr values, enabling unauthorized modification of kernel routing state.
A:HAvailability impact, high
Out-of-bounds header access in the IPVS ICMP tunnel path can trigger kernel oops or panic, and a remote attacker can repeatedly send crafted ICMP errors to deny service on IPVS TUN load balancers.