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CVE-2026-72299

tipc: restrict socket queue dumps in enqueue tracepoints

9.8 EPSS 0.7% AV:N

Published 2026-08-15 (2 months ago) by the Linux kernel CNA. Subsystem net/tipc. Debian urgency: not yet assigned.

What to do, per Debian release

Debian's own status for CVE-2026-72299 in every release this site tracks, and what each one means in practice. Every status below is the one the Debian Security Team publishes for this CVE. source

ReleaseStatus VersionWhat this means
Debian 12bookwormfixedDLA-4777-1 · 2026-09-08 · text6.1.187-1Update the kernel and reboot. DLA-4777-1 shipped the fix on 2026-09-08, in 6.1.187-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian 13trixiefixed6.12.101-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 6.12.101-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian 14forkyfixed7.1.5-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.1.5-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian unstablesidfixed7.1.5-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.1.5-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian 12bookworm · linux-6.12fixedDLA-4745-1 · 2026-08-18 · text6.12.101-1~deb12u1Update the kernel and reboot. DLA-4745-1 shipped the fix on 2026-08-18, in 6.12.101-1~deb12u1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.

The vulnerability

What the bug is

tipc_sk_enqueue() runs with sk->sk_lock.slock held while the socket is owned by user context. The spinlock protects the backlog queue in this path, but it does not serialize against the socket owner consuming or purging sk_receive_queue. KASAN reported: CPU: 14 UID: 0 PID: 1050 Comm: tipc3 Not tainted 7.1.0-rc6+ #126 PREEMPT(lazy) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x76/0xa0 lib/dump_stack.c:123 print_report+0xce/0x5b0 mm/kasan/report.c:482 kasan_report+0xc6/0x100 mm/kasan/report.c:597 __asan_report_load4_noabort+0x14/0x30 mm/kasan/report_generic.c:380 tipc_skb_dump+0x1327/0x16f0 net/tipc/trace.c:73 tipc_list_dump+0x208/0x2e0 net/tipc/trace.c:187 tipc_sk_dump+0xaf6/0xd60 net/tipc/socket.c:3996 trace_event_raw_event_tipc_sk_class+0x312/0x5a0 net/tipc/trace.h:188 tipc_sk_rcv+0xb1d/0x1d50 net/tipc/socket.c:2497 tipc_node_xmit+0x1c3/0x1440 net/tipc/node.c:1689 __tipc_sendmsg+0x97a/0x1440 net/tipc/socket.c:1512 tipc_sendmsg+0x52/0x80 net/tipc/socket.c:1400 sock_sendmsg+0x2f6/0x3e0 net/socket.c:825 splice_to_socket+0x7f9/0x1010 fs/splice.c:884 do_splice+0xe21/0x2330 fs/splice.c:936 __do_splice+0x153/0x260 fs/splice.c:1431 __x64_sys_splice+0x150/0x230 fs/splice.c:1616 x64_sys_call+0xeb5/0x2790 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:41 do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x620 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130 RIP: 0033:0x71624e8aafe2 Code: 08 0f 85 71 3a ff ff 49 89 fb 48 89 f0 48 89 d7 48 89 ce 4c 89 c2 4d 89 ca 4c 8b 44 24 08 4c 8b 4c 24 10 4c 89 5c 24 08 0f 05 <c3> 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 RSP: 002b:0000716157ffed68 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000113 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000716157fff6c0 RCX: 000071624e8aafe2 RDX: 000000000000005f RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000066 RBP: 0000716157ffed90 R08: 0000000000008000 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: ffffffffffffff00 R13: 0000000000000021 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00007fff89799c40 </TASK> The TIPC_DUMP_ALL tracepoints in tipc_sk_enqueue() also dump sk_receive_queue and can therefore dereference skbs that the socket owner has already dequeued or freed. Restrict these dumps to TIPC_DUMP_SK_BKLGQ, which matches the queue protected by the held spinlock. Keep the change limited to the enqueue path, where the unsafe queue dump is reachable while the socket is owned by user context.

Where it lives

The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.

net/tipc/socket.c

What this is
TIPC NETWORK LAYERMAINTAINERS section matched on net/tipc/ · netdev@vger.kernel.org · Maintained
Kernel module
tipc

Check it on the machine

grep -w CONFIG_TIPC /boot/config-$(uname -r)

Reads the booted kernel's own configuration, on the machine and nowhere else. =y is built in, =m is a module, and an is not set line means the code is not there.

lsmod | grep -w tipc

Prints a line if that module is loaded right now, and nothing if it is not. One that is not loaded can still be loaded later by anything that needs it.

Show whether Debian builds this, per release

Debian builds this as a loadable module. Every release below compiles it as a module on every flavour, so whether the code is in the running kernel depends on whether that module is loaded.

  • bookworm, trixie, forky, sid, bookworm · linux-6.12m
m
a loadable module on every flavour - check lsmod, can be blacklisted
Build switch
CONFIG_TIPC

From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS kbuild Makefiles Debian linux-config packages

Signals

Published
2026-08-15 (2 months ago)source
CVSS
9.8 critical
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hsource recompute it
Attack vector
network (AV:N)source
EPSS
0.74%, higher than 53.9% of all CVEssource
CISA KEV
not listedthe KEV catalogue
Debian urgency
not yet assignedsource
Subsystem
net/tipc

Upstream fixes

The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source

IntroducedFixed inCommit
5.05.10.266ae5d0d9ce767
5.05.15.217273ff83c49b8
5.06.1.184258fb15b30db
5.06.6.14812876864f9de
5.06.12.101b9e100815f4b
5.06.18.4061a55fa24a5d
5.07.1.56acbbe54215d
5.07.2acd7df8d9554

Debian advisories

AdvisoryDateShipped toDebian
DLA-4777-12026-09-08bookworm 6.1.187-1tracker
DLA-4745-12026-08-18bookworm 6.12.101-1~deb12u1tracker

Why the CNA scored it this way

Quoted from the kernel CNA's own scoring file, word for word. A highlighted metric carries the most severe value CVSS v3.1 defines for it, which is what pushes the score up. source

AV:NAttack vector, network
tipc_sk_enqueue() is invoked from tipc_sk_rcv() on inbound TIPC traffic (tipc_rcv()/tipc_link_rcv() from UDP/Ethernet bearers) and on loopback xmit; a remote cluster peer can deliver packets that hit the enqueue trace path while the destination socket is user-owned.
AC:LAttack complexity, low
This is a controllable race between enqueue-time TIPC_DUMP_ALL trace dumps of sk_receive_queue and the socket owner dequeuing/freeing those skbs; the attacker drives both sides via concurrent recvmsg/splice/sendmsg threads or by flooding TIPC messages while a receiver holds lock_sock().
PR:NPrivileges required, none
TIPC data-plane delivery to an existing socket/port needs no authentication or victim credentials; any local user may open AF_TIPC sockets (including via user namespaces with CAP_NET_ADMIN), and default sk_filter sysctl matches all sockets once trace events are enabled.
UI:NUser interaction, none
Exploitation needs no victim interaction beyond normal socket/cluster I/O; the attacker controls message injection and thread timing without requiring mounts, prompts, or other deliberate user actions.
S:UScope, unchanged
The flaw is a kernel sk_buff use-after-free in the TIPC socket path and its impact stays within the kernel security authority; it does not by itself cross VM, IOMMU, or hypervisor isolation boundaries.
C:HConfidentiality impact, high
KASAN reported __asan_report_load4 in tipc_skb_dump() reading freed skb/message fields from sk_receive_queue; this UAF read of attacker-influenced heap objects can disclose kernel memory and supports further info-leak exploitation.
I:HIntegrity impact, high
Concurrent enqueue tracing walks queue pointers while skbs are freed by the socket owner, creating a classic UAF on sk_buff slabs that can be groomed for arbitrary kernel memory corruption and privilege escalation.
A:HAvailability impact, high
Dereferencing freed skbs during tipc_list_dump()/tipc_skb_dump() can oops or panic the kernel; UAF in the TIPC receive/enqueue path is a high-availability risk even when not fully weaponized for code execution.