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CVE-2026-72221
sunrpc: wait for in-flight TLS handshake callback when cancel loses race
Published 2026-08-15 (2 months ago) by the Linux kernel CNA. Subsystem net/sunrpc. Debian urgency: unimportant.
What to do, per Debian release
Debian's own status for CVE-2026-72221 in every release this site tracks, and what each one means in practice. Every status below is the one the Debian Security Team publishes for this CVE. source
| Release | Status | Version | What this means |
|---|---|---|---|
| Debian 12bookworm | not affected | 6.1.190-1 | Nothing to do. bookworm never shipped the vulnerable code. |
| Debian 13trixie | fixed | 6.12.100-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 6.12.100-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
| Debian 14forky | fixed | 7.1.5-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.1.5-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
| Debian unstablesid | fixed | 7.1.5-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.1.5-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
The vulnerability
What the bug is
When wait_for_completion_interruptible_timeout() in svc_tcp_handshake() returns 0 (timeout) or -ERESTARTSYS (signal) and tls_handshake_cancel() then returns false, handshake_complete() has won the cancellation race: it has set HANDSHAKE_F_REQ_COMPLETED and is about to invoke svc_tcp_handshake_done(), but the callback's side effects on xpt_flags and on svsk->sk_handshake_done have not yet committed. The current code reads xpt_flags immediately to decide whether the session succeeded. Two races result. If the callback has executed set_bit(XPT_TLS_SESSION) but not yet clear_bit(XPT_HANDSHAKE), svc_tcp_handshake() sees a session, enqueues the transport, and returns. svc_xprt_received() then clears XPT_BUSY, a worker thread picks the transport up, the dispatcher in svc_handle_xprt() observes XPT_HANDSHAKE still set, and xpo_handshake is invoked a second time. That svc_tcp_handshake() calls init_completion(&svsk->sk_handshake_done) while the original callback concurrently calls complete_all() on it, corrupting the embedded swait_queue. If the callback has set HANDSHAKE_F_REQ_COMPLETED but not yet entered svc_tcp_handshake_done(), svc_tcp_handshake() reads XPT_TLS_SESSION as clear and tears the connection down even though the handshake is about to succeed. Wait for the callback to commit before inspecting xpt_flags. The completion is guaranteed to fire because handshake_complete() invokes svc_tcp_handshake_done() unconditionally once it has set HANDSHAKE_F_REQ_COMPLETED.
Where it lives
The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.
net/sunrpc/svcsock.c
- What this is
- KERNEL NFSD, SUNRPC, AND LOCKD SERVERSMAINTAINERS section matched on net/sunrpc/ · linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org · Supported
- Kernel module
- sunrpc
Check it on the machine
grep -w CONFIG_SUNRPC /boot/config-$(uname -r)Reads the booted kernel's own configuration, on the machine and nowhere else. =y is built in, =m is a module, and an is not set line means the code is not there.
lsmod | grep -w sunrpcPrints a line if that module is loaded right now, and nothing if it is not. One that is not loaded can still be loaded later by anything that needs it.
Show whether Debian builds this, per release
Debian builds this as a loadable module. Every release below compiles it as a module on every flavour, so whether the code is in the running kernel depends on whether that module is loaded.
- bookworm, trixie, forky, sidm
- m
- a loadable module on every flavour - check lsmod, can be blacklisted
- Build switch
- CONFIG_SUNRPC
From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS kbuild Makefiles Debian linux-config packages
Signals
- Published
- 2026-08-15 (2 months ago)source
- CVSS
- 9.8 critical
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hsource recompute it - Attack vector
- network (AV:N)source
- EPSS
- 0.64%, higher than 49.4% of all CVEssource
- CISA KEV
- not listedthe KEV catalogue
- Debian urgency
- unimportantsource
- Subsystem
- net/sunrpc
Upstream fixes
The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source
| Introduced | Fixed in | Commit |
|---|---|---|
| 6.4 | 6.6.145 | 0d8ceb398841 |
| 6.4 | 6.12.97 | e0f4691d42a5 |
| 6.4 | 6.18.40 | 65b23bec1fca |
| 6.4 | 7.1.5 | a4f878e8ecd7 |
| 6.4 | 7.2 | d00e32f84ca1 |
Why the CNA scored it this way
Quoted from the kernel CNA's own scoring file, word for word. A highlighted metric carries the most severe value CVSS v3.1 defines for it, which is what pushes the score up. source
- AV:NAttack vector, network
- Reachable over TCP by any remote peer of an in-kernel NFS/RPC server (nfsd) via the pre-auth RPC_AUTH_TLS NULL-procedure STARTTLS path that invokes svc_tcp_handshake() on the accepted SUNRPC transport.
- AC:LAttack complexity, low
- The attacker controls both sides of the race by timing TLS client handshake messages against the fixed 5-second SVC_HANDSHAKE_TO and opening many parallel connections to reliably hit the cancel-lost window.
- PR:NPrivileges required, none
- No credentials or export authorization are required; svcauth_tls_accept() accepts empty AUTH_TLS on RPC NULL from any TCP client, and svcauth_unix_set_client() skips IP export checks when rq_proc==0.
- UI:NUser interaction, none
- Exploitation requires only scripted network connections and TLS client traffic to nfsd; no victim user interaction such as mounting a filesystem or opening a file is needed.
- S:UScope, unchanged
- Memory corruption occurs in nfsd kernel worker context on the same host; impact is kernel privilege compromise within the server security authority, not a VM escape or IOMMU boundary bypass.
- C:HConfidentiality impact, high
- A second svc_tcp_handshake() can call init_completion() while svc_tcp_handshake_done() concurrently calls complete_all(), corrupting the embedded swait_queue in heap-allocated svc_sock and enabling arbitrary kernel memory disclosure.
- I:HIntegrity impact, high
- Corrupting completion wait-queue metadata in the svc_sock heap object can be leveraged for arbitrary kernel writes and control-flow hijacking to achieve local privilege escalation on the NFS server.
- A:HAvailability impact, high
- The swait_queue corruption can trigger kernel oops/panic, and the alternate race path tears down connections whose TLS handshake is about to succeed, enabling repeatable remote denial-of-service against nfsd.