data built 2026-10-19T13:16:53Z

Look up another CVE · open CVE-2026-72183 in the interactive tracker

CVE-2026-72183

landlock: Fix LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL bypass on the SIGIO path

8.4 EPSS 0.2% AV:L

Published 2026-08-15 (2 months ago) by the Linux kernel CNA. Subsystem security/landlock. Debian urgency: unimportant.

What to do, per Debian release

Debian's own status for CVE-2026-72183 in every release this site tracks, and what each one means in practice. Every status below is the one the Debian Security Team publishes for this CVE. source

ReleaseStatus VersionWhat this means
Debian 12bookwormnot affected6.1.190-1Nothing to do. bookworm never shipped the vulnerable code.
Debian 13trixiefixed6.12.101-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 6.12.101-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian 14forkyfixed7.1.5-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.1.5-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian unstablesidfixed7.1.5-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.1.5-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian 12bookworm · linux-6.12fixedDLA-4745-1 · 2026-08-18 · text6.12.101-1~deb12u1Update the kernel and reboot. DLA-4745-1 shipped the fix on 2026-08-18, in 6.12.101-1~deb12u1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.

The vulnerability

What the bug is

LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL must prevent a sandboxed process from signaling processes outside its Landlock domain. It can be bypassed through the asynchronous SIGIO delivery path. A sandboxed process that owns any file or socket can arm it with fcntl(fd, F_SETOWN, -pgid), fcntl(fd, F_SETSIG, SIGKILL) and O_ASYNC, so that an I/O event makes the kernel deliver the chosen signal to the whole process group. As the head of its process group's task list (the default position right after fork()) that group can also hold the non-sandboxed process that launched it, e.g. a supervisor or a security monitor. The sandbox can thus kill or signal the processes LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL is meant to protect from it. The scope is enforced in hook_file_send_sigiotask() against the Landlock domain recorded at F_SETOWN time, not the live domain of the sender. control_current_fowner() decides whether to record that domain and skips recording it when the fowner target is in the caller's thread group, which is safe only for a single-task target (PIDTYPE_PID, PIDTYPE_TGID). For a process group (PIDTYPE_PGID) pid_task() returns only one member; recording is skipped whenever that member shares the caller's thread group, and hook_file_send_sigiotask() then lets the signal fan out to the whole group unchecked. Record the domain for every non single-process target so the scope is enforced against each group member at delivery time. That recording is necessary but not sufficient on its own: the kernel signals a process group through its members' thread-group leaders, and the leader of the registrant's own process can carry a different Landlock domain than the sibling thread that armed the owner. domain_is_scoped() would then deny that leader, even though commit 18eb75f3af40 ("landlock: Always allow signals between threads of the same process") requires same-process delivery to be allowed. hook_task_kill() avoids this by evaluating same_thread_group() live, per recipient; the SIGIO path instead delegates the whole decision to a single registration-time check, which a process-group fan-out cannot honor. So also record the registrant's thread group next to its domain and exempt it at delivery: hook_file_send_sigiotask() allows the signal whenever the recipient belongs to the registrant's own process, restoring the same-process guarantee while keeping out-of-domain group members blocked. The direct kill() path (hook_task_kill) already evaluates the live domain and is unaffected. [mic: Check pid_type earlier and improve comment, fix commit message, fix comment formatting]

Where it lives

The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.

security/landlock/fs.c
security/landlock/fs.h
security/landlock/task.c

What this is
LANDLOCK SECURITY MODULEMAINTAINERS section matched on security/landlock/ · linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org · Supported

Check it on the machine

grep -w CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK /boot/config-$(uname -r)

Reads the booted kernel's own configuration, on the machine and nowhere else. =y is built in, =m is a module, and an is not set line means the code is not there.

Show whether Debian builds this, per release

Debian builds this code. Every release below compiles the affected file into the kernels it ships.

  • bookworm, trixie, forky, sid, bookworm · linux-6.12y
y
built into the kernel image on every flavour - only a patch removes it
Build switch
CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK

From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS kbuild Makefiles Debian linux-config packages

Signals

Published
2026-08-15 (2 months ago)source
CVSS
8.4 high
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:Hsource recompute it
Attack vector
local (AV:L)source
EPSS
0.17%, higher than 6.4% of all CVEssource
CISA KEV
not listedthe KEV catalogue
Debian urgency
unimportantsource
Subsystem
security/landlock

Upstream fixes

The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source

IntroducedFixed inCommit
6.12.246.12.1017a92e9fd1d49
6.156.18.401f18aac26372
6.157.1.504916f7dc6d3
6.157.24b80320ca7ed
6.13.1200
6.14.300

Debian advisories

AdvisoryDateShipped toDebian
DLA-4745-12026-08-18bookworm 6.12.101-1~deb12u1tracker

Why the CNA scored it this way

Quoted from the kernel CNA's own scoring file, word for word. A highlighted metric carries the most severe value CVSS v3.1 defines for it, which is what pushes the score up. source

AV:LAttack vector, local
Exploitation requires local syscalls (fcntl F_SETOWN/F_SETSIG/F_SETFL, landlock_restrict_self, and pipe or socket I/O); the bug is in hook_file_send_sigiotask() on the SIGIO path with no network, Bluetooth, or physical entry point.
AC:LAttack complexity, low
The attacker controls every step (fork into the launcher process group, apply LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL, arm O_ASYNC with -pgid, trigger I/O); the upstream selftest reproduces the bypass deterministically with no race or layout dependency.
PR:LPrivileges required, low
Only an ordinary local user running inside a Landlock sandbox with LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL is needed; landlock_restrict_self() and fcntl() require no capabilities (selftests call drop_caps()), matching other Landlock CVE scoring.
UI:NUser interaction, none
The exploited supervisor or monitor is the attacker's own parent in the shared process group; escalation is driven entirely by the sandboxed process's syscalls with no separate victim interaction.
S:CScope, changed
This bypasses LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL, letting a confined process signal or SIGKILL tasks outside its Landlock domain (e.g., the unsandboxed launcher), crossing the sandbox security authority like CVE-2024-42318.
C:NConfidentiality impact, none
The flaw only skips signal-scope enforcement on asynchronous SIGIO delivery; it does not read kernel or victim memory or leak pointers, and no confidentiality primitive is created even with arbitrary signal choice.
I:HIntegrity impact, high
A sandboxed attacker can deliver arbitrary signals including SIGKILL to every out-of-domain process group member reachable via fcntl(F_SETOWN,-pgid)/O_ASYNC, completely defeating the integrity of LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL protections.
A:HAvailability impact, high
SIGKILL (explicitly shown in the fix commit) or other fatal/control signals terminate the supervisor, security monitor, or peer processes the policy was meant to isolate, causing high availability loss.