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Look up another CVE · open CVE-2026-72139 in the interactive tracker

CVE-2026-72139

tcp: defer md5sig_info kfree past RCU grace period in tcp_connect

9.8 EPSS 0.6% AV:N

Published 2026-08-15 (2 months ago) by the Linux kernel CNA. Subsystem net/ipv4. Debian urgency: unimportant.

What to do, per Debian release

Debian's own status for CVE-2026-72139 in every release this site tracks, and what each one means in practice. Every status below is the one the Debian Security Team publishes for this CVE. source

ReleaseStatus VersionWhat this means
Debian 12bookwormnot affected6.1.190-1Nothing to do. bookworm never shipped the vulnerable code.
Debian 13trixienot affected6.12.113-1Nothing to do. trixie never shipped the vulnerable code.
Debian 14forkyfixed7.1.5-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.1.5-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian unstablesidfixed7.1.5-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.1.5-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.

The vulnerability

What the bug is

The md5+ao reconciliation in tcp_connect() (net/ipv4/tcp_output.c) has two symmetric branches: if (needs_md5) { tcp_ao_destroy_sock(sk, false); } else if (needs_ao) { tcp_clear_md5_list(sk); kfree(rcu_replace_pointer(tp->md5sig_info, NULL, ...)); } Both branches free a per-socket auth-info object while the socket is in TCP_SYN_SENT and is already on the inet ehash (inserted by inet_hash_connect() in tcp_v4_connect()). Both branches are reachable by softirq RX-path readers that load the corresponding info pointer via implicit RCU before bh_lock_sock_nested() is taken. The needs_md5 branch is fixed in the prior patch by re-introducing the call_rcu() free in tcp_ao_destroy_sock(): the equivalent per-key loop runs inside tcp_ao_info_free_rcu(), the RCU callback, so by the time it frees each tcp_ao_key all softirq readers that captured the container have already completed rcu_read_unlock(). The needs_ao branch is not symmetric in the same way. The container free can be deferred via kfree_rcu(md5sig, rcu) -- struct tcp_md5sig_info already has the required rcu member (include/net/tcp.h:1999-2002), and the rest of the tree already does this in the tcp_md5sig_info_add() rollback paths (net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1410, 1436). But the per-key teardown is done by tcp_clear_md5_list() in process context BEFORE the container's RCU grace period: it walks &md5sig->head and frees each tcp_md5sig_key with bare hlist_del + kfree. A concurrent softirq reader in __tcp_md5_do_lookup() / __tcp_md5_do_lookup_exact() (tcp_ipv4.c:1253, 1298) walks the same list via hlist_for_each_entry_rcu() and races with that bare kfree on the keys themselves -- a per-key slab use-after-free of the same class as the TCP-AO bug, on the same race window. Fix this in two halves: 1. Convert the bare kfree() in tcp_connect() to kfree_rcu() so the md5sig_info container joins the rest of the md5sig lifecycle. The local-variable lift is mechanical and required because kfree_rcu() is a macro that expects an lvalue. 2. Make tcp_clear_md5_list() RCU-safe by replacing hlist_del + kfree(key) with hlist_del_rcu + kfree_rcu(key, rcu). struct tcp_md5sig_key already carries the rcu member (include/net/tcp.h:1995) and tcp_md5_do_del() (net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1456) already uses kfree_rcu, so this restores the lifecycle invariant the rest of the file follows rather than introducing a one-off. The other caller of tcp_clear_md5_list() is tcp_md5_destruct_sock() (net/ipv4/tcp.c:412), which runs from the sock destructor when the socket is already unhashed and unreachable; the extra grace period there is unnecessary but harmless. Making the helper unconditionally RCU-safe is the cleaner contract. The needs_ao branch is not reachable by the userns reproducer used to demonstrate the AO-side splat (the repro installs both keys but ends up in the needs_md5 branch because the connect peer matches the MD5 key, not the AO key); however the symmetric race exists and a maintainer touching this code should not have to think about which branch escapes RCU and which one does not. [also credits to Qihang, who found that this races with tcp-diag]

Where it lives

The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.

net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
net/ipv4/tcp_output.c

What this is
NETWORKING [TCP]MAINTAINERS section matched on net/ipv4/tcp*.c · netdev@vger.kernel.org · Maintained

Check it on the machine

grep -w CONFIG_INET /boot/config-$(uname -r)

Reads the booted kernel's own configuration, on the machine and nowhere else. =y is built in, =m is a module, and an is not set line means the code is not there.

Show whether Debian builds this, per release

Debian builds this code. Every release below compiles the affected file into the kernels it ships.

  • bookworm, trixie, forky, sidy
y
built into the kernel image on every flavour - only a patch removes it
Build switch
CONFIG_INET

From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS kbuild Makefiles Debian linux-config packages

Signals

Published
2026-08-15 (2 months ago)source
CVSS
9.8 critical
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hsource recompute it
Attack vector
network (AV:N)source
EPSS
0.63%, higher than 49.2% of all CVEssource
CISA KEV
not listedthe KEV catalogue
Debian urgency
unimportantsource
Subsystem
net/ipv4

Upstream fixes

The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source

IntroducedFixed inCommit
6.186.18.4033a1bee41362
6.187.1.5da48b9bf1eb9
6.187.2b74cd5503890

Why the CNA scored it this way

Quoted from the kernel CNA's own scoring file, word for word. A highlighted metric carries the most severe value CVSS v3.1 defines for it, which is what pushes the score up. source

AV:NAttack vector, network
The UAF is driven by a race between tcp_connect() freeing MD5 keys and softirq RX handlers (tcp_v4_rcv→tcp_inbound_hash→__tcp_md5_do_lookup) on an ehashed SYN_SENT socket; forged inbound TCP segments reach this path over the network, matching internet-facing BGP/TCP-AO peers.
AC:LAttack complexity, low
The attacker controls both sides of the race by calling connect() while concurrently spraying TCP segments (raw sockets or as the remote peer) at the socket 4-tuple; no victim-dependent timing or memory layout is required beyond standard heap reuse inherent to slab UAF.
PR:NPrivileges required, none
Exploitation needs no host root: a remote BGP/TCP peer can send segments during the victim's outbound connect, and the demonstrated userns repro uses only uid=1000 with CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_NEWNET caps to install TCP_MD5/TCP-AO keys and trigger the race.
UI:NUser interaction, none
No end-user action is required; the bug fires during automated connect() handling (e.g., BGP session establishment) concurrent with inbound packet processing, without anyone opening files or confirming prompts.
S:UScope, unchanged
Impact is confined to kernel memory integrity/availability on the affected host; it does not cross VM, container, or IOMMU security boundaries into another authority.
C:HConfidentiality impact, high
Concurrent hlist_for_each_entry_rcu() over tcp_md5sig_key objects that are being kfree()'d is a slab use-after-free; freed key memory can be reallocated and read during RCU traversal, enabling kernel information disclosure.
I:HIntegrity impact, high
The per-key UAF corrupts RCU list traversal in softirq and allows attacker-influenced slab reuse, providing a standard path to heap grooming and arbitrary kernel write or control-flow hijack.
A:HAvailability impact, high
The symmetric TCP-AO connect race in the same window produces kernel GPF/oops in softirq (KASAN wild-memory-access); this MD5-key UAF in the identical SYN_SENT/ehash race window can panic or hang the system.