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CVE-2026-72122

can: bcm: fix lockless bound/ifindex race and silent RX_SETUP failure

7.3 EPSS 0.2% AV:L

Published 2026-08-15 (2 months ago) by the Linux kernel CNA. Subsystem net/can. Debian urgency: not yet assigned.

What to do, per Debian release

Debian's own status for CVE-2026-72122 in every release this site tracks, and what each one means in practice. Every status below is the one the Debian Security Team publishes for this CVE. source

ReleaseStatus VersionWhat this means
Debian 12bookwormfixed6.1.180-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 6.1.180-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian 13trixiefixed6.12.100-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 6.12.100-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian 14forkyfixed7.1.5-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.1.5-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian unstablesidfixed7.1.5-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.1.5-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.

The vulnerability

What the bug is

bcm_sendmsg() reads bo->ifindex and checks bo->bound before taking lock_sock(), while bcm_notify(), bcm_connect() and bcm_release() all mutate both fields under that same lock. Because the lockless reads and the locked writes are unordered with respect to each other, a racing bcm_notify() (device unregister) or bcm_connect() (concurrent bind on another thread sharing the socket) can make bcm_sendmsg() observe an inconsistent combination, e.g. a stale bound=1 together with the now-cleared ifindex=0, silently turning a socket bound to a specific CAN interface into one that also matches "any" interface. Keep the lockless bo->bound check purely as a fast-path reject, and move the ifindex read (and a bo->bound re-check) into the locked section, where every writer already serializes. This removes the possibility of observing the two fields torn against each other, rather than trying to fix it with more READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() pairs on two independently updated fields. Annotate the now-purely-lockless bo->bound accesses consistently across all its write sites. Also fix bcm_rx_setup() silently returning success when the target device disappears concurrently instead of reporting -ENODEV, so a broken RX op is no longer left registered as if it had succeeded.

Where it lives

The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.

net/can/bcm.c

What this is
CAN NETWORK LAYERMAINTAINERS section matched on net/can/ · linux-can@vger.kernel.org · Maintained
Kernel module
can_bcm

Check it on the machine

grep -wE 'CONFIG_CAN|CONFIG_CAN_BCM' /boot/config-$(uname -r)

Reads the booted kernel's own configuration, on the machine and nowhere else. =y is built in, =m is a module, and an is not set line means the code is not there.

lsmod | grep -w can_bcm

Prints a line if that module is loaded right now, and nothing if it is not. One that is not loaded can still be loaded later by anything that needs it.

Show whether Debian builds this, per release

Debian builds this, but not on every flavour. At least one release below builds the code on some of its kernel flavours and not on others, so the answer depends on the architecture and flavour installed.

  • bookworm, trixie, forky, sidMnot built on amd64/cloud-amd64, arm64/cloud-arm64
M
a module where it is built at all; some flavours do not build it
Build switches
CONFIG_CAN, CONFIG_CAN_BCM
Reads as
all on means the file is compiled; any one off means it is not.

From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS kbuild Makefiles Debian linux-config packages

Signals

Published
2026-08-15 (2 months ago)source
CVSS
7.3 high
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Lsource recompute it
Attack vector
local (AV:L)source
EPSS
0.16%, higher than 5.3% of all CVEssource
CISA KEV
not listedthe KEV catalogue
Debian urgency
not yet assignedsource
Subsystem
net/can

Upstream fixes

The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source

IntroducedFixed inCommit
2.6.255.10.2619e60c586faea
2.6.255.15.212ffa80a2af27c
2.6.256.1.1786bcc5cd247c2
2.6.256.6.1450f6f9f95294b
2.6.256.12.97b70f1a15533a
2.6.256.18.4035f0ac19efb1
2.6.257.1.5b9c6ac6fb4e0
2.6.257.2d9b091d9d22f

Why the CNA scored it this way

Quoted from the kernel CNA's own scoring file, word for word. A highlighted metric carries the most severe value CVSS v3.1 defines for it, which is what pushes the score up. source

AV:LAttack vector, local
Exploitation requires local access to a PF_CAN SOCK_DGRAM CAN_BCM socket via sendmsg()/connect() syscalls; the race is in kernel socket state handling, not in remote packet reception or the physical CAN bus itself.
AC:LAttack complexity, low
The attacker controls both sides of the race by concurrently calling sendmsg() on one thread while triggering bcm_connect() or NETDEV_UNREGISTER (e.g. ip link del) on another, making the torn bound/ifindex observation reliably triggerable.
PR:LPrivileges required, low
No real-root capability is required beyond opening BCM sockets and binding to a CAN interface; unprivileged users with CAN access or CAP_NET_ADMIN via user namespaces can create vcan devices and drive the unregister/connect race.
UI:NUser interaction, none
Exploitation is fully attacker-driven through concurrent syscalls and does not require any victim user action such as mounting filesystems or opening files.
S:UScope, unchanged
The impact is unauthorized access to additional CAN interfaces within the same kernel security domain, not a cross-boundary escape such as VM breakout, sandbox escape, or IOMMU bypass.
C:HConfidentiality impact, high
Racing to observe bound=1 with ifindex=0 causes RX_SETUP to register can_rx_register() on all CAN devices, letting a socket bound to one interface sniff traffic from every other CAN bus on the system including safety-critical vehicle or industrial networks.
I:HIntegrity impact, high
The same torn state enables TX_SETUP/TX_SEND on arbitrary interfaces via msg_name when per-socket binding would normally block it, allowing injection of attacker-controlled CAN frames onto buses the process was not authorized to transmit on.
A:LAvailability impact, low
The concurrent bcm_rx_setup() bug can silently return success without registering a filter when the target device vanishes, degrading CAN monitoring reliability without causing kernel panic, oops, or deadlock.