Look up another CVE · open CVE-2026-72122 in the interactive tracker
CVE-2026-72122
can: bcm: fix lockless bound/ifindex race and silent RX_SETUP failure
Published 2026-08-15 (2 months ago) by the Linux kernel CNA. Subsystem net/can. Debian urgency: not yet assigned.
What to do, per Debian release
Debian's own status for CVE-2026-72122 in every release this site tracks, and what each one means in practice. Every status below is the one the Debian Security Team publishes for this CVE. source
| Release | Status | Version | What this means |
|---|---|---|---|
| Debian 12bookworm | fixed | 6.1.180-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 6.1.180-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
| Debian 13trixie | fixed | 6.12.100-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 6.12.100-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
| Debian 14forky | fixed | 7.1.5-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.1.5-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
| Debian unstablesid | fixed | 7.1.5-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.1.5-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
The vulnerability
What the bug is
bcm_sendmsg() reads bo->ifindex and checks bo->bound before taking lock_sock(), while bcm_notify(), bcm_connect() and bcm_release() all mutate both fields under that same lock. Because the lockless reads and the locked writes are unordered with respect to each other, a racing bcm_notify() (device unregister) or bcm_connect() (concurrent bind on another thread sharing the socket) can make bcm_sendmsg() observe an inconsistent combination, e.g. a stale bound=1 together with the now-cleared ifindex=0, silently turning a socket bound to a specific CAN interface into one that also matches "any" interface. Keep the lockless bo->bound check purely as a fast-path reject, and move the ifindex read (and a bo->bound re-check) into the locked section, where every writer already serializes. This removes the possibility of observing the two fields torn against each other, rather than trying to fix it with more READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() pairs on two independently updated fields. Annotate the now-purely-lockless bo->bound accesses consistently across all its write sites. Also fix bcm_rx_setup() silently returning success when the target device disappears concurrently instead of reporting -ENODEV, so a broken RX op is no longer left registered as if it had succeeded.
Where it lives
The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.
net/can/bcm.c
- What this is
- CAN NETWORK LAYERMAINTAINERS section matched on net/can/ · linux-can@vger.kernel.org · Maintained
- Kernel module
- can_bcm
Check it on the machine
grep -wE 'CONFIG_CAN|CONFIG_CAN_BCM' /boot/config-$(uname -r)Reads the booted kernel's own configuration, on the machine and nowhere else. =y is built in, =m is a module, and an is not set line means the code is not there.
lsmod | grep -w can_bcmPrints a line if that module is loaded right now, and nothing if it is not. One that is not loaded can still be loaded later by anything that needs it.
Show whether Debian builds this, per release
Debian builds this, but not on every flavour. At least one release below builds the code on some of its kernel flavours and not on others, so the answer depends on the architecture and flavour installed.
- bookworm, trixie, forky, sidMnot built on amd64/cloud-amd64, arm64/cloud-arm64
- M
- a module where it is built at all; some flavours do not build it
- Build switches
- CONFIG_CAN, CONFIG_CAN_BCM
- Reads as
- all on means the file is compiled; any one off means it is not.
From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS kbuild Makefiles Debian linux-config packages
Signals
- Published
- 2026-08-15 (2 months ago)source
- CVSS
- 7.3 high
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Lsource recompute it - Attack vector
- local (AV:L)source
- EPSS
- 0.16%, higher than 5.3% of all CVEssource
- CISA KEV
- not listedthe KEV catalogue
- Debian urgency
- not yet assignedsource
- Subsystem
- net/can
Upstream fixes
The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source
| Introduced | Fixed in | Commit |
|---|---|---|
| 2.6.25 | 5.10.261 | 9e60c586faea |
| 2.6.25 | 5.15.212 | ffa80a2af27c |
| 2.6.25 | 6.1.178 | 6bcc5cd247c2 |
| 2.6.25 | 6.6.145 | 0f6f9f95294b |
| 2.6.25 | 6.12.97 | b70f1a15533a |
| 2.6.25 | 6.18.40 | 35f0ac19efb1 |
| 2.6.25 | 7.1.5 | b9c6ac6fb4e0 |
| 2.6.25 | 7.2 | d9b091d9d22f |
Why the CNA scored it this way
Quoted from the kernel CNA's own scoring file, word for word. A highlighted metric carries the most severe value CVSS v3.1 defines for it, which is what pushes the score up. source
- AV:LAttack vector, local
- Exploitation requires local access to a PF_CAN SOCK_DGRAM CAN_BCM socket via sendmsg()/connect() syscalls; the race is in kernel socket state handling, not in remote packet reception or the physical CAN bus itself.
- AC:LAttack complexity, low
- The attacker controls both sides of the race by concurrently calling sendmsg() on one thread while triggering bcm_connect() or NETDEV_UNREGISTER (e.g. ip link del) on another, making the torn bound/ifindex observation reliably triggerable.
- PR:LPrivileges required, low
- No real-root capability is required beyond opening BCM sockets and binding to a CAN interface; unprivileged users with CAN access or CAP_NET_ADMIN via user namespaces can create vcan devices and drive the unregister/connect race.
- UI:NUser interaction, none
- Exploitation is fully attacker-driven through concurrent syscalls and does not require any victim user action such as mounting filesystems or opening files.
- S:UScope, unchanged
- The impact is unauthorized access to additional CAN interfaces within the same kernel security domain, not a cross-boundary escape such as VM breakout, sandbox escape, or IOMMU bypass.
- C:HConfidentiality impact, high
- Racing to observe bound=1 with ifindex=0 causes RX_SETUP to register can_rx_register() on all CAN devices, letting a socket bound to one interface sniff traffic from every other CAN bus on the system including safety-critical vehicle or industrial networks.
- I:HIntegrity impact, high
- The same torn state enables TX_SETUP/TX_SEND on arbitrary interfaces via msg_name when per-socket binding would normally block it, allowing injection of attacker-controlled CAN frames onto buses the process was not authorized to transmit on.
- A:LAvailability impact, low
- The concurrent bcm_rx_setup() bug can silently return success without registering a filter when the target device vanishes, degrading CAN monitoring reliability without causing kernel panic, oops, or deadlock.