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CVE-2026-72046

gve: fix header buffer corruption with header-split and HW-GRO

9.8 EPSS 0.6% AV:N

Published 2026-08-15 (2 months ago) by the Linux kernel CNA. Subsystem drivers/net. Debian urgency: unimportant.

What to do, per Debian release

Debian's own status for CVE-2026-72046 in every release this site tracks, and what each one means in practice. Every status below is the one the Debian Security Team publishes for this CVE. source

ReleaseStatus VersionWhat this means
Debian 12bookwormnot affected6.1.190-1Nothing to do. bookworm never shipped the vulnerable code.
Debian 13trixiefixed6.12.101-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 6.12.101-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian 14forkyfixed7.1.5-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.1.5-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian unstablesidfixed7.1.5-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.1.5-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian 12bookworm · linux-6.12fixedDLA-4745-1 · 2026-08-18 · text6.12.101-1~deb12u1Update the kernel and reboot. DLA-4745-1 shipped the fix on 2026-08-18, in 6.12.101-1~deb12u1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.

The vulnerability

What the bug is

The DQO RX datapath programs a per-buffer-queue-descriptor header_buf_addr at post time and reads the split header back at completion time. Both the post and the read currently index the header buffer by queue position rather than by the buffer's identity: - post (gve_rx_post_buffers_dqo): header_buf_addr is computed from bufq->tail - read (gve_rx_dqo): the header is read from desc_idx (the completion queue head index) This relies on the buffer-queue index and the completion-queue index being equal for the start of every packet, i.e. on the device consuming posted buffers and returning completions in the exact same order. That assumption does not hold once HW-GRO is enabled with multiple flows: coalesced segments are accepted and completed in an order that may differ from the order buffers were posted, and segments from different flows may interleave. That results in two problems: 1. Wrong header slot on read. Because the read offset is derived from the completion index (desc_idx) while the device wrote the header to the address programmed for the buffer's buf_id, the driver can copy a header belonging to a different packet. This shows up as throughput drop (about 30% drop and large numbers of TCP retransmissions) with header-split and HW-GRO both enabled and many streams. 2. Header buffer reused while still owned by the device. The driver advances bufq->head by one per completion and re-posts buffers based on that. Arrival of N RX completions only guarantees that at least N RX buffer descriptors have been read by the device. It does not guarantee that the device has relinquished the ownership of all the buffers corresponding to those N descriptors. With out-of-order completions (e.g. the completion for a packet copied into buffer N arrives before the completion for a packet copied into buffer N-1), the driver can re-post and overwrite a header buffer that the device is still going to write into, corrupting the header of a packet whose completion has not yet been processed. Fix both issues by indexing the header buffer by buf_id on both the post and read paths. Reading from buf_id's slot is therefore always correct regardless of completion ordering (fixes problem 1). Indexing by buf_id also ties each header slot to the lifetime of its buffer state. A buffer state is only returned to the free/recycle lists when its own completion (buf_id) is processed, so its header slot can only be re-posted after the device is done with it. This makes header slot reuse safe under out-of-order completions (fixes problem 2). Allocate (gve_rx_alloc_hdr_bufs) and free (gve_rx_free_hdr_bufs) the header buffers based on num_buf_states to match the buf_id indexing.

Where it lives

The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.

drivers/net/ethernet/google/gve/gve_rx_dqo.c

What this is
GOOGLE ETHERNET DRIVERSMAINTAINERS section matched on drivers/net/ethernet/google · netdev@vger.kernel.org · Maintained
Kernel module
gve

Check it on the machine

grep -wE 'CONFIG_ETHERNET|CONFIG_GVE|CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_GOOGLE' /boot/config-$(uname -r)

Reads the booted kernel's own configuration, on the machine and nowhere else. =y is built in, =m is a module, and an is not set line means the code is not there.

lsmod | grep -w gve

Prints a line if that module is loaded right now, and nothing if it is not. One that is not loaded can still be loaded later by anything that needs it.

Show whether Debian builds this, per release

Debian builds this, but not on every flavour. At least one release below builds the code on some of its kernel flavours and not on others, so the answer depends on the architecture and flavour installed.

  • bookwormMnot built on armhf/armmp, armhf/armmp-lpae, armhf/rt/armmp, i386/686, i386/686-pae, i386/rt/686-pae, ppc64el/powerpc64le
  • trixieMnot built on armel/rpi, armhf/armmp, armhf/armmp-lpae, armhf/rt/armmp, ppc64el/powerpc64le, ppc64el/powerpc64le-64k, riscv64/riscv64, s390x/s390x
  • forky, sidMnot built on armhf/armmp, armhf/armmp-lpae, loong64/loong64, ppc64el/powerpc64le, ppc64el/powerpc64le-64k, riscv64/riscv64, s390x/s390x
  • bookworm · linux-6.12Mnot built on armhf/armmp, armhf/armmp-lpae, armhf/rt/armmp, ppc64el/powerpc64le, ppc64el/powerpc64le-64k
M
a module where it is built at all; some flavours do not build it
Build switches
CONFIG_ETHERNET, CONFIG_GVE, CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_GOOGLE
Reads as
all on means the file is compiled; any one off means it is not.

From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS kbuild Makefiles Debian linux-config packages

Signals

Published
2026-08-15 (2 months ago)source
CVSS
9.8 critical
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hsource recompute it
Attack vector
network (AV:N)source
EPSS
0.64%, higher than 49.4% of all CVEssource
CISA KEV
not listedthe KEV catalogue
Debian urgency
unimportantsource
Subsystem
drivers/net

Upstream fixes

The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source

IntroducedFixed inCommit
6.96.12.10184d3753d4bf2
6.96.18.4035267819b250
6.97.1.59f8e7f59b0c2
6.97.2d676c9a73bdc

Debian advisories

AdvisoryDateShipped toDebian
DLA-4745-12026-08-18bookworm 6.12.101-1~deb12u1tracker

Why the CNA scored it this way

Quoted from the kernel CNA's own scoring file, word for word. A highlighted metric carries the most severe value CVSS v3.1 defines for it, which is what pushes the score up. source

AV:NAttack vector, network
The flaw is in the GVE driver RX NAPI path triggered by incoming network frames; a remote peer can reach gve_rx_dqo()/gve_rx_post_buffers_dqo() by sending TCP traffic to an internet-facing GVE interface (e.g., GCP VM) without local access.
AC:LAttack complexity, low
Once header-split and HW-GRO are enabled, an attacker can reliably trigger out-of-order HW-GRO completions by opening many concurrent TCP flows to the target; no race against uncontrollable victim state is required beyond normal multi-stream traffic patterns.
PR:NPrivileges required, none
Exploitation requires only the ability to send network packets to the host; no local account, capabilities, or authentication on the victim is needed. Header-split being enabled is victim configuration, not attacker privilege.
UI:NUser interaction, none
No victim user action is required during exploitation beyond the host already receiving network traffic on its GVE interface; the attacker does not depend on the user mounting filesystems or opening files.
S:UScope, unchanged
Impact is confined to the guest kernel network stack and driver DMA header buffers on the affected VM; it does not cross a VM/host or IOMMU security boundary to affect the hypervisor or other tenants.
C:HConfidentiality impact, high
Out-of-order completions cause the driver to read the wrong header slot, mixing headers between packets/flows and disclosing other connections' L3/L4 header bytes; premature header-buffer reuse also corrupts DMA data the driver later copies into skbs.
I:HIntegrity impact, high
The driver can repost and overwrite header DMA buffers while the device is still writing them, corrupting packet headers fed into the stack; wrong headers paired with payloads can break protocol parsing and constitutes exploitable kernel memory corruption.
A:HAvailability impact, high
The bug causes severe TCP throughput collapse, massive retransmissions, and dropped/corrupted packets; header-buffer corruption and malformed skbs can also destabilize the kernel RX path and cause oopses or loss of network availability on the host.