Look up another CVE · open CVE-2026-68445 in the interactive tracker
CVE-2026-68445
drm/vc4: Prevent shader BO mappings from becoming writable
Published 2026-08-12 (2 months ago) by the Linux kernel CNA. Subsystem drivers/gpu. Debian urgency: not yet assigned.
What to do, per Debian release
Debian's own status for CVE-2026-68445 in every release this site tracks, and what each one means in practice. Every status below is the one the Debian Security Team publishes for this CVE. source
| Release | Status | Version | What this means |
|---|---|---|---|
| Debian 12bookworm | vulnerable | 6.1.190-1 | No fix published anywhere yet, neither in Debian nor upstream for the series bookworm tracks. Watch the Debian tracker page for this CVE. Advisories for bookworm have historically landed a median of 23 days after publication. |
| Debian 13trixie | fixed | 6.12.101-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 6.12.101-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
| Debian 14forky | fixed | 7.1.6-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.1.6-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
| Debian unstablesid | fixed | 7.1.6-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.1.6-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
| Debian 12bookworm · linux-6.12 | fixedDLA-4745-1 · 2026-08-18 · text | 6.12.101-1~deb12u1 | Update the kernel and reboot. DLA-4745-1 shipped the fix on 2026-08-18, in 6.12.101-1~deb12u1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
The vulnerability
What the bug is
vc4_gem_object_mmap() rejects a writable mapping of a validated shader BO, but leaves VM_MAYWRITE set. Userspace can map the BO read-only and then turn it writable with mprotect(). Validated shader BOs must stay read-only: the validator checks the instructions once and the GPU trusts them afterwards. A writable mapping lets userspace rewrite the code after validation, bypassing the validator. Clear VM_MAYWRITE on the read-only path so the mapping cannot be upgraded, as i915 already does for its read-only objects.
Where it lives
The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.
drivers/gpu/drm/vc4/vc4_bo.c
- What this is
- DRM DRIVERS FOR VC4MAINTAINERS section matched on drivers/gpu/drm/vc4/ · Supported
- Kernel module
- vc4
Check it on the machine
grep -w CONFIG_DRM_VC4 /boot/config-$(uname -r)Reads the booted kernel's own configuration, on the machine and nowhere else. =y is built in, =m is a module, and an is not set line means the code is not there.
lsmod | grep -w vc4Prints a line if that module is loaded right now, and nothing if it is not. One that is not loaded can still be loaded later by anything that needs it.
Show whether Debian builds this, per release
Debian builds this, but not on every flavour. At least one release below builds the code on some of its kernel flavours and not on others, so the answer depends on the architecture and flavour installed.
- bookwormMnot built on amd64/amd64, amd64/cloud-amd64, amd64/rt/amd64, arm64/cloud-arm64, i386/686, i386/686-pae, i386/rt/686-pae, ppc64el/powerpc64le
- trixieMnot built on amd64/amd64, amd64/cloud-amd64, amd64/rt/amd64, arm64/cloud-arm64, ppc64el/powerpc64le, ppc64el/powerpc64le-64k, riscv64/riscv64, s390x/s390x
- forky, sidMnot built on amd64/amd64, amd64/cloud-amd64, amd64/rt-amd64, arm64/cloud-arm64, loong64/loong64, ppc64el/powerpc64le, ppc64el/powerpc64le-64k, riscv64/riscv64, s390x/s390x
- bookworm · linux-6.12Mnot built on amd64/amd64, amd64/cloud-amd64, amd64/rt/amd64, arm64/cloud-arm64, ppc64el/powerpc64le, ppc64el/powerpc64le-64k
- M
- a module where it is built at all; some flavours do not build it
- Build switch
- CONFIG_DRM_VC4
From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS kbuild Makefiles Debian linux-config packages
Signals
- Published
- 2026-08-12 (2 months ago)source
- CVSS
- 7.8 high
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hsource recompute it - Attack vector
- local (AV:L)source
- EPSS
- 0.13%, higher than 2.1% of all CVEssource
- CISA KEV
- not listedthe KEV catalogue
- Debian urgency
- not yet assignedsource
- Subsystem
- drivers/gpu
Upstream fixes
The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source
| Introduced | Fixed in | Commit |
|---|---|---|
| 4.5 | 6.6.148 | 9f0ee411fc2d |
| 4.5 | 6.12.101 | 019e6ad247f7 |
| 4.5 | 6.18.42 | 6deaa3172018 |
| 4.5 | 7.1.6 | fe168ef1d232 |
| 4.5 | 7.2 | 0c9e63676395 |
Debian advisories
| Advisory | Date | Shipped to | Debian |
|---|---|---|---|
| DLA-4745-1 | 2026-08-18 | bookworm 6.12.101-1~deb12u1 | tracker |
Why the CNA scored it this way
Quoted from the kernel CNA's own scoring file, word for word. A highlighted metric carries the most severe value CVSS v3.1 defines for it, which is what pushes the score up. source
- AV:LAttack vector, local
- Exploitation requires local access to the vc4 DRM render node (/dev/dri/renderD*) to issue VC4_CREATE_SHADER_BO, VC4_MMAP_BO, mmap/mprotect and VC4_SUBMIT_CL; there is no remote or network-facing path to this code.
- AC:LAttack complexity, low
- The attacker fully controls every step: create a shader that passes validation, map it PROT_READ, upgrade it with mprotect(PROT_WRITE), rewrite the instructions and submit. There is no race, no memory-layout dependency, and it works on the default configuration of any VC4 (Raspberry Pi) system.
- PR:LPrivileges required, low
- VC4_CREATE_SHADER_BO, VC4_MMAP_BO and VC4_SUBMIT_CL are all DRM_RENDER_ALLOW ioctls, so an ordinary unprivileged user with render-node access (the default for logged-in/graphical users on Raspberry Pi and embedded VC4 devices) can perform the whole sequence. No capability check is involved.
- UI:NUser interaction, none
- The attacking process performs the entire sequence itself; no action by another user or administrator is needed.
- S:UScope, unchanged
- The vulnerable driver and the compromised resource (kernel/system memory) are both under the kernel's security authority; this is a standard local kernel privilege escalation rather than a VM or hypervisor boundary escape.
- C:HConfidentiality impact, high
- Post-validation rewriting of shader code lets the GPU, which has no IOMMU on VC4, read arbitrary system memory via texture, uniform and direct-addressed TMU lookups — exactly the disclosure the validator exists to prevent, giving arbitrary kernel memory read.
- I:HIntegrity impact, high
- Unvalidated QPU code can use the VPM write address register in general-purpose DMA mode to write to arbitrary physical addresses, an arbitrary kernel-memory write primitive that yields full privilege escalation and code execution.
- A:HAvailability impact, high
- The same arbitrary DMA writes and unbounded shader execution readily corrupt kernel structures or hang the GPU, causing kernel panics or a full system hang triggerable at will by an unprivileged user.