data built 2026-10-19T13:16:53Z

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CVE-2026-68391

Bluetooth: mgmt: hold reference for hci_conn in mgmt_pending_cmds

7.8 EPSS 0.1% AV:L

Published 2026-08-10 (2 months ago) by the Linux kernel CNA. Subsystem net/bluetooth. Debian urgency: not yet assigned.

What to do, per Debian release

Debian's own status for CVE-2026-68391 in every release this site tracks, and what each one means in practice. Every status below is the one the Debian Security Team publishes for this CVE. source

ReleaseStatus VersionWhat this means
Debian 12bookwormfixedDLA-4841-1 · 2026-10-17 · text6.1.190-1Update the kernel and reboot. DLA-4841-1 shipped the fix on 2026-10-17, in 6.1.190-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian 13trixiefixed6.12.101-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 6.12.101-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian 14forkyfixed7.1.6-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.1.6-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian unstablesidfixed7.1.6-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.1.6-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian 12bookworm · linux-6.12fixedDLA-4745-1 · 2026-08-18 · text6.12.101-1~deb12u1Update the kernel and reboot. DLA-4745-1 shipped the fix on 2026-08-18, in 6.12.101-1~deb12u1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.

The vulnerability

What the bug is

Dereferencing RCU-protected pointers outside critical sections is invalid and may lead to UAF. Use of hci_conn in hci_sync callbacks also needs to hold refcount to avoid UAF. Take appropriate locks for hci_conn lookups, and take refcount for hci_conn pointers stored in mgmt_pending_cmd so that the pointer stays valid. When accessing conn->state, ensure hdev->lock is held to avoid data race.

Where it lives

The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.

net/bluetooth/mgmt.c

What this is
BLUETOOTH SUBSYSTEMMAINTAINERS section matched on net/bluetooth/ · linux-bluetooth@vger.kernel.org · Supported
Kernel module
bluetooth

Check it on the machine

grep -w CONFIG_BT /boot/config-$(uname -r)

Reads the booted kernel's own configuration, on the machine and nowhere else. =y is built in, =m is a module, and an is not set line means the code is not there.

lsmod | grep -w bluetooth

Prints a line if that module is loaded right now, and nothing if it is not. One that is not loaded can still be loaded later by anything that needs it.

Show whether Debian builds this, per release

Debian builds this, but not on every flavour. At least one release below builds the code on some of its kernel flavours and not on others, so the answer depends on the architecture and flavour installed.

  • bookwormMnot built on amd64/cloud-amd64, arm64/cloud-arm64
  • trixie, forky, sidMnot built on amd64/cloud-amd64, arm64/cloud-arm64, s390x/s390x
  • bookworm · linux-6.12Mnot built on amd64/cloud-amd64, arm64/cloud-arm64
M
a module where it is built at all; some flavours do not build it
Build switch
CONFIG_BT

From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS kbuild Makefiles Debian linux-config packages

Signals

Published
2026-08-10 (2 months ago)source
CVSS
7.8 high
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hsource recompute it
Attack vector
local (AV:L)source
EPSS
0.13%, higher than 2.3% of all CVEssource
CISA KEV
not listedthe KEV catalogue
Debian urgency
not yet assignedsource
Subsystem
net/bluetooth

Upstream fixes

The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source

IntroducedFixed inCommit
6.06.1.18984674dd1d319
6.06.6.148b56f2ecafc08
6.06.12.101f915e74b6f18
6.06.18.42d5b3b484b62b
6.07.1.6ecdcb55ea1c0
6.07.2da55f570191d

Debian advisories

AdvisoryDateShipped toDebian
DLA-4841-12026-10-17bookworm 6.1.190-1tracker
DLA-4745-12026-08-18bookworm 6.12.101-1~deb12u1tracker

Why the CNA scored it this way

Quoted from the kernel CNA's own scoring file, word for word. A highlighted metric carries the most severe value CVSS v3.1 defines for it, which is what pushes the score up. source

AV:LAttack vector, local
Both sides of the race are local: the vulnerable path is entered only by writing MGMT_OP_GET_CONN_INFO/MGMT_OP_GET_CLOCK_INFO to an AF_BLUETOOTH/BTPROTO_HCI socket bound to HCI_CHANNEL_CONTROL, and the free is driven by a local disconnect/device-teardown. A remote or adjacent Bluetooth peer cannot inject mgmt commands, so the vector is local even though the subsystem is Bluetooth.
AC:LAttack complexity, low
The attacker owns both sides of the race: one thread loops GET_CONN_INFO/GET_CLOCK_INFO, whose sync callback blocks in __hci_cmd_sync waiting on the controller for up to HCI_CMD_TIMEOUT, while another issues MGMT_OP_DISCONNECT or HCIDEVDOWN to free the hci_conn inside that wide window; with an emulated controller the response timing is fully controlled, and the sequence can be retried indefinitely.
PR:LPrivileges required, low
The opcodes lack HCI_MGMT_UNTRUSTED so they need a trusted mgmt socket (CAP_NET_ADMIN), which kernel CNA practice for the Bluetooth mgmt interface treats as low privilege: it is a delegable capability held by the non-root bluetoothd service account and Android's sandboxed Bluetooth process rather than full init-namespace root.
UI:NUser interaction, none
The attacker performs every step itself — queueing the mgmt command and tearing down the connection or the HCI index — with no victim action, pairing, or user-initiated Bluetooth operation required.
S:UScope, unchanged
The use-after-free and the resulting heap corruption stay entirely within the kernel's own security authority; no VM, IOMMU, or sandbox boundary is crossed.
C:HConfidentiality impact, high
get_conn_info_complete()/get_clock_info_complete() read rssi, tx_power, max_tx_power, clock and clock_accuracy from a freed hci_conn and return them to userspace over the mgmt socket; hci_conn comes from a general-purpose kmalloc cache, so grooming the reclaimed slab turns this into a repeatable kernel-memory disclosure oracle.
I:HIntegrity impact, high
The dangling cmd->user_data points at a freed, sprayable struct-device-embedded object that can be reclaimed with attacker-shaped data and is later put/released, and the unlocked lookup also propagates a stale conn->handle into hci_read_rssi_sync/hci_read_clock_sync so the host acts on a handle that may have been reused by another link — sufficient for controlled corruption after heap grooming.
A:HAvailability impact, high
Dereferencing the freed hci_conn in the hci_cmd_sync completion callback is a slab use-after-free that produces a KASAN splat and can oops or panic the kernel when the slab has been returned to the page allocator, and it can be re-triggered in a loop for sustained denial of service.