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CVE-2026-68391
Bluetooth: mgmt: hold reference for hci_conn in mgmt_pending_cmds
Published 2026-08-10 (2 months ago) by the Linux kernel CNA. Subsystem net/bluetooth. Debian urgency: not yet assigned.
What to do, per Debian release
Debian's own status for CVE-2026-68391 in every release this site tracks, and what each one means in practice. Every status below is the one the Debian Security Team publishes for this CVE. source
| Release | Status | Version | What this means |
|---|---|---|---|
| Debian 12bookworm | fixedDLA-4841-1 · 2026-10-17 · text | 6.1.190-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. DLA-4841-1 shipped the fix on 2026-10-17, in 6.1.190-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
| Debian 13trixie | fixed | 6.12.101-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 6.12.101-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
| Debian 14forky | fixed | 7.1.6-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.1.6-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
| Debian unstablesid | fixed | 7.1.6-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.1.6-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
| Debian 12bookworm · linux-6.12 | fixedDLA-4745-1 · 2026-08-18 · text | 6.12.101-1~deb12u1 | Update the kernel and reboot. DLA-4745-1 shipped the fix on 2026-08-18, in 6.12.101-1~deb12u1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
The vulnerability
What the bug is
Dereferencing RCU-protected pointers outside critical sections is invalid and may lead to UAF. Use of hci_conn in hci_sync callbacks also needs to hold refcount to avoid UAF. Take appropriate locks for hci_conn lookups, and take refcount for hci_conn pointers stored in mgmt_pending_cmd so that the pointer stays valid. When accessing conn->state, ensure hdev->lock is held to avoid data race.
Where it lives
The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.
net/bluetooth/mgmt.c
- What this is
- BLUETOOTH SUBSYSTEMMAINTAINERS section matched on net/bluetooth/ · linux-bluetooth@vger.kernel.org · Supported
- Kernel module
- bluetooth
Check it on the machine
grep -w CONFIG_BT /boot/config-$(uname -r)Reads the booted kernel's own configuration, on the machine and nowhere else. =y is built in, =m is a module, and an is not set line means the code is not there.
lsmod | grep -w bluetoothPrints a line if that module is loaded right now, and nothing if it is not. One that is not loaded can still be loaded later by anything that needs it.
Show whether Debian builds this, per release
Debian builds this, but not on every flavour. At least one release below builds the code on some of its kernel flavours and not on others, so the answer depends on the architecture and flavour installed.
- bookwormMnot built on amd64/cloud-amd64, arm64/cloud-arm64
- trixie, forky, sidMnot built on amd64/cloud-amd64, arm64/cloud-arm64, s390x/s390x
- bookworm · linux-6.12Mnot built on amd64/cloud-amd64, arm64/cloud-arm64
- M
- a module where it is built at all; some flavours do not build it
- Build switch
- CONFIG_BT
From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS kbuild Makefiles Debian linux-config packages
Signals
- Published
- 2026-08-10 (2 months ago)source
- CVSS
- 7.8 high
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hsource recompute it - Attack vector
- local (AV:L)source
- EPSS
- 0.13%, higher than 2.3% of all CVEssource
- CISA KEV
- not listedthe KEV catalogue
- Debian urgency
- not yet assignedsource
- Subsystem
- net/bluetooth
Upstream fixes
The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source
| Introduced | Fixed in | Commit |
|---|---|---|
| 6.0 | 6.1.189 | 84674dd1d319 |
| 6.0 | 6.6.148 | b56f2ecafc08 |
| 6.0 | 6.12.101 | f915e74b6f18 |
| 6.0 | 6.18.42 | d5b3b484b62b |
| 6.0 | 7.1.6 | ecdcb55ea1c0 |
| 6.0 | 7.2 | da55f570191d |
Debian advisories
| Advisory | Date | Shipped to | Debian |
|---|---|---|---|
| DLA-4841-1 | 2026-10-17 | bookworm 6.1.190-1 | tracker |
| DLA-4745-1 | 2026-08-18 | bookworm 6.12.101-1~deb12u1 | tracker |
Why the CNA scored it this way
Quoted from the kernel CNA's own scoring file, word for word. A highlighted metric carries the most severe value CVSS v3.1 defines for it, which is what pushes the score up. source
- AV:LAttack vector, local
- Both sides of the race are local: the vulnerable path is entered only by writing MGMT_OP_GET_CONN_INFO/MGMT_OP_GET_CLOCK_INFO to an AF_BLUETOOTH/BTPROTO_HCI socket bound to HCI_CHANNEL_CONTROL, and the free is driven by a local disconnect/device-teardown. A remote or adjacent Bluetooth peer cannot inject mgmt commands, so the vector is local even though the subsystem is Bluetooth.
- AC:LAttack complexity, low
- The attacker owns both sides of the race: one thread loops GET_CONN_INFO/GET_CLOCK_INFO, whose sync callback blocks in __hci_cmd_sync waiting on the controller for up to HCI_CMD_TIMEOUT, while another issues MGMT_OP_DISCONNECT or HCIDEVDOWN to free the hci_conn inside that wide window; with an emulated controller the response timing is fully controlled, and the sequence can be retried indefinitely.
- PR:LPrivileges required, low
- The opcodes lack HCI_MGMT_UNTRUSTED so they need a trusted mgmt socket (CAP_NET_ADMIN), which kernel CNA practice for the Bluetooth mgmt interface treats as low privilege: it is a delegable capability held by the non-root bluetoothd service account and Android's sandboxed Bluetooth process rather than full init-namespace root.
- UI:NUser interaction, none
- The attacker performs every step itself — queueing the mgmt command and tearing down the connection or the HCI index — with no victim action, pairing, or user-initiated Bluetooth operation required.
- S:UScope, unchanged
- The use-after-free and the resulting heap corruption stay entirely within the kernel's own security authority; no VM, IOMMU, or sandbox boundary is crossed.
- C:HConfidentiality impact, high
- get_conn_info_complete()/get_clock_info_complete() read rssi, tx_power, max_tx_power, clock and clock_accuracy from a freed hci_conn and return them to userspace over the mgmt socket; hci_conn comes from a general-purpose kmalloc cache, so grooming the reclaimed slab turns this into a repeatable kernel-memory disclosure oracle.
- I:HIntegrity impact, high
- The dangling cmd->user_data points at a freed, sprayable struct-device-embedded object that can be reclaimed with attacker-shaped data and is later put/released, and the unlocked lookup also propagates a stale conn->handle into hci_read_rssi_sync/hci_read_clock_sync so the host acts on a handle that may have been reused by another link — sufficient for controlled corruption after heap grooming.
- A:HAvailability impact, high
- Dereferencing the freed hci_conn in the hci_cmd_sync completion callback is a slab use-after-free that produces a KASAN splat and can oops or panic the kernel when the slab has been returned to the page allocator, and it can be re-triggered in a loop for sustained denial of service.