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CVE-2026-68320
sctp: fix auth_chunk_list capacity check in sctp_auth_ep_add_chunkid
Published 2026-08-10 (2 months ago) by the Linux kernel CNA. Subsystem net/sctp. Debian urgency: not yet assigned.
What to do, per Debian release
Debian's own status for CVE-2026-68320 in every release this site tracks, and what each one means in practice. Every status below is the one the Debian Security Team publishes for this CVE. source
| Release | Status | Version | What this means |
|---|---|---|---|
| Debian 12bookworm | fixedDLA-4777-1 · 2026-09-08 · text | 6.1.187-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. DLA-4777-1 shipped the fix on 2026-09-08, in 6.1.187-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
| Debian 13trixie | fixed | 6.12.101-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 6.12.101-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
| Debian 14forky | fixed | 7.1.6-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.1.6-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
| Debian unstablesid | fixed | 7.1.6-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.1.6-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
| Debian 12bookworm · linux-6.12 | fixedDLA-4745-1 · 2026-08-18 · text | 6.12.101-1~deb12u1 | Update the kernel and reboot. DLA-4745-1 shipped the fix on 2026-08-18, in 6.12.101-1~deb12u1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
The vulnerability
What the bug is
sctp_auth_ep_add_chunkid() uses SCTP_NUM_CHUNK_TYPES (20) as the capacity limit for ep->auth_chunk_list, allowing it to hold up to 20 chunk entries (param_hdr.length up to 24). However, the copy destination asoc->c.auth_chunks in struct sctp_cookie is only SCTP_AUTH_MAX_CHUNKS (16) entries (20 bytes). When more than 16 chunks are added, sctp_association_init() memcpy overflows the destination by up to 4 bytes. Fix by using SCTP_AUTH_MAX_CHUNKS as the capacity limit, matching the destination capacity.
Where it lives
The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.
net/sctp/auth.c
- What this is
- SCTP PROTOCOLMAINTAINERS section matched on net/sctp/ · linux-sctp@vger.kernel.org · Maintained
- Kernel module
- sctp
Check it on the machine
grep -w CONFIG_IP_SCTP /boot/config-$(uname -r)Reads the booted kernel's own configuration, on the machine and nowhere else. =y is built in, =m is a module, and an is not set line means the code is not there.
lsmod | grep -w sctpPrints a line if that module is loaded right now, and nothing if it is not. One that is not loaded can still be loaded later by anything that needs it.
Show whether Debian builds this, per release
Debian builds this as a loadable module. Every release below compiles it as a module on every flavour, so whether the code is in the running kernel depends on whether that module is loaded.
- bookworm, trixie, forky, sid, bookworm · linux-6.12m
- m
- a loadable module on every flavour - check lsmod, can be blacklisted
- Build switch
- CONFIG_IP_SCTP
From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS kbuild Makefiles Debian linux-config packages
Signals
- Published
- 2026-08-10 (2 months ago)source
- CVSS
- 7.3 high
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:Hsource recompute it - Attack vector
- local (AV:L)source
- EPSS
- 0.13%, higher than 2.2% of all CVEssource
- CISA KEV
- not listedthe KEV catalogue
- Debian urgency
- not yet assignedsource
- Subsystem
- net/sctp
Upstream fixes
The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source
| Introduced | Fixed in | Commit |
|---|---|---|
| 2.6.24 | 5.10.265 | 3d22a7da2e26 |
| 2.6.24 | 5.15.216 | 6837c1c19a25 |
| 2.6.24 | 6.1.183 | 54bb4c03fa17 |
| 2.6.24 | 6.6.148 | 5a365f1e4234 |
| 2.6.24 | 6.12.101 | 886e28e14ab6 |
| 2.6.24 | 6.18.42 | 11092d79eb2b |
| 2.6.24 | 7.1.6 | b6ea3dda09eb |
| 2.6.24 | 7.2 | ff04b26794a1 |
Debian advisories
| Advisory | Date | Shipped to | Debian |
|---|---|---|---|
| DLA-4777-1 | 2026-09-08 | bookworm 6.1.187-1 | tracker |
| DLA-4745-1 | 2026-08-18 | bookworm 6.12.101-1~deb12u1 | tracker |
Why the CNA scored it this way
Quoted from the kernel CNA's own scoring file, word for word. A highlighted metric carries the most severe value CVSS v3.1 defines for it, which is what pushes the score up. source
- AV:LAttack vector, local
- The overflow condition can only be created locally: an attacker must call setsockopt(SCTP_AUTH_SUPPORTED) and then setsockopt(SCTP_AUTH_CHUNK) more than 16 times on an SCTP socket they own. A remote peer can trigger the memcpy by connecting to such a socket, but cannot itself populate the oversized chunk list.
- AC:LAttack complexity, low
- The sequence is fully deterministic and entirely under attacker control — enable AUTH, add 17-20 distinct chunk IDs, then create an association via connect() or accept(); no race, timing window, or memory-layout condition is involved.
- PR:LPrivileges required, low
- Creating an IPPROTO_SCTP socket and issuing SCTP_AUTH_SUPPORTED/SCTP_AUTH_CHUNK setsockopts requires no capability; sctp_setsockopt_auth_supported() enables AUTH per-endpoint regardless of the net.sctp.auth_enable sysctl, so any unprivileged local user reaches the bug.
- UI:NUser interaction, none
- The attacker performs every step from their own process — socket setup, setsockopt calls, and association establishment — with no action required from any other user or administrator.
- S:UScope, unchanged
- The corruption and the over-read are confined to the kernel's own SCTP association object; no other security authority or privilege domain is crossed.
- C:LConfidentiality impact, low
- sctp_make_init()/sctp_make_init_ack() copy ntohs(auth_chunks->length) bytes from the 20-byte field, emitting up to 4 bytes past it (the adjacent raw_addr_list_len) inside the CHUNKS parameter of INIT/INIT-ACK sent to the remote peer — a real but small, strictly bounded out-of-bounds read.
- I:HIntegrity impact, high
- sctp_association_init() writes up to 4 bytes of fully attacker-chosen data (the chunk-ID values) past the end of asoc->c.auth_chunks into the adjacent kernel struct field, an out-of-bounds write of controlled content into kernel memory.
- A:HAvailability impact, high
- On CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE kernels the memcpy is flagged as a field-spanning write and emits a WARN, which is fatal on the widely used panic_on_warn configurations, and the out-of-bounds write itself corrupts SCTP association state; the trigger is cheap and repeatable by any local user.