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CVE-2026-68266

drm/xe: Hold a dma-buf reference for imported BOs

7.8 EPSS 0.1% AV:L

Published 2026-08-10 (2 months ago) by the Linux kernel CNA. Subsystem drivers/gpu. Debian urgency: unimportant.

What to do, per Debian release

Debian's own status for CVE-2026-68266 in every release this site tracks, and what each one means in practice. Every status below is the one the Debian Security Team publishes for this CVE. source

ReleaseStatus VersionWhat this means
Debian 12bookwormnot affected6.1.190-1Nothing to do. bookworm never shipped the vulnerable code.
Debian 13trixiefixedDSA-6466-1 · 2026-08-25 · text6.12.105-1Update the kernel and reboot. DSA-6466-1 shipped the fix on 2026-08-25, in 6.12.105-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian 14forkyfixed7.1.6-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.1.6-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian unstablesidfixed7.1.6-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.1.6-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian 12bookworm · linux-6.12fixedDLA-4788-1 · 2026-09-19 · text6.12.107-1~deb12u1Update the kernel and reboot. DLA-4788-1 shipped the fix on 2026-09-19, in 6.12.107-1~deb12u1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.

The vulnerability

What the bug is

An imported dma-buf BO is created as a ttm_bo_type_sg BO whose reservation object is the exporter's dma_buf->resv. The importer, however, only takes a dma-buf reference after a successful dma_buf_dynamic_attach(). Until then nothing keeps the exporter alive, so if the exporter is freed while the BO still references its resv, a later access to that resv is a use-after-free: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x6b6b6b6b6b6b6b9c Workqueue: ttm ttm_bo_delayed_delete [ttm] RIP: 0010:mutex_can_spin_on_owner+0x3f/0xc0 This can be reached on two paths: - dma_buf_dynamic_attach() fails, or - ttm_bo_init_reserved() fails during BO creation. In both cases the BO already has bo->base.resv pointing at the exporter resv, and sg BOs are always torn down via ttm_bo_delayed_delete(), which locks bo->base.resv asynchronously - potentially after the exporter has been freed. Take the dma-buf reference in xe_bo_init_locked(), before ttm_bo_init_reserved(), so it also covers a creation failure there, and release it in xe_ttm_bo_destroy(). The reference is held for the whole BO lifetime, keeping the shared resv alive on every path. v2: - Reworked the fix to avoid creating the imported sg BO before dma_buf_dynamic_attach() succeeds. - Attach with importer_priv == NULL and make invalidate_mappings ignore incomplete imports. v3: - Dropped the xe-side reordering approach since importer_priv must be valid when dma_buf_dynamic_attach() publishes the attachment. - Per Christian's suggestion on the v1 thread, keyed the check on import_attach rather than removing the sg guard entirely. - Fixes both xe and amdgpu in a single TTM patch. v4: - Moved import_attach check to after dma_resv_copy_fences() so fences are copied before returning for successful imports (Thomas). - Removed exporter-alive claim from commit message (Thomas). v5: - Add drm/xe patch to keep imported sg BOs off the LRU before attach succeeds; the TTM fix alone is not sufficient for xe if the BO is already LRU-visible. (Thomas) v4 patch: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/736663/?series=169129&rev=2 - Patch 1 (drm/ttm) carries Christian's Reviewed-by from v4. v6: - Reworked the fix based on Thomas' suggestion. Instead of the TTM resv individualization (v1-v5) plus the xe off-LRU/placement handling (v5), just hold a dma-buf reference for the imported BO lifetime so the shared resv can never be freed while the BO still references it. Single xe patch, no TTM change. (Thomas) - Take the reference in xe_bo_init_locked() before ttm_bo_init_reserved() so a TTM creation failure is covered too (Thomas). - Dropped the v5 series (drm/ttm + drm/xe off-LRU); the off-LRU approach also regressed in CI BAT via ttm_bo_pipeline_gutting() creating a ghost BO that outlived the exporter. Link to v5: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/series/169984/ v7: - Move changelog above --- so it stays in the commit message. - Reorder changelog entries oldest-to-newest. (Thomas) (cherry picked from commit 3516f3fae6be35642f8f06f8a218da6425c0306a)

Where it lives

The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.

drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_bo.c
drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_bo.h
drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_bo_types.h
drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_dma_buf.c

What this is
INTEL DRM XE DRIVER (Lunar Lake and newer)MAINTAINERS section matched on drivers/gpu/drm/xe/ · intel-xe@lists.freedesktop.org · Supported
Kernel module
xe

Check it on the machine

grep -w CONFIG_DRM_XE /boot/config-$(uname -r)

Reads the booted kernel's own configuration, on the machine and nowhere else. =y is built in, =m is a module, and an is not set line means the code is not there.

lsmod | grep -w xe

Prints a line if that module is loaded right now, and nothing if it is not. One that is not loaded can still be loaded later by anything that needs it.

Show whether Debian builds this, per release

Debian builds this, but not on every flavour. At least one release below builds the code on some of its kernel flavours and not on others, so the answer depends on the architecture and flavour installed. The build rule could not be established for 1 release, so nothing is claimed about those.

  • bookworm?
  • trixieMnot built on amd64/cloud-amd64, arm64/arm64-16k, arm64/cloud-arm64, armel/rpi, ppc64el/powerpc64le-64k, s390x/s390x
  • forky, sidMnot built on amd64/cloud-amd64, arm64/arm64-16k, arm64/cloud-arm64, loong64/loong64, ppc64el/powerpc64le-64k, s390x/s390x
  • bookworm · linux-6.12Mnot built on amd64/cloud-amd64, arm64/arm64-16k, arm64/cloud-arm64, ppc64el/powerpc64le-64k
?
not established - no Makefile entry for the affected file
M
a module where it is built at all; some flavours do not build it

Where a release above reads "not established", no build rule for the affected file was found in that release's kernel tree. That is a gap in this lookup, not a finding that the code is absent.

Build switch
CONFIG_DRM_XE

From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS kbuild Makefiles Debian linux-config packages

Signals

Published
2026-08-10 (2 months ago)source
CVSS
7.8 high
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hsource recompute it
Attack vector
local (AV:L)source
EPSS
0.13%, higher than 2.6% of all CVEssource
CISA KEV
not listedthe KEV catalogue
Debian urgency
unimportantsource
Subsystem
drivers/gpu

Upstream fixes

The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source

IntroducedFixed inCommit
6.86.12.103c22d65d62b33
6.86.18.42c1954c66662d
6.87.1.6ba8c4cbb31c6
6.87.262775525a27c

Debian advisories

AdvisoryDateShipped toDebian
DLA-4788-12026-09-19bookworm 6.12.107-1~deb12u1tracker
DSA-6466-12026-08-25trixie 6.12.105-1tracker

Why the CNA scored it this way

Quoted from the kernel CNA's own scoring file, word for word. A highlighted metric carries the most severe value CVSS v3.1 defines for it, which is what pushes the score up. source

AV:LAttack vector, local
The bug is reached through DRM_IOCTL_PRIME_FD_TO_HANDLE on an Intel xe DRM render node (/dev/dri/renderD*), which requires local access to the device file; there is no remote or network-facing path into xe_gem_prime_import().
AC:LAttack complexity, low
The attacker fully controls both halves: they pick an exporter whose attach fails deterministically (drm_gem_map_attach() returns -ENOSYS, xe_dma_buf_attach() returns -EOPNOTSUPP for non-p2p cross-device imports) or induce the -ENOMEM paths, then simply close the dma-buf fd while the sg BO teardown is still queued on the TTM workqueue. No condition outside their control is needed.
PR:LPrivileges required, low
DRM_IOCTL_PRIME_FD_TO_HANDLE is marked DRM_RENDER_ALLOW, so any unprivileged local user holding the normally world/group-accessible render node (any GUI user on a distro, any app on Android/ChromeOS) can perform the import; no capabilities are checked.
UI:NUser interaction, none
The entire sequence — export a dma-buf, import it into xe, close the fd — is performed by the attacker's own process; no victim action or cooperation is required.
S:UScope, unchanged
The use-after-free occurs on kernel heap memory within the same kernel security authority; there is no crossing of a VM, IOMMU, or sandbox boundary.
C:HConfidentiality impact, high
The freed dma_buf/dma_resv is a slab object the attacker can reclaim with sprayed content before ttm_bo_delayed_delete() dereferences it, so the stale bo->base.resv can be aimed at attacker-chosen kernel addresses and the resulting ww_mutex/fence walks leaked back, giving arbitrary kernel memory disclosure.
I:HIntegrity impact, high
dma_resv_lock()/dma_resv_unlock() and the subsequent ttm_bo_cleanup_memtype_use() perform writes and list manipulation through the dangling pointer into reclaimed heap memory, so the UAF yields a controllable write primitive usable for control-flow hijacking and privilege escalation.
A:HAvailability impact, high
Even unexploited, the flaw reliably produces a kernel oops — the reported general protection fault on poisoned memory in mutex_can_spin_on_owner() from the ttm workqueue — which is a fatal fault in kernel worker context and takes down the GPU stack or the whole machine.