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CVE-2026-68177
tracing: Delay module ref count for "enable_event" trigger
Published 2026-08-10 (2 months ago) by the Linux kernel CNA. Subsystem kernel/trace. Debian urgency: unimportant.
What to do, per Debian release
Debian's own status for CVE-2026-68177 in every release this site tracks, and what each one means in practice. Every status below is the one the Debian Security Team publishes for this CVE. source
| Release | Status | Version | What this means |
|---|---|---|---|
| Debian 12bookworm | not affected | 6.1.190-1 | Nothing to do. bookworm never shipped the vulnerable code. |
| Debian 13trixie | not affected | 6.12.113-1 | Nothing to do. trixie never shipped the vulnerable code. |
| Debian 14forky | fixed | 7.1.6-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.1.6-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
| Debian unstablesid | fixed | 7.1.6-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.1.6-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
The vulnerability
What the bug is
Triggers are now delayed from freeing, but can still be triggered until after the RCU grace period has ended. The freeing of the enable_event data is put into the private_data_free() callback, but the put of the module refcount is done immediately. It is possible that if a module is removed that has an event that would enable (or disable) it is still active, it can read the data of the module after it is removed causing a use-after-free bug. Move the trace_event_put_ref() that releases the module into the delayed callback so that the module can not be removed until any reference to its events are finished.
Where it lives
The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.
kernel/trace/trace_events_trigger.c
- What this is
- TRACINGMAINTAINERS section matched on kernel/trace/ · linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org · Maintained
Check it on the machine
grep -wE 'CONFIG_EVENT_TRACING|CONFIG_FUNCTION_TRACER|CONFIG_RETHOOK|CONFIG_RING_BUFFER|CONFIG_TRACEPOINTS|CONFIG_TRACE_CLOCK|CONFIG_TRACING' /boot/config-$(uname -r)Reads the booted kernel's own configuration, on the machine and nowhere else. =y is built in, =m is a module, and an is not set line means the code is not there.
Show whether Debian builds this, per release
Debian builds this, but not on every flavour. At least one release below builds the code on some of its kernel flavours and not on others, so the answer depends on the architecture and flavour installed.
- bookwormYnot built on arm64/arm64, arm64/cloud-arm64, arm64/rt/arm64, armhf/armmp, armhf/armmp-lpae, armhf/rt/armmp, ppc64el/powerpc64le
- trixieYnot built on arm64/arm64, arm64/arm64-16k, arm64/cloud-arm64, arm64/rt/arm64, armel/rpi, armhf/armmp, armhf/armmp-lpae, armhf/rt/armmp
- forky, sidYnot built on arm64/arm64, arm64/arm64-16k, arm64/cloud-arm64, arm64/rt-arm64, armhf/armmp, armhf/armmp-lpae
- Y
- built in where it is built at all; some flavours do not build it
- Build switches
- CONFIG_EVENT_TRACING, CONFIG_FUNCTION_TRACER, CONFIG_RETHOOK, CONFIG_RING_BUFFER, CONFIG_TRACEPOINTS, CONFIG_TRACE_CLOCK, CONFIG_TRACING
- Reads as
- all on means the file is compiled; any one off means it is not.
From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS kbuild Makefiles Debian linux-config packages
Signals
- Published
- 2026-08-10 (2 months ago)source
- CVSS
- 7.8 high
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hsource recompute it - Attack vector
- local (AV:L)source
- EPSS
- 0.15%, higher than 4.1% of all CVEssource
- CISA KEV
- not listedthe KEV catalogue
- Debian urgency
- unimportantsource
- Subsystem
- kernel/trace
Upstream fixes
The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source
| Introduced | Fixed in | Commit |
|---|---|---|
| 6.19 | 7.1.6 | 159fdc3e01dc |
| 6.19 | 7.2 | e091351b3881 |
Why the CNA scored it this way
Quoted from the kernel CNA's own scoring file, word for word. A highlighted metric carries the most severe value CVSS v3.1 defines for it, which is what pushes the score up. source
- AV:LAttack vector, local
- The bug is reached only via local `write()` to tracefs event `trigger` files to register/remove `enable_event`/`disable_event` triggers and via local `delete_module(2)`/`rmmod` to unload the referenced trace-event module; no network, adjacent, or physical input path reaches `event_enable_trigger_free()` or `event_enable_trigger()`.
- AC:LAttack complexity, low
- The attacker controls both sides of the race: one thread removes the trigger (premature `trace_event_put_ref()`) and unloads the module while another continuously fires the bound source tracepoint, exploiting the deferred-free window before `tracepoint_synchronize_unregister()` completes in the trigger cleanup kthread.
- PR:LPrivileges required, low
- Trigger registration/removal is gated only by tracefs DAC and `LOCKDOWN_TRACEFS` without `capable()`, which Android/ChromeOS/Perfetto and tracing-group mounts grant to ordinary users; unloading the held module is achievable with `CAP_SYS_MODULE` in a user namespace on permissive kernels loading attacker-controlled modules.
- UI:NUser interaction, none
- The attacker performs trigger setup/removal, module unload, and source-event generation from their own threads; no separate victim user action is required once tracefs and module privileges are available.
- S:UScope, unchanged
- The use-after-free corrupts kernel heap/trace structures within the same OS security authority and does not cross a VM, IOMMU, or sandbox boundary.
- C:HConfidentiality impact, high
- After premature `trace_event_put_ref()` permits module removal, in-flight `event_enable_trigger()`/`event_enable_count_func()` dereference freed `trace_event_file` and module-resident `trace_event_call` data, exposing reclaimed kernel heap contents.
- I:HIntegrity impact, high
- `event_enable_trigger()` performs `set_bit`/`clear_bit` on `enable_data->file->flags` through a pointer to a kmem_cache-freed `trace_event_file`, giving a controllable kernel write primitive via heap shaping.
- A:HAvailability impact, high
- Dereferencing freed module/event-file memory from tracepoint context readily causes kernel oops/panic, and the attacker can repeat the race at will.