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CVE-2026-68147

fscrypt: Avoid dynamic allocation in fscrypt_get_devices()

7.8 EPSS 0.1% AV:L

Published 2026-08-10 (2 months ago) by the Linux kernel CNA. Subsystem fs/crypto. Debian urgency: not yet assigned.

Debian does not build this code. The per-release build detail is under "Where it lives" below.

What to do, per Debian release

Debian's own status for CVE-2026-68147 in every release this site tracks, and what each one means in practice. Every status below is the one the Debian Security Team publishes for this CVE. source

ReleaseStatus VersionWhat this means
Debian 12bookwormfixedDLA-4777-1 · 2026-09-08 · text6.1.187-1Update the kernel and reboot. DLA-4777-1 shipped the fix on 2026-09-08, in 6.1.187-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian 13trixiefixed6.12.101-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 6.12.101-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian 14forkyfixed7.1.6-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.1.6-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian unstablesidfixed7.1.6-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.1.6-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian 12bookworm · linux-6.12fixedDLA-4745-1 · 2026-08-18 · text6.12.101-1~deb12u1Update the kernel and reboot. DLA-4745-1 shipped the fix on 2026-08-18, in 6.12.101-1~deb12u1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.

The vulnerability

What the bug is

When a blk_crypto_key starts being used or is evicted, fs/crypto/ calls fscrypt_get_devices() to get the filesystem's list of block devices, then iterates over them and calls blk_crypto_config_supported(), blk_crypto_start_using_key(), or blk_crypto_evict_key() on each one. Currently, the block device pointers are placed in a dynamically allocated array. This dynamic allocation is problematic because: - It can fail, especially at the fscrypt_destroy_inline_crypt_key() call site when it's invoked for inode eviction under direct reclaim. - fscrypt_destroy_inline_crypt_key() doesn't handle the failure. It just zeroizes and frees the blk_crypto_key without calling blk_crypto_evict_key(). That causes a use-after-free. For now, let's fix this in the straightforward and easily-backportable way by switching to an on-stack array. Currently the fscrypt multi-device functionality is used only by f2fs, which has a hardcoded limit of 8 block devices. An on-stack array works fine for that. (Of course, this solution won't scale up to large number of block devices. For that we'd need a different solution, like moving the block device iteration into the filesystem. Or in the case of btrfs, which will only support blk-crypto-fallback, we should make it just call blk-crypto-fallback directly, so the block devices won't be needed.)

Where it lives

The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.

fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c
fs/f2fs/super.c
include/linux/fscrypt.h

What this is
FSCRYPT: FILE SYSTEM LEVEL ENCRYPTION SUPPORTMAINTAINERS section matched on fs/crypto/ · linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org · Supported
Kernel module
none to look for. The file would have gone into fscrypto, and Debian does not compile it into that module, so finding fscrypto in lsmod would say nothing about this CVE.

Check it on the machine

grep -wE 'CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION|CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION_INLINE_CRYPT' /boot/config-$(uname -r)

Reads the booted kernel's own configuration, on the machine and nowhere else. =y is built in, =m is a module, and an is not set line means the code is not there.

Show whether Debian builds this, per release

Debian does not build this code. In 5 releases below, every kernel flavour Debian publishes has the switch off, so the vulnerable file is compiled into no kernel binary Debian ships.

  • bookworm, trixie, forky, sid, bookworm · linux-6.12n
n
not enabled on any flavour - this release does not build the code
Build switches
CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION, CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION_INLINE_CRYPT
Reads as
all on means the file is compiled; any one off means it is not.

From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS kbuild Makefiles Debian linux-config packages

Signals

Published
2026-08-10 (2 months ago)source
CVSS
7.8 high
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hsource recompute it
Attack vector
local (AV:L)source
EPSS
0.14%, higher than 2.6% of all CVEssource
CISA KEV
not listedthe KEV catalogue
Debian urgency
not yet assignedsource
Subsystem
fs/crypto

Upstream fixes

The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source

IntroducedFixed inCommit
6.16.1.183bab016bb80d7
6.16.6.1484462ac3d90e8
6.16.12.10197a688563be7
6.16.18.4281ea8e822185
6.17.1.6bc2d630296e0
6.17.26fe4e4b8259e

Debian advisories

AdvisoryDateShipped toDebian
DLA-4777-12026-09-08bookworm 6.1.187-1tracker
DLA-4745-12026-08-18bookworm 6.12.101-1~deb12u1tracker

Why the CNA scored it this way

Quoted from the kernel CNA's own scoring file, word for word. A highlighted metric carries the most severe value CVSS v3.1 defines for it, which is what pushes the score up. source

AV:LAttack vector, local
The bug is reached only via local fscrypt/inline-crypto teardown (fscrypt_destroy_inline_crypt_key) during inode eviction or key removal on ext4/f2fs, triggered by local syscalls/ioctls and file operations, not by any network-facing kernel service.
AC:LAttack complexity, low
An attacker can reliably induce the kmalloc failure by creating memory pressure while closing encrypted inodes or removing v2 fscrypt keys, especially under direct reclaim where the commit notes this path fails; both sides of the race are attacker-controlled.
PR:LPrivileges required, low
Exploitation requires only a local unprivileged user on an inlinecrypt-mounted filesystem: v2 FS_IOC_ADD/REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY are unprivileged, and the attacker can create/close their own encrypted files to drive fscrypt_put_encryption_info into the buggy destroy path.
UI:NUser interaction, none
No victim interaction is required; the attacker triggers memory pressure and encrypted inode/key teardown themselves through normal local file and fscrypt ioctl operations on systems already mounted with inline encryption.
S:UScope, unchanged
Impact is confined to kernel memory corruption and privilege escalation within the same kernel security domain; this is not a VM escape, IOMMU bypass, or other cross-authority boundary violation.
C:HConfidentiality impact, high
Skipping blk_crypto_evict_key before kfree_sensitive leaves dangling slot->key/bio_crypt_ctx pointers to a freed blk_crypto_key (containing raw key bytes), a classic use-after-free that enables arbitrary kernel memory disclosure and heap grooming.
I:HIntegrity impact, high
The use-after-free of blk_crypto_key structures still registered in blk-crypto keyslot hash tables can be leveraged for heap corruption and control-flow hijacking, yielding arbitrary kernel write or local privilege escalation primitives.
A:HAvailability impact, high
Dereferencing the prematurely freed blk_crypto_key during subsequent block I/O or keyslot lookups can cause kernel oops/panic; use-after-free in the block crypto path also inherently threatens system availability even before full exploitation.