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CVE-2026-64584
usb: gadget: f_midi: cancel pending IN work before freeing the midi object
Published 2026-08-06 (2 months ago) by the Linux kernel CNA. Subsystem drivers/usb. Debian urgency: not yet assigned.
What to do, per Debian release
Debian's own status for CVE-2026-64584 in every release this site tracks, and what each one means in practice. Every status below is the one the Debian Security Team publishes for this CVE. source
| Release | Status | Version | What this means |
|---|---|---|---|
| Debian 12bookworm | fixedDLA-4777-1 · 2026-09-08 · text | 6.1.187-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. DLA-4777-1 shipped the fix on 2026-09-08, in 6.1.187-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
| Debian 13trixie | fixedDSA-6415-1 · 2026-08-06 · text | 6.12.101-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. DSA-6415-1 shipped the fix on 2026-08-06, in 6.12.101-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
| Debian 14forky | fixed | 7.1.6-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.1.6-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
| Debian unstablesid | fixed | 7.1.6-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.1.6-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
| Debian 12bookworm · linux-6.12 | fixedDLA-4745-1 · 2026-08-18 · text | 6.12.101-1~deb12u1 | Update the kernel and reboot. DLA-4745-1 shipped the fix on 2026-08-18, in 6.12.101-1~deb12u1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
The vulnerability
What the bug is
The f_midi driver embeds a work item (midi->work) whose handler, f_midi_in_work(), dereferences the enclosing struct f_midi through container_of(). This work is armed from two sites: f_midi_complete(), on a normal IN-endpoint completion, and f_midi_in_trigger(), on an ALSA rawmidi output-stream start. Neither f_midi_disable() nor f_midi_unbind() cancels midi->work. f_midi_disable() only disables the endpoints and drains the in_req_fifo; it does not synchronize the work item, and the sound card is released asynchronously to the final free of the midi object. The midi object is reference-counted (midi->free_ref) and is freed in f_midi_free() only once both the usb_function reference and the rawmidi private_data reference have been dropped. In f_midi_unbind(), f_midi_disable() runs before the sound card is released, so while the USB endpoints are already disabled the rawmidi device is still usable by an open substream. A concurrent userspace write on such a substream can reach f_midi_in_trigger() and queue midi->work again after f_midi_disable() has returned. A work item armed this way may still be pending when the last reference drops and f_midi_free() proceeds to kfree(midi), letting f_midi_in_work() dereference the struct after it has been freed, a use-after-free. For this reason cancelling midi->work in f_midi_disable() would not be sufficient: the ALSA trigger path can rearm the work after disable() returns. Cancelling at the refcount-zero free site is the boundary after which neither arming source can survive, because by then both references that keep the midi object alive have been dropped: the USB endpoints are already disabled and the rawmidi device has been released. Fix this by calling cancel_work_sync(&midi->work) in the refcount-zero block of f_midi_free(), before the embedded work_struct is freed along with the rest of the structure. opts->lock is a sleeping mutex, so calling cancel_work_sync() under it is permitted, and the handler takes midi->transmit_lock rather than opts->lock, so no self-deadlock can occur while it waits for a running instance of the work to finish. This issue was found by an in-house static analysis tool.
Where it lives
The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.
drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_midi.c
- What this is
- USB SUBSYSTEMMAINTAINERS section matched on drivers/usb/ · linux-usb@vger.kernel.org · Supported
- Kernel module
- usb_f_midi
Check it on the machine
grep -wE 'CONFIG_OF|CONFIG_PCI|CONFIG_USB|CONFIG_USB_F_MIDI|CONFIG_USB_GADGET|CONFIG_USB_PHY|CONFIG_USB_SUPPORT' /boot/config-$(uname -r)Reads the booted kernel's own configuration, on the machine and nowhere else. =y is built in, =m is a module, and an is not set line means the code is not there.
lsmod | grep -w usb_f_midiPrints a line if that module is loaded right now, and nothing if it is not. One that is not loaded can still be loaded later by anything that needs it.
Show whether Debian builds this, per release
Debian builds this, but not on every flavour. At least one release below builds the code on some of its kernel flavours and not on others, so the answer depends on the architecture and flavour installed.
- bookwormMnot built on amd64/amd64, amd64/cloud-amd64, amd64/rt/amd64, arm64/cloud-arm64, i386/686, i386/686-pae, i386/rt/686-pae, ppc64el/powerpc64le
- trixieMnot built on amd64/amd64, amd64/cloud-amd64, amd64/rt/amd64, arm64/cloud-arm64, armel/rpi, ppc64el/powerpc64le, ppc64el/powerpc64le-64k, s390x/s390x
- forky, sidMnot built on amd64/amd64, amd64/cloud-amd64, amd64/rt-amd64, arm64/cloud-arm64, loong64/loong64, ppc64el/powerpc64le, ppc64el/powerpc64le-64k, s390x/s390x
- bookworm · linux-6.12Mnot built on amd64/amd64, amd64/cloud-amd64, amd64/rt/amd64, arm64/cloud-arm64, ppc64el/powerpc64le, ppc64el/powerpc64le-64k
- M
- a module where it is built at all; some flavours do not build it
- Build switches
- CONFIG_OF, CONFIG_PCI, CONFIG_USB, CONFIG_USB_F_MIDI, CONFIG_USB_GADGET, CONFIG_USB_PHY, CONFIG_USB_SUPPORT
- Reads as
- all on means the file is compiled; any one off means it is not.
From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS kbuild Makefiles Debian linux-config packages
Signals
- Published
- 2026-08-06 (2 months ago)source
- CVSS
- 7.8 high
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hsource recompute it - Attack vector
- local (AV:L)source
- EPSS
- 0.12%, higher than 1.5% of all CVEssource
- CISA KEV
- not listedthe KEV catalogue
- Debian urgency
- not yet assignedsource
- Subsystem
- drivers/usb
Upstream fixes
The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source
| Introduced | Fixed in | Commit |
|---|---|---|
| 5.10.235 | 5.10.265 | f3c6f2c38062 |
| 5.12 | 5.15.216 | df18150126f6 |
| 5.12 | 6.1.183 | 620955b222c4 |
| 5.12 | 6.6.148 | 380b4bef46c2 |
| 5.12 | 6.12.101 | 87bc316dd6fc |
| 5.12 | 6.18.42 | f45089eaad0a |
| 5.12 | 7.1.6 | ac9a51d910bb |
| 5.12 | 7.2 | 5650c18d93a1 |
| 5.4.291 | 0 | 0 |
Debian advisories
| Advisory | Date | Shipped to | Debian |
|---|---|---|---|
| DLA-4777-1 | 2026-09-08 | bookworm 6.1.187-1 | tracker |
| DLA-4745-1 | 2026-08-18 | bookworm 6.12.101-1~deb12u1 | tracker |
| DSA-6415-1 | 2026-08-06 | trixie 6.12.101-1 | tracker |
Why the CNA scored it this way
Quoted from the kernel CNA's own scoring file, word for word. A highlighted metric carries the most severe value CVSS v3.1 defines for it, which is what pushes the score up. source
- AV:LAttack vector, local
- The UAF is reached by local configfs UDC clear or function unlink (unregister_gadget → f_midi_unbind/disable) plus ALSA rawmidi write/close on /dev/snd/midi*; no USB host traffic or cable access is required, and dummy_hcd suffices, matching other gadget teardown UAFs scored AV:L.
- AC:LAttack complexity, low
- The attacker controls both sides of the race: opening/writing the rawmidi substream to queue midi->work via f_midi_in_trigger after disable, and forcing unbind plus dropping the last free_ref via configfs unlink/close, so the window is freely repeatable.
- PR:LPrivileges required, low
- Exploitation needs access to the gadget configfs tree and/or the ALSA MIDI node; both are routinely delegated to non-root system/audio accounts on Android and embedded MIDI gadgets, with no capability check on the rawmidi write or UDC store path itself.
- UI:NUser interaction, none
- The attacker performs the full sequence—configfs unbind/unlink, rawmidi write to rearm work, and close to free the midi object—without any action by another user or administrator.
- S:UScope, unchanged
- The use-after-free corrupts kernel heap within the same kernel security authority; no VM, IOMMU, or sandbox boundary is crossed.
- C:HConfidentiality impact, high
- f_midi_in_work() container_of()s the freed embedded work_struct and then reads midi->in_ep, fifo, and port/substream fields; reclaiming the freed f_midi slab yields a classic UAF read/disclosure primitive.
- I:HIntegrity impact, high
- Post-free f_midi_transmit()/f_midi_drop_out_substreams() write through the reclaimed object (port state, kfifo, snd_rawmidi_drop_output), giving a heap write-after-free primitive suitable for control-flow hijack.
- A:HAvailability impact, high
- Dereferencing the freed f_midi from system_highpri_wq reliably produces KASAN reports, oops, or kernel panic even without full exploitation.