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CVE-2026-64574

wifi: mac80211: tear down new links on vif update error path

7.8 EPSS 0.1% AV:L

Published 2026-08-05 (2 months ago) by the Linux kernel CNA. Subsystem net/mac80211. Debian urgency: unimportant.

What to do, per Debian release

Debian's own status for CVE-2026-64574 in every release this site tracks, and what each one means in practice. Every status below is the one the Debian Security Team publishes for this CVE. source

ReleaseStatus VersionWhat this means
Debian 12bookwormnot affected6.1.190-1Nothing to do. bookworm never shipped the vulnerable code.
Debian 13trixiefixedDSA-6415-1 · 2026-08-06 · text6.12.101-1Update the kernel and reboot. DSA-6415-1 shipped the fix on 2026-08-06, in 6.12.101-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian 14forkyfixed7.1.6-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.1.6-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian unstablesidfixed7.1.6-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.1.6-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian 12bookworm · linux-6.12fixedDLA-4745-1 · 2026-08-18 · text6.12.101-1~deb12u1Update the kernel and reboot. DLA-4745-1 shipped the fix on 2026-08-18, in 6.12.101-1~deb12u1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.

The vulnerability

What the bug is

When ieee80211_vif_update_links() adds new links it allocates a link container for each and calls ieee80211_link_init() (which registers the per-link debugfs files with file->private_data pointing into the container) and ieee80211_link_setup(). If the subsequent drv_change_vif_links() fails, the error path restores the old pointers and jumps to 'free', which frees the new containers but never removes their debugfs entries or stops the links. The debugfs files survive with file->private_data dangling at the freed container, so a later open()+read() (e.g. link-1/txpower) dereferences freed memory in ieee80211_if_read_link(), a use-after-free. The removal path already dismantles links correctly via ieee80211_tear_down_links(), which removes each link's keys and debugfs entries and calls ieee80211_link_stop(); the add path on the error branch does not. Commit be1ba9ed221f ("wifi: mac80211: avoid weird state in error path") hardened this same error path for the link-removal case (new_links == 0) but left the newly-added links' teardown unaddressed. drv_change_vif_links() can fail at runtime on MLO drivers (internal allocation / queue / firmware command failures). Remove the new links' debugfs entries and stop them before freeing. BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ieee80211_if_read_link (net/mac80211/debugfs_netdev.c:127) Read of size 8 at addr ffff888011290000 by task exploit/145 Call Trace: ... ieee80211_if_read_link (net/mac80211/debugfs_netdev.c:127) short_proxy_read (fs/debugfs/file.c:373) vfs_read (fs/read_write.c:572) ksys_read (fs/read_write.c:716) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121) ... Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc000000000a RIP: 0010:ieee80211_if_read_link (net/mac80211/debugfs_netdev.c:127) Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception

Where it lives

The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.

net/mac80211/link.c

What this is
MAC80211MAINTAINERS section matched on net/mac80211/ · linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org · Maintained
Kernel module
mac80211

Check it on the machine

grep -w CONFIG_MAC80211 /boot/config-$(uname -r)

Reads the booted kernel's own configuration, on the machine and nowhere else. =y is built in, =m is a module, and an is not set line means the code is not there.

lsmod | grep -w mac80211

Prints a line if that module is loaded right now, and nothing if it is not. One that is not loaded can still be loaded later by anything that needs it.

Show whether Debian builds this, per release

Debian builds this, but not on every flavour. At least one release below builds the code on some of its kernel flavours and not on others, so the answer depends on the architecture and flavour installed.

  • bookwormMnot built on amd64/cloud-amd64, arm64/cloud-arm64
  • trixie, forky, sidMnot built on amd64/cloud-amd64, arm64/cloud-arm64, s390x/s390x
  • bookworm · linux-6.12Mnot built on amd64/cloud-amd64, arm64/cloud-arm64
M
a module where it is built at all; some flavours do not build it
Build switch
CONFIG_MAC80211

From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS kbuild Makefiles Debian linux-config packages

Signals

Published
2026-08-05 (2 months ago)source
CVSS
7.8 high
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hsource recompute it
Attack vector
local (AV:L)source
EPSS
0.12%, higher than 1.8% of all CVEssource
CISA KEV
not listedthe KEV catalogue
Debian urgency
unimportantsource
Subsystem
net/mac80211

Upstream fixes

The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source

IntroducedFixed inCommit
6.46.6.148329589417214
6.46.12.101c57d97f38130
6.46.18.420f7eaeb950ad
6.47.1.6901a73523e09
6.47.2952c02b33f56

Debian advisories

AdvisoryDateShipped toDebian
DLA-4745-12026-08-18bookworm 6.12.101-1~deb12u1tracker
DSA-6415-12026-08-06trixie 6.12.101-1tracker

Why the CNA scored it this way

Quoted from the kernel CNA's own scoring file, word for word. A highlighted metric carries the most severe value CVSS v3.1 defines for it, which is what pushes the score up. source

AV:LAttack vector, local
The bug is reached via local nl80211 link updates (NL80211_CMD_ADD_LINK / ieee80211_vif_set_links → ieee80211_vif_update_links) and completed by a local debugfs open/read of the dangling per-link file, not by processing over-the-air frames alone.
AC:LAttack complexity, low
An attacker can reliably force the error path by adding an MLO AP link whose MAC duplicates an existing link so ieee80211_check_dup_link_addrs() fails after ieee80211_link_init() already registered debugfs, then read the leftover file; no attacker-independent condition is required.
PR:LPrivileges required, low
NL80211_CMD_ADD_LINK is gated by GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM (CAP_NET_ADMIN in the netns user_ns), which an unprivileged user can obtain via user/net namespaces or common WiFi management paths, so privileges are Low rather than init-namespace root.
UI:NUser interaction, none
The attacker issues the nl80211 ADD_LINK sequence and the subsequent debugfs read themselves; no separate victim action such as mounting a filesystem or opening a hostile file is required.
S:UScope, unchanged
The use-after-free and resulting kernel memory corruption stay within the host mac80211/debugfs authority and do not cross a VM, IOMMU, or other separate security boundary.
C:HConfidentiality impact, high
Dangling debugfs file->private_data points at the freed link_container; reading it (ieee80211_if_read_link) is a slab use-after-free that can be reclaimed/sprayed for arbitrary kernel memory disclosure.
I:HIntegrity impact, high
The same freed link object is the debugfs private_data for readable/writable per-link files, so UAF reclaim enables attacker-controlled structure contents and control-flow hijack consistent with kernel UAF integrity High.
A:HAvailability impact, high
The fix commit’s KASAN slab-use-after-free in ieee80211_if_read_link leads to a general protection fault and kernel panic, so availability impact is High even without full exploitation.