data built 2026-10-19T13:16:53Z

Look up another CVE · open CVE-2026-64564 in the interactive tracker

CVE-2026-64564

sctp: don't free the ASCONF's own transport in DEL-IP processing

9.8 EPSS 1.4% AV:N

Published 2026-08-04 (2 months ago) by the Linux kernel CNA. Subsystem net/sctp. Debian urgency: not yet assigned.

What to do, per Debian release

Debian's own status for CVE-2026-64564 in every release this site tracks, and what each one means in practice. Every status below is the one the Debian Security Team publishes for this CVE. source

ReleaseStatus VersionWhat this means
Debian 12bookwormfixedDLA-4777-1 · 2026-09-08 · text6.1.187-1Update the kernel and reboot. DLA-4777-1 shipped the fix on 2026-09-08, in 6.1.187-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian 13trixiefixedDSA-6415-1 · 2026-08-06 · text6.12.101-1Update the kernel and reboot. DSA-6415-1 shipped the fix on 2026-08-06, in 6.12.101-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian 14forkyfixed7.1.6-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.1.6-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian unstablesidfixed7.1.6-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.1.6-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian 12bookworm · linux-6.12fixedDLA-4745-1 · 2026-08-18 · text6.12.101-1~deb12u1Update the kernel and reboot. DLA-4745-1 shipped the fix on 2026-08-18, in 6.12.101-1~deb12u1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.

The vulnerability

What the bug is

sctp_process_asconf() caches the transport the ASCONF chunk is processed against in asconf->transport (== chunk->transport, set once in sctp_rcv()). For an ASCONF located through its Address Parameter by __sctp_rcv_asconf_lookup(), that cached transport corresponds to the Address Parameter, which need not be the packet's source address. sctp_process_asconf_param() rejects a DEL-IP for the packet source address (ADDIP D8, SCTP_ERROR_DEL_SRC_IP), but nothing protects asconf->transport. A single ASCONF can therefore carry, in order: [Address Parameter L] [DEL-IP L] [DEL-IP 0.0.0.0] where L differs from the source. The DEL-IP for L passes the D8 check and calls sctp_assoc_rm_peer() on the transport that asconf->transport still points at, freeing it (RCU-deferred). The following wildcard DEL-IP then reuses the now-dangling asconf->transport in sctp_assoc_set_primary() and sctp_assoc_del_nonprimary_peers(): set_primary() dereferences the freed transport (->ipaddr, ->state) and plants the dangling pointer into asoc->peer.primary_path / active_path, and del_nonprimary_peers(), keeping only the pointer that is no longer on the list, removes every real transport, leaving the association with a transport_count of 0 and primary_path/active_path pointing at freed memory. Reject a DEL-IP that targets the transport the ASCONF is being processed against, mirroring the existing source-address guard, so the wildcard branch can never reuse a freed transport.

Where it lives

The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.

net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c

What this is
SCTP PROTOCOLMAINTAINERS section matched on net/sctp/ · linux-sctp@vger.kernel.org · Maintained
Kernel module
sctp

Check it on the machine

grep -w CONFIG_IP_SCTP /boot/config-$(uname -r)

Reads the booted kernel's own configuration, on the machine and nowhere else. =y is built in, =m is a module, and an is not set line means the code is not there.

lsmod | grep -w sctp

Prints a line if that module is loaded right now, and nothing if it is not. One that is not loaded can still be loaded later by anything that needs it.

Show whether Debian builds this, per release

Debian builds this as a loadable module. Every release below compiles it as a module on every flavour, so whether the code is in the running kernel depends on whether that module is loaded.

  • bookworm, trixie, forky, sid, bookworm · linux-6.12m
m
a loadable module on every flavour - check lsmod, can be blacklisted
Build switch
CONFIG_IP_SCTP

From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS kbuild Makefiles Debian linux-config packages

Signals

Published
2026-08-04 (2 months ago)source
CVSS
9.8 critical
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hsource recompute it
Attack vector
network (AV:N)source
EPSS
1.41%, higher than 72.2% of all CVEssource
CISA KEV
not listedthe KEV catalogue
Debian urgency
not yet assignedsource
Subsystem
net/sctp

Upstream fixes

The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source

IntroducedFixed inCommit
2.6.255.10.265a9ce31be4cb1
2.6.255.15.216a63afa1f9b12
2.6.256.1.1832b324ba3494a
2.6.256.6.148fedeb4468987
2.6.256.12.10174e8f3e7114f
2.6.256.18.4285aca407c560
2.6.257.1.6d136b29bf91d
2.6.257.29b2854f86f0b

Debian advisories

AdvisoryDateShipped toDebian
DLA-4777-12026-09-08bookworm 6.1.187-1tracker
DLA-4745-12026-08-18bookworm 6.12.101-1~deb12u1tracker
DSA-6415-12026-08-06trixie 6.12.101-1tracker

Why the CNA scored it this way

Quoted from the kernel CNA's own scoring file, word for word. A highlighted metric carries the most severe value CVSS v3.1 defines for it, which is what pushes the score up. source

AV:NAttack vector, network
The bug is in SCTP ASCONF receive processing (sctp_rcv → sctp_sf_do_asconf → sctp_process_asconf → sctp_process_asconf_param); a remote peer triggers it by sending a crafted ASCONF over IP/IPv6 on an established association, matching kernel guidance that net/ stack bugs reachable via received packets are Network.
AC:LAttack complexity, low
A single attacker-controlled ASCONF with [Address Parameter L][DEL-IP L][DEL-IP 0.0.0.0] reliably frees asconf->transport then reuses it in the same softirq; the peer fully controls multi-homing, serial, and parameter order, with no race or other condition outside attacker influence.
PR:NPrivileges required, none
Any remote SCTP peer that completes a normal association with ADD-IP negotiated can send the ASCONF; SCTP-AUTH keys come from the handshake the peer itself performs (or addip_noauth), and no local credentials or capabilities on the target are required.
UI:NUser interaction, none
Exploitation requires only attacker-sent SCTP packets processed automatically in the receive/state-machine path; no victim user action such as opening a file or mounting a device is needed.
S:UScope, unchanged
Impact is confined to the vulnerable host kernel (sctp_transport UAF / crash or privilege escalation) and does not cross a VM, IOMMU, or other security-authority boundary.
C:HConfidentiality impact, high
This is a heap use-after-free of an sctp_transport planted into primary_path/active_path after RCU-deferred free; freed-object reuse yields arbitrary kernel read primitives, scored High per UAF guidance.
I:HIntegrity impact, high
The same transport UAF enables heap spraying and write/control-flow hijacking via later dereferences of the dangling primary_path/active_path, so integrity impact is High.
A:HAvailability impact, high
set_primary() immediately dereferences the freed transport and leaves the association with transport_count 0 and dangling path pointers, causing a reproducible kernel oops/panic on subsequent use, which is High availability impact.