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CVE-2026-64560

posix-cpu-timers: Prevent UAF caused by non-leader exec() race

7.8 EPSS 0.7% AV:L

Published 2026-07-29 (3 months ago) by the Linux kernel CNA. Subsystem kernel. Debian urgency: not yet assigned.

What to do, per Debian release

Debian's own status for CVE-2026-64560 in every release this site tracks, and what each one means in practice. Every status below is the one the Debian Security Team publishes for this CVE. source

ReleaseStatus VersionWhat this means
Debian 12bookwormfixedDLA-4720-1 · 2026-08-05 · text6.1.180-1Update the kernel and reboot. DLA-4720-1 shipped the fix on 2026-08-05, in 6.1.180-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian 13trixiefixedDSA-6405-1 · 2026-07-31 · text6.12.100-1Update the kernel and reboot. DSA-6405-1 shipped the fix on 2026-07-31, in 6.12.100-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian 14forkyfixed7.1.5-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.1.5-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian unstablesidfixed7.1.5-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.1.5-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian 12bookworm · linux-6.12fixedDLA-4724-1 · 2026-08-07 · text6.12.100-1~deb12u1Update the kernel and reboot. DLA-4724-1 shipped the fix on 2026-08-07, in 6.12.100-1~deb12u1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.

The vulnerability

What the bug is

Wongi and Jungwoo decoded and reported a non-leader exec() related race which can result in an UAF: sys_timer_delete() exec() posix_cpu_timer_del() // Observes old leader p = pid_task(pid, pid_type); de_thread() switch_leader(); release_task(old_leader) __exit_signal(old_leader) sighand = lock(old_leader, sighand); posix_cpu_timers*_exit(); sighand = lock_task_sighand(p) unhash_task(old_leader); sh = lock(p, sighand) old_leader->sighand = NULL; unlock(sighand); (p->sighand == NULL) unlock(sh) return NULL; // Returns without action if(!sighand) return 0; free_posix_timer(); This is "harmless" unless the deleted timer was armed and enqueued in p->signal because on exec() a TGID targeted timer is inherited. As sys_timer_delete() freed the underlying posix timer object run_posix_cpu_timers() or any timerqueue related add/delete operations on other timers will access the freed object's timerqueue node, which results in an UAF. There is a similar problem vs. posix_cpu_timer_set(). For regular posix timers it just transiently returns -ESRCH to user space, but for the use case in do_cpu_nanosleep() it's the same UAF just that the k_itimer is allocated on the stack. Also posix_cpu_timer_rearm() fails to rearm the timer, which means it stops to expire. While debating solutions Frederic pointed out another problem: posix_cpu_timer_del(tmr) __exit_signal(p) posix_cpu_timers*_exit(p); unhash_task(p); p->sighand = NULL; sh = lock_task_sighand(p) sighand = p->sighand; if (!sighand) return NULL; lock(sighand); if (!sh) WARN_ON_ONCE(timer_queued(tmr)); On weakly ordered architectures it is not guaranteed that posix_cpu_timer_del() will observe the stores in posix_cpu_timers*_exit() when p->sighand is observed as NULL, which means the WARN() can be a false positive. Solve these issues by: 1) Changing the store in __exit_signal() to smp_store_release(). 2) Adding a smp_acquire__after_ctrl_dep() into the !sighand path of lock_task_sighand(). 3) Creating a helper function for looking up the task and locking sighand which does not return when sighand == NULL. Instead it retries the task lookup and only if that fails it gives up. 4) Using that helper in the three affected functions. #1/#2 ensures that the reader side which observes sighand == NULL also observes all preceeding stores, i.e. the stores in posix_cpu_timers*_exit() and the ones in unhash_task(). #3 ensures that the above described non-leader exec() situation is handled gracefully. When the task lookup returns the old leader, but sighand == NULL then it retries. In the non-leader exec() case the subsequent task lookup will observe the new leader due to #1/#2. In normal exit() scenarios the subsequent lookup fails. When the task lookup fails, the function also checks whether the timer is still enqueued and issues a warning if that's the case. Unfortunately there is nothing which can be done about it, but as the task is already not longer visible the timer should not be accessed anymore. This check also requires memory ordering, which is not provided when the first lookup fails. To achieve that the check is preceeded by a smp_rmb() which pairs with the smp_wmb() in write_seqlock() in __exit_signal(). That ensures that the stores in posix_cpu_timers*_exit() are visible. The history of the non-leader exec() issue goes back to the early days of posix CPU timers, which stored a pointer to the group leader task in the timer. That obviously fails when a non-leader exec() switches the leader. commit e0a70217107e ("posix-cpu-timers: workaround to suppress the problems with mt exec") added a temporary workaround for that in 2010 which surv ---truncated---

Where it lives

The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.

kernel/exit.c
kernel/signal.c
kernel/time/posix-cpu-timers.c

What this is
POSIX CLOCKS and TIMERSMAINTAINERS section matched on kernel/time/posix-* · linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org · Maintained
Show whether Debian builds this, per release

Debian builds this code. Every release below compiles the affected file into the kernels it ships.

  • bookworm, trixie, forky, sid, bookworm · linux-6.12y
y
built into the kernel image on every flavour - only a patch removes it

From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS Debian linux-config packages

Signals

Published
2026-07-29 (3 months ago)source
CVSS
7.8 high
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hsource recompute it
Attack vector
local (AV:L)source
EPSS
0.65%, higher than 50.3% of all CVEssource
CISA KEV
not listedthe KEV catalogue
Debian urgency
not yet assignedsource
Subsystem
kernel

Upstream fixes

The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source

IntroducedFixed inCommit
5.75.10.26267aa823e3e8c
5.75.15.213d8bcb28abad8
5.76.1.180cc35ddbc4973
5.76.6.14712a891c773ae
5.76.12.100e74443f5db00
5.76.18.416a7ecc25abe6
5.77.1.5ad1cafa1bdaa
5.77.2920f893f735e

Debian advisories

AdvisoryDateShipped toDebian
DLA-4724-12026-08-07bookworm 6.12.100-1~deb12u1tracker
DLA-4723-12026-08-07bullseye 6.1.180-1~deb11u1tracker
DLA-4720-12026-08-05bookworm 6.1.180-1tracker
DLA-4717-12026-08-05bullseye 5.10.262-1tracker
DSA-6405-12026-07-31trixie 6.12.100-1tracker

Why the CNA scored it this way

Quoted from the kernel CNA's own scoring file, word for word. A highlighted metric carries the most severe value CVSS v3.1 defines for it, which is what pushes the score up. source

AV:LAttack vector, local
The vulnerability is reached purely through local syscalls (`timer_create`/`timer_settime`/`timer_delete`/`clock_nanosleep`) raced against `execve()` from a non-leader thread in the attacker's own process. No network or remote data path reaches posix-cpu-timers.
AC:LAttack complexity, low
The attacker controls both sides of the race — one thread arms and deletes a process-wide CPU timer while a non-leader thread in the same process calls `execve()` — and can loop indefinitely with CPU pinning/thread spraying to widen the window between `pid_task()` and `lock_task_sighand()`. No condition depends on anything outside attacker control.
PR:LPrivileges required, low
Any ordinary unprivileged local user can create and delete `CLOCK_PROCESS_CPUTIME_ID` timers; `pid_for_clock()` performs no capability check when the encoded PID is 0, and `CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS` is `default y` on essentially all deployments.
UI:NUser interaction, none
The attacker performs every step — timer creation, arming, deletion, and the concurrent non-leader exec — entirely within its own multithreaded process. No victim action is involved.
S:UScope, unchanged
The corruption stays within the kernel's own security authority; it is a standard local kernel memory-corruption/privilege-escalation primitive with no VM, IOMMU, or hypervisor boundary crossed.
C:HConfidentiality impact, high
The stale timerqueue node yields UAF reads of the freed `k_itimer` and causes `current` (a live `task_struct` pointer) plus rbtree pointers to be written into the freed/reallocated slot, and the freed object can be reclaimed by another attacker-created `k_itimer`, enabling kernel pointer disclosure and broad memory read.
I:HIntegrity impact, high
`collect_timerqueue()` writes into freed memory (`ctmr->firing`, `ctmr->handling`, rbtree rebalancing, list insertion) and the `do_cpu_nanosleep()` variant does so into a live, attacker-groomed kernel stack frame, followed by `cpu_timer_fire()` dereferencing attacker-controlled `it_process`/`it_signal` — a control-flow-hijack-capable write primitive.
A:HAvailability impact, high
Even without exploitation the dangling timerqueue node produces rbtree/list corruption and a kernel oops, and the pre-fix `WARN_ON_ONCE(timerqueue_node_queued(...))` is an immediate panic under `panic_on_warn`; the race can be triggered repeatedly by any local user.