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CVE-2026-64552

virtio-net: fix len check in receive_big()

8.4 EPSS 0.1% AV:L

Published 2026-07-27 (3 months ago) by the Linux kernel CNA. Subsystem drivers/net. Debian urgency: not yet assigned.

What to do, per Debian release

Debian's own status for CVE-2026-64552 in every release this site tracks, and what each one means in practice. Every status below is the one the Debian Security Team publishes for this CVE. source

ReleaseStatus VersionWhat this means
Debian 12bookwormfixedDLA-4720-1 · 2026-08-05 · text6.1.180-1Update the kernel and reboot. DLA-4720-1 shipped the fix on 2026-08-05, in 6.1.180-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian 13trixiefixedDSA-6405-1 · 2026-07-31 · text6.12.100-1Update the kernel and reboot. DSA-6405-1 shipped the fix on 2026-07-31, in 6.12.100-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian 14forkyfixed7.1.5-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.1.5-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian unstablesidfixed7.1.5-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.1.5-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian 12bookworm · linux-6.12fixedDLA-4724-1 · 2026-08-07 · text6.12.100-1~deb12u1Update the kernel and reboot. DLA-4724-1 shipped the fix on 2026-08-07, in 6.12.100-1~deb12u1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.

The vulnerability

What the bug is

receive_big() bounds the device-announced length by (big_packets_num_skbfrags + 1) * PAGE_SIZE. That is still too loose: add_recvbuf_big() sets sg[1] to start at offset sizeof(struct padded_vnet_hdr) into the first page, so the chain actually carries hdr_len + (PAGE_SIZE - sizeof(padded_vnet_hdr)) + big_packets_num_skbfrags * PAGE_SIZE bytes -- 20 bytes less than the check allows for the common hdr_len == 12 case. A malicious virtio backend can announce a len in that gap. page_to_skb() then walks one frag past the page chain, storing a NULL page->private into skb_shinfo()->frags[MAX_SKB_FRAGS], which is both an out-of-bounds write past the static frag array and a NULL frag handed up the rx path. Bound len by the size add_recvbuf_big() actually advertised.

Where it lives

The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.

drivers/net/virtio_net.c

What this is
VIRTIO NET DRIVERMAINTAINERS section matched on drivers/net/virtio_net.c · netdev@vger.kernel.org · Maintained
Kernel module
virtio_net

Check it on the machine

grep -w CONFIG_VIRTIO_NET /boot/config-$(uname -r)

Reads the booted kernel's own configuration, on the machine and nowhere else. =y is built in, =m is a module, and an is not set line means the code is not there.

lsmod | grep -w virtio_net

Prints a line if that module is loaded right now, and nothing if it is not. One that is not loaded can still be loaded later by anything that needs it.

Show whether Debian builds this, per release

Debian builds this as a loadable module. Every release below compiles it as a module on every flavour, so whether the code is in the running kernel depends on whether that module is loaded.

  • bookworm, trixie, forky, sid, bookworm · linux-6.12m
m
a loadable module on every flavour - check lsmod, can be blacklisted
Build switch
CONFIG_VIRTIO_NET

From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS kbuild Makefiles Debian linux-config packages

Signals

Published
2026-07-27 (3 months ago)source
CVSS
8.4 high
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hsource recompute it
Attack vector
local (AV:L)source
EPSS
0.14%, higher than 3.1% of all CVEssource
CISA KEV
not listedthe KEV catalogue
Debian urgency
not yet assignedsource
Subsystem
drivers/net

Upstream fixes

The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source

IntroducedFixed inCommit
6.1.1596.1.178f9451d0fd5ba
6.6.1176.6.14538e94d63e29f
6.12.586.12.97fbeb65154583
6.186.18.40c7fc9adf4e00
6.187.1.5e6b8463b7d79
6.187.29e5ad06ea826
6.17.800

Debian advisories

AdvisoryDateShipped toDebian
DLA-4724-12026-08-07bookworm 6.12.100-1~deb12u1tracker
DLA-4723-12026-08-07bullseye 6.1.180-1~deb11u1tracker
DLA-4720-12026-08-05bookworm 6.1.180-1tracker
DSA-6405-12026-07-31trixie 6.12.100-1tracker

Why the CNA scored it this way

Quoted from the kernel CNA's own scoring file, word for word. A highlighted metric carries the most severe value CVSS v3.1 defines for it, which is what pushes the score up. source

AV:LAttack vector, local
The malicious input is the buffer length announced by the virtio backend (hypervisor, vhost-user/VDUSE daemon, or virtio-net hardware device), not data from a network peer; a conforming backend can never announce a length in the vulnerable gap. This is the local device-to-driver attack surface, matching how other malicious-virtio-device bugs are scored.
AC:LAttack complexity, low
The backend deterministically controls feature negotiation, MTU (hence big_packets_num_skbfrags), and the announced len, so it can force big-packets mode and hit the 20-byte gap on the first packet with no race or memory-layout luck.
PR:NPrivileges required, none
The attacking backend requires no credentials or privileges inside the victim kernel — it is outside the guest's security authority and simply completes an RX descriptor. No guest-side account is needed.
UI:NUser interaction, none
Triggered automatically in the NAPI receive path as soon as the backend completes a receive buffer; no victim action is required.
S:UScope, unchanged
The corruption and crash are confined to the kernel that owns the virtio-net driver, with no crossing into a different security-managing authority such as an IOMMU or hypervisor boundary.
C:HConfidentiality impact, high
A controlled 16-byte out-of-bounds write past skb_shared_info into an adjacent skb head in the NAPI page-frag cache lets the attacker corrupt neighbouring network buffer metadata, which is leverageable to disclose adjacent kernel memory; nr_frags is also left one past MAX_SKB_FRAGS so downstream code reads out-of-bounds frag state.
I:HIntegrity impact, high
This is an out-of-bounds write past the end of the static skb_shinfo()->frags[] array with attacker-influenced index and size, corrupting adjacent slab/page-frag memory — per guidance an OOB write is High and is potentially leverageable for control-flow hijack.
A:HAvailability impact, high
After the OOB write, a NULL page is stored as a frag and immediately dereferenced via compound_head() in softirq context, producing a guaranteed kernel oops; the backend can repeat this at will.