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CVE-2026-64502

iio: adc: ad_sigma_delta: fix clear_pending_event for registerless devices

7.8 EPSS 0.2% AV:L

Published 2026-07-25 (3 months ago) by the Linux kernel CNA. Subsystem drivers/iio. Debian urgency: unimportant.

What to do, per Debian release

Debian's own status for CVE-2026-64502 in every release this site tracks, and what each one means in practice. Every status below is the one the Debian Security Team publishes for this CVE. source

ReleaseStatus VersionWhat this means
Debian 12bookwormnot affected6.1.190-1Nothing to do. bookworm never shipped the vulnerable code.
Debian 13trixienot affected6.12.113-1Nothing to do. trixie never shipped the vulnerable code.
Debian 14forkyfixed7.1.4-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.1.4-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian unstablesidfixed7.1.4-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.1.4-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.

The vulnerability

What the bug is

ad_sigma_delta_clear_pending_event() falls through to the status register read path for devices with has_registers = false and no rdy_gpiod. For such devices, ad_sd_read_reg() skips the address byte entirely and clocks raw MISO bytes with no address phase — making it byte-for-byte identical to reading conversion data. If a pending conversion result is present, this partially consumes it and corrupts the data stream for the subsequent ad_sd_read_reg() call in ad_sigma_delta_single_conversion(). Furthermore, with num_resetclks = 0 on these devices, data_read_len evaluates to 0. If the clocked byte has bit 7 clear, pending_event is set and the code attempts memset(data + 2, 0xff, 0 - 1), overflowing to SIZE_MAX and corrupting the heap. Fix by returning 0 immediately when neither rdy_gpiod nor has_registers is set. This is safe for all current registerless devices: ad7191 and ad7780 (with powerdown GPIO) are reset between conversions by CS deassertion, so there is no stale result to drain; ad7780 (without powerdown GPIO) and max11205 are continuously-converting and cycle ~DRDY at the output data rate regardless of whether the previous result was read, so the next falling edge fires naturally. A future registerless device that holds ~DRDY asserted until data is read would be broken by this early return and would require either num_resetclks set or a rdy-gpio. The same heap corruption is reachable on any device with rdy_gpiod set but num_resetclks = 0: if the GPIO indicates a pending event, the drain path executes memset(data + 2, 0xff, 0 - 1) regardless of has_registers. Add an explicit data_read_len == 0 guard after the pending event check; the stale result is then consumed by the first ad_sd_read_reg() call in ad_sigma_delta_single_conversion().

Where it lives

The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.

drivers/iio/adc/ad_sigma_delta.c

What this is
ANALOG DEVICES INC IIO DRIVERSMAINTAINERS section matched on drivers/iio/*/ad* · linux@analog.com · Supported
Kernel module
ad_sigma_delta

Check it on the machine

grep -wE 'CONFIG_AD_SIGMA_DELTA|CONFIG_IIO' /boot/config-$(uname -r)

Reads the booted kernel's own configuration, on the machine and nowhere else. =y is built in, =m is a module, and an is not set line means the code is not there.

lsmod | grep -w ad_sigma_delta

Prints a line if that module is loaded right now, and nothing if it is not. One that is not loaded can still be loaded later by anything that needs it.

Show whether Debian builds this, per release

Debian builds this, but not on every flavour. At least one release below builds the code on some of its kernel flavours and not on others, so the answer depends on the architecture and flavour installed.

  • bookwormMnot built on amd64/cloud-amd64, arm64/cloud-arm64
  • trixie, forky, sidMnot built on amd64/cloud-amd64, arm64/cloud-arm64, s390x/s390x
M
a module where it is built at all; some flavours do not build it
Build switches
CONFIG_AD_SIGMA_DELTA, CONFIG_IIO
Reads as
all on means the file is compiled; any one off means it is not.

From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS kbuild Makefiles Debian linux-config packages

Signals

Published
2026-07-25 (3 months ago)source
CVSS
7.8 high
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hsource recompute it
Attack vector
local (AV:L)source
EPSS
0.17%, higher than 6.3% of all CVEssource
CISA KEV
not listedthe KEV catalogue
Debian urgency
unimportantsource
Subsystem
drivers/iio

Upstream fixes

The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source

IntroducedFixed inCommit
6.146.18.393394e0b33284
6.147.1.43bceb26dfaf7
6.147.291bc6767a4f5

Why the CNA scored it this way

Quoted from the kernel CNA's own scoring file, word for word. A highlighted metric carries the most severe value CVSS v3.1 defines for it, which is what pushes the score up. source

AV:LAttack vector, local
An attacker reaches the flaw locally by reading a world-readable IIO raw sysfs attribute, which invokes the vulnerable conversion path through read(2). No network or physical-device insertion path is required.
AC:LAttack complexity, low
Continuously converting MAX11205 and AD7780 deployments naturally produce the pending result needed to trigger the size underflow. Repeated reads or attacker-controlled interruption of a conversion make the condition reproducible without an uncontrollable race.
PR:LPrivileges required, low
IIO raw attributes are created with mode 0444, and the read path performs no capability, authentication, or namespace privilege check. A basic unprivileged local user is sufficient.
UI:NUser interaction, none
The attacker directly reads the sensor attribute and does not require another user to perform any action.
S:UScope, unchanged
The vulnerable driver and the affected kernel resources belong to the same operating-system security authority. Kernel privilege escalation does not itself constitute a scope change.
C:HConfidentiality impact, high
The one-byte allocation is followed by an effectively unbounded heap overwrite, allowing adjacent kernel objects to be corrupted. Heap grooming and concurrent use of corrupted objects could yield control-flow or memory-disclosure primitives exposing arbitrary kernel and process data.
I:HIntegrity impact, high
The massive out-of-bounds write can corrupt arbitrary adjacent kernel objects and potentially enable control-flow hijacking or privilege escalation.
A:HAvailability impact, high
A trigger can cause a fortification panic, kernel page fault or oops, or catastrophic heap corruption, and an unprivileged attacker can repeat it.