data built 2026-10-19T13:16:53Z

Look up another CVE · open CVE-2026-64447 in the interactive tracker

CVE-2026-64447

staging: media: ipu7: fix double-free and use-after-free in error paths

7.8 EPSS 0.2% AV:L

Published 2026-07-25 (3 months ago) by the Linux kernel CNA. Subsystem drivers/staging. Debian urgency: unimportant.

What to do, per Debian release

Debian's own status for CVE-2026-64447 in every release this site tracks, and what each one means in practice. Every status below is the one the Debian Security Team publishes for this CVE. source

ReleaseStatus VersionWhat this means
Debian 12bookwormnot affected6.1.190-1Nothing to do. bookworm never shipped the vulnerable code.
Debian 13trixienot affected6.12.113-1Nothing to do. trixie never shipped the vulnerable code.
Debian 14forkyfixed7.1.4-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.1.4-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian unstablesidfixed7.1.4-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.1.4-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.

The vulnerability

What the bug is

In both ipu7_isys_init() and ipu7_psys_init(), pdata is allocated and then passed to ipu7_bus_initialize_device(), which stores it in adev->pdata. The ipu7_bus_release() function frees adev->pdata when the device's reference count drops to zero. Two error paths incorrectly call kfree(pdata) after the device teardown has already freed it: 1. When ipu7_mmu_init() fails: put_device() is called, which drops the reference count to zero and triggers ipu7_bus_release() -> kfree(pdata). The subsequent kfree(pdata) is a double-free. 2. When ipu7_bus_add_device() fails: it calls auxiliary_device_uninit() internally, which calls put_device() -> ipu7_bus_release() -> kfree(pdata). The subsequent kfree(pdata) is again a double-free. Note that the kfree(pdata) when ipu7_bus_initialize_device() itself fails is correct, because in that case auxiliary_device_init() failed and the release function was never set up, so pdata must be freed manually. Additionally, the error code was not saved before calling put_device(), causing ERR_CAST() to dereference the already-freed adev pointer when constructing the return value. Fix this by saving the error from dev_err_probe() before put_device() and returning ERR_PTR() instead. Remove the redundant kfree(pdata) calls and fix the use-after-free in the return values of the two affected error paths.

Where it lives

The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.

drivers/staging/media/ipu7/ipu7.c

What this is
INTEL IPU7 INPUT SYSTEM DRIVERMAINTAINERS section matched on drivers/staging/media/ipu7/ · linux-media@vger.kernel.org · Maintained
Kernel module
intel_ipu7

Check it on the machine

grep -wE 'CONFIG_STAGING|CONFIG_VIDEO_INTEL_IPU7' /boot/config-$(uname -r)

Reads the booted kernel's own configuration, on the machine and nowhere else. =y is built in, =m is a module, and an is not set line means the code is not there.

lsmod | grep -w intel_ipu7

Prints a line if that module is loaded right now, and nothing if it is not. One that is not loaded can still be loaded later by anything that needs it.

Show whether Debian builds this, per release

Debian builds this, but not on every flavour. At least one release below builds the code on some of its kernel flavours and not on others, so the answer depends on the architecture and flavour installed. The build rule could not be established for 2 releases, so nothing is claimed about those.

  • bookworm, trixie?
  • forky, sidMnot built on amd64/cloud-amd64, arm64/arm64, arm64/arm64-16k, arm64/cloud-arm64, arm64/rt-arm64, armhf/armmp, armhf/armmp-lpae, loong64/loong64, ppc64el/powerpc64le, ppc64el/powerpc64le-64k, riscv64/riscv64, s390x/s390x
?
not established - no Makefile entry for the affected file
M
a module where it is built at all; some flavours do not build it

Where a release above reads "not established", no build rule for the affected file was found in that release's kernel tree. That is a gap in this lookup, not a finding that the code is absent.

Build switches
CONFIG_STAGING, CONFIG_VIDEO_INTEL_IPU7
Reads as
all on means the file is compiled; any one off means it is not.

From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS kbuild Makefiles Debian linux-config packages

Signals

Published
2026-07-25 (3 months ago)source
CVSS
7.8 high
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hsource recompute it
Attack vector
local (AV:L)source
EPSS
0.17%, higher than 5.8% of all CVEssource
CISA KEV
not listedthe KEV catalogue
Debian urgency
unimportantsource
Subsystem
drivers/staging

Upstream fixes

The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source

IntroducedFixed inCommit
6.176.18.39b5ddc7257bee
6.177.1.4837c1f965542
6.177.2d3a9a8cf2d7f

Why the CNA scored it this way

Quoted from the kernel CNA's own scoring file, word for word. A highlighted metric carries the most severe value CVSS v3.1 defines for it, which is what pushes the score up. source

AV:LAttack vector, local
The affected functions are reached from the Intel IPU7/IPU7.5 PCI driver probe, not network traffic or V4L2 ioctls. Exploitation therefore requires local execution to influence the probe-time failure and heap state.
AC:LAttack complexity, low
Once ipu7_mmu_init() or auxiliary_device_add() fails, the double-free and use-after-free execute deterministically without a race. Allocation pressure and heap grooming are attacker-controlled in the highest reasonable scenario.
PR:LPrivileges required, low
Direct module loading and sysfs reprobe operations require initial-namespace administration and are not enabled by user namespaces. However, an ordinary local user can sustain allocation pressure during an automatic probe, making basic local access sufficient in the highest reasonable scenario.
UI:NUser interaction, none
PCI probing and error unwinding are kernel-driven; no separate victim action is required once the triggering conditions are established.
S:UScope, unchanged
The corruption occurs within the host kernel and affects resources governed by that same security authority, without crossing a VM, IOMMU, or other scope boundary.
C:HConfidentiality impact, high
The double-free can produce overlapping kernel allocations, while the companion use-after-free accesses a freed container. Attacker-controlled reuse can expose arbitrary kernel memory.
I:HIntegrity impact, high
The duplicated allocator entry can yield two live users of one kernel object, enabling corruption of security-sensitive objects and potentially arbitrary writes or control-flow hijacking.
A:HAvailability impact, high
The double-free can trip allocator hardening or corrupt SLUB state, while the use-after-free can cause invalid-pointer accesses, resulting in a kernel oops or panic.