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CVE-2026-64431

ntfs: avoid calling post_write_mst_fixup() for invalid index_block

7.8 EPSS 0.2% AV:L

Published 2026-07-25 (3 months ago) by the Linux kernel CNA. Subsystem fs/ntfs. Debian urgency: unimportant.

What to do, per Debian release

Debian's own status for CVE-2026-64431 in every release this site tracks, and what each one means in practice. Every status below is the one the Debian Security Team publishes for this CVE. source

Release	Status	Version	What this means
Debian 12bookworm	not affected	6.1.190-1	Nothing to do. bookworm never shipped the vulnerable code.
Debian 13trixie	not affected	6.12.113-1	Nothing to do. trixie never shipped the vulnerable code.
Debian 14forky	fixed	7.1.4-1	Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.1.4-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian unstablesid	fixed	7.1.4-1	Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.1.4-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.

The vulnerability

What the bug is

ntfs_icx_ib_sync_write() calls post_write_mst_fixup() when ntfs_ib_write() returns an error, intending to restore the buffer after a failed write. However, ntfs_ib_write() returns an error immediately if pre_write_mst_fixup() validation fails. The caller, ntfs_icx_ib_sync_write(), interprets any error as a write failure requiring rollback. It does not differentiate between I/O errors and validation failures, and calls post_write_mst_fixup() anyway. Since post_write_mst_fixup() assumes that the index_block contents is correct, it doesn't perform the boundary checks, which results in out-of-bounds memory access. An attacker can craft a malicious NTFS image with: - large index_block.usa_ofs offset, pointing outside the ntfs_record - index_block.usa_count = 0, causing integer underflow - or index_block.usa_count larger than actual number of sectors in the ntfs_record, causing out-of-bounds access KASAN reports describing the memory corruption: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in post_write_mst_fixup+0x19c/0x1d0 Read of size 2 at addr ffff8881586c9018 by task p/9428 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x100/0x190 print_report+0x139/0x4ad ? post_write_mst_fixup+0x19c/0x1d0 ? __virt_addr_valid+0x262/0x500 ? post_write_mst_fixup+0x19c/0x1d0 kasan_report+0xe4/0x1d0 ? post_write_mst_fixup+0x19c/0x1d0 post_write_mst_fixup+0x19c/0x1d0 ntfs_icx_ib_sync_write+0x179/0x220 ntfs_inode_sync_filename+0x83d/0x1080 __ntfs_write_inode+0x1049/0x1480 ntfs_file_fsync+0x131/0x9b0 ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in post_write_mst_fixup+0x1aa/0x1d0 Write of size 2 at addr ffff8881586c91fe by task p/9428 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x100/0x190 print_report+0x139/0x4ad ? post_write_mst_fixup+0x1aa/0x1d0 ? __virt_addr_valid+0x262/0x500 ? post_write_mst_fixup+0x1aa/0x1d0 kasan_report+0xe4/0x1d0 ? post_write_mst_fixup+0x1aa/0x1d0 post_write_mst_fixup+0x1aa/0x1d0 ntfs_icx_ib_sync_write+0x179/0x220 ntfs_inode_sync_filename+0x83d/0x1080 __ntfs_write_inode+0x1049/0x1480 ntfs_file_fsync+0x131/0x9b0 ================================================================== Let's move the post_write_mst_fixup() call to ntfs_ib_write(). The ntfs_ib_write() function calls pre_write_mst_fixup() at the beginning. If the index_block contents is invalid, pre_write_mst_fixup() fails and ntfs_ib_write() returns early without calling post_write_mst_fixup() on bad index_block.

Where it lives

The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.

fs/ntfs/index.c

What this is: NTFS FILESYSTEMMAINTAINERS section matched on fs/ntfs/ · linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org · Maintained
Kernel module: ntfs

Check it on the machine

grep -w CONFIG_NTFS_FS /boot/config-$(uname -r)

Reads the booted kernel's own configuration, on the machine and nowhere else. =y is built in, =m is a module, and an is not set line means the code is not there.

lsmod | grep -w ntfs

Prints a line if that module is loaded right now, and nothing if it is not. One that is not loaded can still be loaded later by anything that needs it.

Show whether Debian builds this, per release

Debian does not build this code in 1 release. It does build it in 2 releases, so the answer depends on which release the machine runs. The build rule could not be established for 1 release, so nothing is claimed about those.

bookwormn
trixie?
forky, sidm

n: not enabled on any flavour - this release does not build the code
?: not established - no Makefile entry for the affected file
m: a loadable module on every flavour - check lsmod, can be blacklisted

Where a release above reads "not established", no build rule for the affected file was found in that release's kernel tree. That is a gap in this lookup, not a finding that the code is absent.

Build switch: CONFIG_NTFS_FS

From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS kbuild Makefiles Debian linux-config packages

Debian tracker CVE record NVD kernel CNA record

Signals

Published: 2026-07-25 (3 months ago)source
CVSS: 7.8 high
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hsource recompute it
Attack vector: local (AV:L)source
EPSS: 0.17%, higher than 5.4% of all CVEssource
CISA KEV: not listedthe KEV catalogue
Debian urgency: unimportantsource
Subsystem: fs/ntfs

Upstream fixes

The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source

Introduced	Fixed in	Commit
7.1	7.1.4	e2018628301a
7.1	7.2	5b6eedd7cc29

Why the CNA scored it this way

Quoted from the kernel CNA's own scoring file, word for word. A highlighted metric carries the most severe value CVSS v3.1 defines for it, which is what pushes the score up. source

AV:LAttack vector, local: The malformed USA fields originate in a crafted NTFS volume, and exploitation proceeds through local file modification followed by fsync or writeback. Network file access alone cannot create the required malformed index metadata.
AC:LAttack complexity, low: The attacker controls the index block, USA offset/count, target filename, and triggering operation; no race or condition outside attacker control is required. The usa_count underflow provides a deterministic corruption path.
PR:LPrivileges required, low: Although a direct NTFS mount requires initial-namespace CAP_SYS_ADMIN because NTFS lacks FS_USERNS_MOUNT, delegated or automatic mounting allows an ordinary local user to reach the trigger. After mounting, only write access to the crafted file is needed and no capability check occurs.
UI:NUser interaction, none: In reasonable automount, delegated-mount, or fstab-user deployments, no separate victim action is required. The attacker can mount or access the volume, modify the writable file, and invoke fsync independently.
S:UScope, unchanged: The corruption occurs in the host kernel and compromises resources governed by that same kernel security authority. This is standard local kernel privilege escalation rather than a guest-to-host or IOMMU boundary escape.
C:HConfidentiality impact, high: Unchecked USA metadata causes substantial out-of-bounds reads, and the accompanying kernel heap corruption can be leveraged to disclose arbitrary kernel memory. The reads are not confined to a small bounded value.
I:HIntegrity impact, high: An underflowed usa_count produces up to 65,535 two-byte writes at 512-byte intervals, spanning roughly 32 MiB beyond the index-block allocation. Attacker-controlled initial source values and heap grooming make control-flow hijacking or arbitrary kernel modification defensible.
A:HAvailability impact, high: The extensive out-of-bounds access can corrupt unrelated kernel objects or access invalid memory, causing an oops, panic, or system-wide failure. The trigger is repeatable through local filesystem operations.