data built 2026-10-19T13:16:53Z

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CVE-2026-64423

ipv4: igmp: remove multicast group from hash table on device destruction

7.8 EPSS 0.1% AV:L

Published 2026-07-25 (3 months ago) by the Linux kernel CNA. Subsystem net/ipv4. Debian urgency: not yet assigned.

What to do, per Debian release

Debian's own status for CVE-2026-64423 in every release this site tracks, and what each one means in practice. Every status below is the one the Debian Security Team publishes for this CVE. source

ReleaseStatus VersionWhat this means
Debian 12bookwormfixedDLA-4720-1 · 2026-08-05 · text6.1.180-1Update the kernel and reboot. DLA-4720-1 shipped the fix on 2026-08-05, in 6.1.180-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian 13trixiefixed6.12.96-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 6.12.96-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian 14forkyfixed7.1.4-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.1.4-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian unstablesidfixed7.1.4-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.1.4-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian 12bookworm · linux-6.12fixedDLA-4724-1 · 2026-08-07 · text6.12.100-1~deb12u1Update the kernel and reboot. DLA-4724-1 shipped the fix on 2026-08-07, in 6.12.100-1~deb12u1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.

The vulnerability

What the bug is

When a device is destroyed under RTNL, ip_mc_destroy_dev() iterates through the multicast list and calls ip_ma_put() on each membership, scheduling them for RCU reclamation. However, they are not unlinked from the device's multicast hash table (mc_hash). Since the device remains published in dev->ip_ptr until after ip_mc_destroy_dev() completes, concurrent RCU readers traversing mc_hash can still locate and access the multicast group after its refcount is decremented. If the RCU callback runs and frees the group while a reader is accessing it, a use-after-free occurs. Fix this by unlinking the multicast group from mc_hash using ip_mc_hash_remove() before scheduling it for reclamation. BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ip_check_mc_rcu+0x149/0x3f0 Read of size 4 at addr ffff888009bf1408 by task mausezahn/2276 Call Trace: <IRQ> dump_stack_lvl+0x67/0x90 print_report+0x175/0x7c0 kasan_report+0x147/0x180 ip_check_mc_rcu+0x149/0x3f0 udp_v4_early_demux+0x36d/0x12d0 ip_rcv_finish_core+0xb8b/0x1390 ip_rcv_finish+0x54/0x120 NF_HOOK+0x213/0x2b0 __netif_receive_skb+0x126/0x340 process_backlog+0x4f2/0xf00 __napi_poll+0x92/0x2c0 net_rx_action+0x583/0xc60 handle_softirqs+0x236/0x7f0 do_softirq+0x57/0x80 </IRQ> Allocated by task 2239: kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80 __kasan_kmalloc+0x72/0x90 ____ip_mc_inc_group+0x31a/0xa40 __ip_mc_join_group+0x334/0x3f0 do_ip_setsockopt+0x16fa/0x2010 ip_setsockopt+0x3f/0x90 do_sock_setsockopt+0x1ad/0x300 Freed by task 0: kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80 kasan_save_free_info+0x40/0x50 __kasan_slab_free+0x3a/0x60 __rcu_free_sheaf_prepare+0xd4/0x220 rcu_free_sheaf+0x36/0x190 rcu_core+0x8d9/0x12f0 handle_softirqs+0x236/0x7f0

Where it lives

The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.

net/ipv4/igmp.c

What this is
NETWORKING [IPv4/IPv6]MAINTAINERS section matched on net/ipv4/igmp.c · netdev@vger.kernel.org · Maintained

Check it on the machine

grep -w CONFIG_INET /boot/config-$(uname -r)

Reads the booted kernel's own configuration, on the machine and nowhere else. =y is built in, =m is a module, and an is not set line means the code is not there.

Show whether Debian builds this, per release

Debian builds this code. Every release below compiles the affected file into the kernels it ships.

  • bookworm, trixie, forky, sid, bookworm · linux-6.12y
y
built into the kernel image on every flavour - only a patch removes it
Build switch
CONFIG_INET

From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS kbuild Makefiles Debian linux-config packages

Signals

Published
2026-07-25 (3 months ago)source
CVSS
7.8 high
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hsource recompute it
Attack vector
local (AV:L)source
EPSS
0.13%, higher than 2.4% of all CVEssource
CISA KEV
not listedthe KEV catalogue
Debian urgency
not yet assignedsource
Subsystem
net/ipv4

Upstream fixes

The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source

IntroducedFixed inCommit
3.115.10.261412ba7def06f
3.115.15.212c6cb5f8ebe1c
3.116.1.1785f42729d74bd
3.116.6.14576d030ac95e1
3.116.12.968820b530cb23
3.116.18.392ca18df1c261
3.117.1.4f91883031e5a
3.117.27993211bde16

Debian advisories

AdvisoryDateShipped toDebian
DLA-4724-12026-08-07bookworm 6.12.100-1~deb12u1tracker
DLA-4723-12026-08-07bullseye 6.1.180-1~deb11u1tracker
DLA-4720-12026-08-05bookworm 6.1.180-1tracker
DLA-4717-12026-08-05bullseye 5.10.262-1tracker

Why the CNA scored it this way

Quoted from the kernel CNA's own scoring file, word for word. A highlighted metric carries the most severe value CVSS v3.1 defines for it, which is what pushes the score up. source

AV:LAttack vector, local
An end-to-end attacker-controlled trigger requires local socket and netlink operations to create multicast memberships and concurrently destroy IPv4 device state; received multicast packets alone cannot initiate the necessary teardown. These operations are reachable inside an attacker-created user and network namespace.
AC:LAttack complexity, low
The attacker can populate mc_hash, generate continuous multicast traffic, and repeatedly tear down IPv4 state, controlling both sides of the race. No victim-dependent timing or secret state is required.
PR:LPrivileges required, low
Device teardown or invalid-MTU configuration requires CAP_NET_ADMIN in the target network namespace, while multicast joins and UDP sends are unprivileged. An ordinary user can obtain this namespace-scoped capability through unprivileged user and network namespaces.
UI:NUser interaction, none
Exploitation requires no action by another user once the attacker can execute locally and create the required namespace and traffic.
S:UScope, unchanged
The vulnerable code and resulting host-kernel compromise remain within the same security authority; this is conventional kernel privilege escalation rather than a guest-to-host escape.
C:HConfidentiality impact, high
The stale kmalloc-256 ip_mc_list entry exposes reuse-controlled fields and pointers to kernel reads, making kernel-memory disclosure and broader read primitives plausible.
I:HIntegrity impact, high
Reallocation permits attacker-influenced object contents to drive spinlock writes and pointer traversal on freed memory, making heap corruption and control-flow hijacking defensible.
A:HAvailability impact, high
The confirmed slab use-after-free can dereference corrupted hash pointers or operate on an invalid spinlock, causing a kernel oops, panic, general-protection fault, or hang.