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CVE-2026-64320

nvmet: fix pre-auth out-of-bounds heap read in Discovery Get Log Page

9.1 EPSS 0.7% AV:N

Published 2026-07-25 (3 months ago) by the Linux kernel CNA. Subsystem drivers/nvme. Debian urgency: not yet assigned.

What to do, per Debian release

Debian's own status for CVE-2026-64320 in every release this site tracks, and what each one means in practice. Every status below is the one the Debian Security Team publishes for this CVE. source

ReleaseStatus VersionWhat this means
Debian 12bookwormvulnerable6.1.190-1No fix published anywhere yet, neither in Debian nor upstream for the series bookworm tracks. Watch the Debian tracker page for this CVE. Advisories for bookworm have historically landed a median of 23 days after publication.
Debian 13trixiefixed6.12.96-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 6.12.96-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian 14forkyfixed7.1.4-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.1.4-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian unstablesidfixed7.1.4-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.1.4-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian 12bookworm · linux-6.12fixedDLA-4724-1 · 2026-08-07 · text6.12.100-1~deb12u1Update the kernel and reboot. DLA-4724-1 shipped the fix on 2026-08-07, in 6.12.100-1~deb12u1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.

The vulnerability

What the bug is

nvmet_execute_disc_get_log_page() validates only the dword alignment of the host-supplied Log Page Offset (lpo). The 64-bit offset is then added to a small kzalloc'd buffer that holds the discovery log page and the result is passed straight to nvmet_copy_to_sgl(), which memcpy()s data_len bytes out to the host with no source-side bound check: u64 offset = nvmet_get_log_page_offset(req->cmd); /* 64-bit host */ size_t data_len = nvmet_get_log_page_len(req->cmd); /* 32-bit host */ ... if (offset & 0x3) { ... } /* only check */ ... alloc_len = sizeof(*hdr) + entry_size * discovery_log_entries(req); buffer = kzalloc(alloc_len, GFP_KERNEL); ... status = nvmet_copy_to_sgl(req, 0, buffer + offset, data_len); The Discovery controller is unauthenticated -- nvmet_host_allowed() returns true unconditionally for the discovery subsystem -- so the call is reachable pre-authentication by any TCP/RDMA/FC peer that can reach the nvmet target. With a discovery log page of ~1 KiB, an attacker requesting up to 4 KiB starting at offset == alloc_len reads the next slab page out and gets its content returned over the fabric (an empirical run on a default nvmet-tcp loopback target leaked 81 canonical kernel pointers in one Get Log Page response). Pointing the offset at unmapped kernel memory faults the in-kernel memcpy and crashes (or panics, on panic_on_oops=1) the target host instead. The attacker-controlled source-side offset pattern "nvmet_copy_to_sgl(req, 0, buffer + ATTACKER_OFFSET, ...)" is unique to nvmet_execute_disc_get_log_page in the entire nvmet codebase: every other Get Log Page handler in admin-cmd.c either ignores lpo (and silently starts every response at offset 0) or tracks a local destination offset with a fixed source pointer. Validate the host-supplied offset against the log page size, cap the copy length to what is actually available, and zero-fill any remainder of the host transfer buffer. The zero-fill matches the existing short-response pattern in nvmet_execute_get_log_changed_ns() (admin-cmd.c) and prevents leaking transport SGL contents when the host asks for more bytes than the log page contains.

Where it lives

The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.

drivers/nvme/target/discovery.c

What this is
NVM EXPRESS TARGET DRIVERMAINTAINERS section matched on drivers/nvme/target/ · linux-nvme@lists.infradead.org · Supported
Kernel module
nvmet

Check it on the machine

grep -w CONFIG_NVME_TARGET /boot/config-$(uname -r)

Reads the booted kernel's own configuration, on the machine and nowhere else. =y is built in, =m is a module, and an is not set line means the code is not there.

lsmod | grep -w nvmet

Prints a line if that module is loaded right now, and nothing if it is not. One that is not loaded can still be loaded later by anything that needs it.

Show whether Debian builds this, per release

Debian builds this as a loadable module. Every release below compiles it as a module on every flavour, so whether the code is in the running kernel depends on whether that module is loaded.

  • bookworm, trixie, forky, sid, bookworm · linux-6.12m
m
a loadable module on every flavour - check lsmod, can be blacklisted
Build switch
CONFIG_NVME_TARGET

From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS kbuild Makefiles Debian linux-config packages

Signals

Published
2026-07-25 (3 months ago)source
CVSS
9.1 critical
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:Hsource recompute it
Attack vector
network (AV:N)source
EPSS
0.75%, higher than 54.0% of all CVEssource
CISA KEV
not listedthe KEV catalogue
Debian urgency
not yet assignedsource
Subsystem
drivers/nvme

Upstream fixes

The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source

IntroducedFixed inCommit
4.86.12.9633b974eb6261
4.86.18.3956c021a08692
4.87.1.4a29b316b9bbf
4.87.253cd102a7a56

Debian advisories

AdvisoryDateShipped toDebian
DLA-4724-12026-08-07bookworm 6.12.100-1~deb12u1tracker

Why the CNA scored it this way

Quoted from the kernel CNA's own scoring file, word for word. A highlighted metric carries the most severe value CVSS v3.1 defines for it, which is what pushes the score up. source

AV:NAttack vector, network
The vulnerable discovery command is remotely reachable through routable NVMe/TCP, as well as NVMe/RDMA and FC transports.
AC:LAttack complexity, low
The attacker controls the protocol sequence, transfer length, and aligned 64-bit offset, with no race or condition outside their control.
PR:NPrivileges required, none
The discovery subsystem accepts every Host NQN and explicitly skips DH-HMAC-CHAP authentication, making the command reachable pre-authentication.
UI:NUser interaction, none
No victim action is required after the NVMe-oF target port is available.
S:UScope, unchanged
The disclosure and crash affect the vulnerable target kernel within the same security authority.
C:HConfidentiality impact, high
The unbounded offset permits repeated multi-kilobyte kernel heap disclosures; testing cited by the fix exposed 81 canonical kernel pointers in one response.
I:NIntegrity impact, none
The primitive reads target memory into transport response pages but provides no attacker-selected write to target memory.
A:HAvailability impact, high
An offset resolving to unmapped or noncanonical memory faults the in-kernel memcpy, causing an oops or target-host panic.