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CVE-2026-64109

af_unix: Fix UAF read of tail->len in unix_stream_data_wait()

8.8 EPSS 0.1% AV:L

Published 2026-07-19 (3 months ago) by the Linux kernel CNA. Subsystem net/unix. Debian urgency: not yet assigned.

What to do, per Debian release

Debian's own status for CVE-2026-64109 in every release this site tracks, and what each one means in practice. Every status below is the one the Debian Security Team publishes for this CVE. source

ReleaseStatus VersionWhat this means
Debian 12bookwormvulnerable6.1.190-1No fix published anywhere yet, neither in Debian nor upstream for the series bookworm tracks. Watch the Debian tracker page for this CVE. Advisories for bookworm have historically landed a median of 23 days after publication.
Debian 13trixiefixed6.12.94-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 6.12.94-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian 14forkyfixed7.0.12-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.0.12-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian unstablesidfixed7.0.12-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.0.12-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.

The vulnerability

What the bug is

unix_stream_data_wait() does skb_peek_tail(&sk->sk_receive_queue) without holding any lock that prevents SKBs on that queue from being dequeued and freed. This has been the case since commit 79f632c71bea ("unix/stream: fix peeking with an offset larger than data in queue"). The first consequence of this is that the pointer comparison `tail != last` can be false even if `last` semantically refers to an already-freed SKB while `tail` is a new SKB allocated at the same address; which can cause unix_stream_data_wait() to wrongly keep blocking after new data has arrived, but only in a weird scenario where a peeking recv() and a normal recv() on the same socket are racing, which is probably not a real problem. But since commit 2b514574f7e8 ("net: af_unix: implement splice for stream af_unix sockets"), `tail` is actually dereferenced, which can cause UAF in the following race scenario (where test_setup() runs single-threaded, and afterwards, test_thread1() and test_thread2() run concurrently in two threads: ``` static int socks[2]; void test_setup(void) { socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, socks); send(socks[1], "A", 1, 0); int peekoff = 1; setsockopt(socks[0], SOL_SOCKET, SO_PEEK_OFF, &peekoff, sizeof(peekoff)); } void test_thread1(void) { char dummy; recv(socks[0], &dummy, 1, MSG_PEEK); } void test_thread2(void) { char dummy; recv(socks[0], &dummy, 1, 0); shutdown(socks[1], SHUT_WR); } ``` when racing like this: ``` thread1 thread2 unix_stream_read_generic mutex_lock(&u->iolock) skb_peek(&sk->sk_receive_queue) skb_peek_next(skb, &sk->sk_receive_queue) mutex_unlock(&u->iolock) unix_stream_read_generic unix_state_lock(sk) skb_peek(&sk->sk_receive_queue) unix_state_unlock(sk) unix_stream_data_wait unix_state_lock(sk) tail = skb_peek_tail(&sk->sk_receive_queue) spin_lock(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock) __skb_unlink(skb, &sk->sk_receive_queue) spin_unlock(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock) consume_skb(skb) [frees the SKB] `tail != last`: false `tail`: true `tail->len != last_len` ***UAF*** ``` Fix the UAF by removing the read of tail->len; checking tail->len would only make sense if SKBs in the receive queue of a UNIX socket could grow, which can no longer happen. Kuniyuki explained: > When commit 869e7c62486e ("net: af_unix: implement stream sendpage > support") added sendpage() support, data could be appended to the last > skb in the receiver's queue. > > That's why we needed to check if the length of the last skb was changed > while waiting for new data in unix_stream_data_wait(). > > However, commit a0dbf5f818f9 ("af_unix: Support MSG_SPLICE_PAGES") and > commit 57d44a354a43 ("unix: Convert unix_stream_sendpage() to use > MSG_SPLICE_PAGES") refactored sendmsg(), and now data is always added > to a new skb. That means this fix is not suitable for kernels before 6.5.

Where it lives

The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.

net/unix/af_unix.c

What this is
NETWORKING [UNIX SOCKETS]MAINTAINERS section matched on net/unix/ · Maintained

Check it on the machine

grep -w CONFIG_UNIX /boot/config-$(uname -r)

Reads the booted kernel's own configuration, on the machine and nowhere else. =y is built in, =m is a module, and an is not set line means the code is not there.

Show whether Debian builds this, per release

Debian builds this code. Every release below compiles the affected file into the kernels it ships.

  • bookworm, trixie, forky, sidy
y
built into the kernel image on every flavour - only a patch removes it
Build switch
CONFIG_UNIX

From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS kbuild Makefiles Debian linux-config packages

Signals

Published
2026-07-19 (3 months ago)source
CVSS
8.8 high
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:Hsource recompute it
Attack vector
local (AV:L)source
EPSS
0.13%, higher than 2.2% of all CVEssource
CISA KEV
not listedthe KEV catalogue
Debian urgency
not yet assignedsource
Subsystem
net/unix

Upstream fixes

The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source

IntroducedFixed inCommit
4.26.6.14326342087fac9
4.26.12.9238bccb927d83
4.26.18.34acdff9907478
4.27.0.115f162f95a958
4.27.1be309f8eae8b

Why the CNA scored it this way

Quoted from the kernel CNA's own scoring file, word for word. A highlighted metric carries the most severe value CVSS v3.1 defines for it, which is what pushes the score up. source

AV:LAttack vector, local
The bug is reached only through local syscalls on AF_UNIX SOCK_STREAM sockets (recvmsg, splice_read, setsockopt SO_PEEK_OFF), not via any network protocol handler.
AC:LAttack complexity, low
The attacker controls both racing threads on the same socket fd and can retry the peek/normal-recv interleaving; this is a self-induced race, not one dependent on uncontrollable kernel state.
PR:LPrivileges required, low
Any unprivileged local user can create AF_UNIX socketpairs, set SO_PEEK_OFF, and run concurrent recv operations without capabilities, including from within user namespaces.
UI:NUser interaction, none
Exploitation requires no victim interaction; the attacker sets up and races their own socket endpoints programmatically.
S:CScope, changed
Successful kernel heap UAF exploitation from an unprivileged container, Android app sandbox, or user-namespace tenant crosses the sandbox boundary to compromise the host kernel.
C:HConfidentiality impact, high
This is a slab use-after-free read of sk_buff->len on freed memory, which per UAF guidance enables arbitrary kernel memory disclosure and heap layout leaks.
I:HIntegrity impact, high
UAF on sk_buff objects in the kernel heap can be leveraged through heap grooming and spraying to obtain arbitrary write and kernel code execution primitives.
A:HAvailability impact, high
The UAF read can trigger KASAN slab-use-after-free faults, kernel oops, or panic during the dereference, and repeated triggering causes denial of service.