data built 2026-10-19T13:16:53Z

Look up another CVE · open CVE-2026-64026 in the interactive tracker

CVE-2026-64026

rxrpc: Fix DATA decrypt vs splice() by copying data to buffer in recvmsg

7.8 EPSS 0.1% AV:L

Published 2026-07-19 (3 months ago) by the Linux kernel CNA. Subsystem net/rxrpc. Debian urgency: not yet assigned.

What to do, per Debian release

Debian's own status for CVE-2026-64026 in every release this site tracks, and what each one means in practice. Every status below is the one the Debian Security Team publishes for this CVE. source

ReleaseStatus VersionWhat this means
Debian 12bookwormvulnerable6.1.190-1No fix published anywhere yet, neither in Debian nor upstream for the series bookworm tracks. Watch the Debian tracker page for this CVE. Advisories for bookworm have historically landed a median of 23 days after publication.
Debian 13trixiefixed6.12.94-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 6.12.94-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian 14forkyfixed7.0.12-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.0.12-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian unstablesidfixed7.0.12-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.0.12-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.

The vulnerability

What the bug is

This improves the fix for CVE-2026-43500. Fix the pagecache corruption from in-place decryption of a DATA packet transmitted locally by splice() by getting rid of the packet sharing in the I/O thread and unconditionally extracting the packet content into a bounce buffer in which the buffer is decrypted. recvmsg() (or the kernel equivalent) then copies the data from the bounce buffer to the destination buffer. The sk_buff then remains unmodified. This has an additional advantage in that the packet is then arranged in the buffer with the correct alignment required for the crypto algorithms to process directly. The performance of the crypto does seem to be a little faster and, surprisingly, the unencrypted performance doesn't seem to change much - possibly due to removing complexity from the I/O thread. Yet another advantage is that the I/O thread doesn't have to copy packets which would slow down packet distribution, ACK generation, etc.. The buffer belongs to the call and is allocated initially at 2K, sufficiently large to hold a whole jumbo subpacket, but the buffer will be increased in size if needed. However, to take this work, MSG_PEEK may cause a later packet to be decrypted into the buffer, in which case the earlier one will need re-decrypting for a subsequent recvmsg(). Note that rx_pkt_offset may legitimately see 0 as a valid offset now, so switch to using USHRT_MAX to indicate an invalid offset. Note also that I would generally prefer to replace the buffers of the current sk_buff with a new kmalloc'd buffer of the right size, ditching the old data and frags as this makes the handling of MSG_PEEK easier and removes the re-decryption issue, but this looks like quite a complicated thing to achieve. skb_morph() looks half way to what I want, but I don't want to have to allocate a new sk_buff.

Where it lives

The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.

net/rxrpc/ar-internal.h
net/rxrpc/call_event.c
net/rxrpc/call_object.c
net/rxrpc/insecure.c
net/rxrpc/recvmsg.c
net/rxrpc/rxgk.c
net/rxrpc/rxgk_common.h
net/rxrpc/rxkad.c

What this is
RXRPC SOCKETS (AF_RXRPC)MAINTAINERS section matched on net/rxrpc/ · linux-afs@lists.infradead.org · Supported
Kernel module
rxrpc

Check it on the machine

grep -w CONFIG_AF_RXRPC /boot/config-$(uname -r)

Reads the booted kernel's own configuration, on the machine and nowhere else. =y is built in, =m is a module, and an is not set line means the code is not there.

lsmod | grep -w rxrpc

Prints a line if that module is loaded right now, and nothing if it is not. One that is not loaded can still be loaded later by anything that needs it.

Show whether Debian builds this, per release

Debian builds this, but not on every flavour. At least one release below builds the code on some of its kernel flavours and not on others, so the answer depends on the architecture and flavour installed.

  • bookworm, trixie, forky, sidMnot built on amd64/cloud-amd64, arm64/cloud-arm64
M
a module where it is built at all; some flavours do not build it
Build switch
CONFIG_AF_RXRPC

From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS kbuild Makefiles Debian linux-config packages

Signals

Published
2026-07-19 (3 months ago)source
CVSS
7.8 high
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hsource recompute it
Attack vector
local (AV:L)source
EPSS
0.14%, higher than 3.1% of all CVEssource
CISA KEV
not listedthe KEV catalogue
Debian urgency
not yet assignedsource
Subsystem
net/rxrpc

Upstream fixes

The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source

IntroducedFixed inCommit
5.36.6.143a05bf6d9e621
5.36.12.93b94a6ccbaf11
5.36.18.3546cb765e2e5a
5.37.0.11c58008774371
5.37.1d2bc90cf6c75

Why the CNA scored it this way

Quoted from the kernel CNA's own scoring file, word for word. A highlighted metric carries the most severe value CVSS v3.1 defines for it, which is what pushes the score up. source

AV:LAttack vector, local
Exploitation requires skb fragments backed by splice()-shared pagecache pages (SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG via __ip_append_data or MSG_SPLICE_PAGES on loopback TX), not packets received from a remote NIC; the corrupting decrypt runs in recvmsg()/rxrpc_kernel_recv_data() on the local receive path.
AC:LAttack complexity, low
The attacker controls both sides of the loopback session—establishing an encrypted rxrpc call, splicing/sending DATA packets with shared frags, and calling recvmsg() to trigger in-place decryption—without depending on timing or layout they cannot influence.
PR:LPrivileges required, low
AF_RXRPC socket creation and bind require no special capabilities; any unprivileged local user who can load/use the rxrpc module (e.g., via kafs/AFS client) can establish encrypted rxrpc sessions with session-keyring credentials.
UI:NUser interaction, none
Triggering pagecache corruption requires only local syscalls (socket, splice/sendmsg, recvmsg) with no victim user action such as opening files or mounting filesystems.
S:UScope, unchanged
The impact is in-kernel pagecache corruption on the same host; it does not cross a VM, container, or IOMMU security boundary to affect a different security authority.
C:HConfidentiality impact, high
In-place decryption via skb_to_sgvec() overwrites shared pagecache pages with transformed ciphertext, constituting uncontrolled kernel memory modification that can corrupt or expose cached file data readable by other processes sharing those pages.
I:HIntegrity impact, high
The bug writes decrypted data directly into pagecache-backed pages referenced by skb frags, enabling arbitrary modification of cached file contents for any file the attacker can splice from, including world-readable shared files.
A:HAvailability impact, high
Corrupting pagecache pages of active file mappings can cause filesystem data integrity failures, application crashes, and potential kernel panics from subsequent I/O on damaged cache state.