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Look up another CVE · open CVE-2026-63978 in the interactive tracker

CVE-2026-63978

net/handshake: Drain pending requests at net namespace exit

9.8 EPSS 0.7% AV:N

Published 2026-07-19 (3 months ago) by the Linux kernel CNA. Subsystem net/handshake. Debian urgency: unimportant.

What to do, per Debian release

Debian's own status for CVE-2026-63978 in every release this site tracks, and what each one means in practice. Every status below is the one the Debian Security Team publishes for this CVE. source

ReleaseStatus VersionWhat this means
Debian 12bookwormnot affected6.1.190-1Nothing to do. bookworm never shipped the vulnerable code.
Debian 13trixiefixed6.12.94-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 6.12.94-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian 14forkyfixed7.0.12-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.0.12-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian unstablesidfixed7.0.12-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.0.12-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.

The vulnerability

What the bug is

The arguments to list_splice_init() in handshake_net_exit() are reversed. The call moves the local empty "requests" list onto hn->hn_requests, leaving the local list empty, so the subsequent drain loop runs zero iterations. Pending handshake requests that had not yet been accepted are not torn down when the net namespace is destroyed; each one keeps a reference on a socket file and on the handshake_req allocation. Pass the source and destination in the documented order (list_splice_init(list, head) moves list onto head) so the pending list is transferred to the local scratch list and drained through handshake_complete(). Fixing the splice direction exposes a list-corruption race. After the splice each req->hr_list still has non-empty link pointers, threading the stack-local scratch list rather than hn_requests. A concurrent handshake_req_cancel() -- for example, from sunrpc's TLS timeout on a kernel socket whose netns reference was not taken -- finds the request through the rhashtable, calls remove_pending(), and sees !list_empty(&req->hr_list). __remove_pending_locked() then list_del_init()s an entry off the scratch list while the drain iterates, corrupting it. The same call arriving after the drain loop has run list_del() on an entry hits LIST_POISON instead. Have remove_pending() check HANDSHAKE_F_NET_DRAINING under hn_lock and report not-found when drain is in progress. The drain has already taken ownership; handshake_complete()'s existing test_and_set on HANDSHAKE_F_REQ_COMPLETED still arbitrates between drain and cancel for who calls the consumer's hp_done. Use list_del_init() rather than list_del() in the drain so req->hr_list does not carry LIST_POISON after drain releases the entry. The DRAINING guard in remove_pending() makes cancel return false, but cancel still falls through to test_and_set_bit on HANDSHAKE_F_REQ_COMPLETED and drops the request's hr_file reference. Without another pin, if that is the last reference, sk_destruct frees the request while it is still linked on the drain loop's local list. Pin each request's hr_file under hn_lock before releasing the list, and drop that drain pin after the loop finishes with the request.

Where it lives

The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.

net/handshake/netlink.c
net/handshake/request.c

What this is
HANDSHAKE UPCALL FOR TRANSPORT LAYER SECURITYMAINTAINERS section matched on net/handshake/ · kernel-tls-handshake@lists.linux.dev · Maintained

Check it on the machine

grep -w CONFIG_NET_HANDSHAKE /boot/config-$(uname -r)

Reads the booted kernel's own configuration, on the machine and nowhere else. =y is built in, =m is a module, and an is not set line means the code is not there.

Show whether Debian builds this, per release

Debian builds this code. Every release with an answer below compiles the affected file into the kernels it ships. The build rule could not be established for 1 release, so nothing is claimed about those.

  • bookworm?
  • trixie, forky, sidy
?
not established - no Makefile entry for the affected file
y
built into the kernel image on every flavour - only a patch removes it

Where a release above reads "not established", no build rule for the affected file was found in that release's kernel tree. That is a gap in this lookup, not a finding that the code is absent.

Build switch
CONFIG_NET_HANDSHAKE

From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS kbuild Makefiles Debian linux-config packages

Signals

Published
2026-07-19 (3 months ago)source
CVSS
9.8 critical
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hsource recompute it
Attack vector
network (AV:N)source
EPSS
0.67%, higher than 51.1% of all CVEssource
CISA KEV
not listedthe KEV catalogue
Debian urgency
unimportantsource
Subsystem
net/handshake

Upstream fixes

The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source

IntroducedFixed inCommit
6.46.12.939ec20c9a5a04
6.46.18.442bf24a7e190a
6.47.0.128c35539db0ab
6.47.1ea5fe6a73ca5

Why the CNA scored it this way

Quoted from the kernel CNA's own scoring file, word for word. A highlighted metric carries the most severe value CVSS v3.1 defines for it, which is what pushes the score up. source

AV:NAttack vector, network
Pending handshake requests are created by network-facing kernel TLS consumers (nfsd via `tls_server_hello_x509()` in sunrpc, nvmet-tcp via `tls_server_hello_psk()`), reachable from unauthenticated remote TCP connections before credentials are verified; the bug fires when that namespace is torn down while those requests remain pending.
AC:LAttack complexity, low
An attacker can reliably orchestrate the failure by opening TLS connections to leave handshakes pending, then destroying the namespace (user/net namespace or container teardown) and waiting for the predictable sunrpc/NVMe TLS timeout to invoke `handshake_req_cancel()` against freed per-net state.
PR:NPrivileges required, none
No server-side privileges are required to reach the vulnerable path—remote peers can initiate the pre-authentication TLS handshake that queues pending requests; namespace teardown is also achievable without init-namespace root via user namespaces granting CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
UI:NUser interaction, none
Exploitation requires no victim interaction beyond the attacker (or orchestrator) initiating connections and namespace lifecycle events; no end-user actions such as mounting filesystems or opening files are needed.
S:UScope, unchanged
Impact is confined to kernel memory corruption and host availability within the same kernel security domain; it does not cross a VM, container sandbox, or IOMMU boundary to affect a separate security authority.
C:HConfidentiality impact, high
Undrained requests leave `handshake_req` objects and freed `handshake_net` state reachable through the global rhashtable; concurrent `handshake_req_cancel()` dereferences freed `hn_lock`/`hn_requests` and can hit LIST_POISON, constituting use-after-free with arbitrary-read potential.
I:HIntegrity impact, high
The reversed `list_splice_init()` and ensuing drain/cancel races corrupt kernel linked lists and free in-use `handshake_req` structures while still linked, enabling memory corruption exploitable for control-flow hijacking.
A:HAvailability impact, high
List corruption and use-after-free on namespace exit or concurrent cancel reliably cause kernel oops/panic or deadlock-class failures, and repeated namespace churn with pending handshakes enables sustained denial of service on the host.