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CVE-2026-63955

mm/vmalloc: do not trigger BUG() on BH disabled context

7.5 EPSS 0.5% AV:N

Published 2026-07-19 (3 months ago) by the Linux kernel CNA. Subsystem mm. Debian urgency: unimportant.

What to do, per Debian release

Debian's own status for CVE-2026-63955 in every release this site tracks, and what each one means in practice. Every status below is the one the Debian Security Team publishes for this CVE. source

ReleaseStatus VersionWhat this means
Debian 12bookwormnot affected6.1.190-1Nothing to do. bookworm never shipped the vulnerable code.
Debian 13trixienot affected6.12.113-1Nothing to do. trixie never shipped the vulnerable code.
Debian 14forkyfixed7.0.12-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.0.12-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian unstablesidfixed7.0.12-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.0.12-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.

The vulnerability

What the bug is

__get_vm_area_node() currently triggers a BUG() if in_interrupt() returns true. However, in_interrupt() also reports true when BH are disabled. The bridge code can call rhashtable_lookup_insert_fast() with bottom halves disabled: __vlan_add() -> br_fdb_add_local() spin_lock_bh(&br->hash_lock); <-- Disable BH -> fdb_add_local() -> fdb_create() -> rhashtable_lookup_insert_fast() -> kvmalloc() -> vmalloc() -> __get_vm_area_node() -> BUG_ON(in_interrupt()) spin_unlock_bh(&br->hash_lock) this triggers the BUG() despite the caller not being in NMI or hard IRQ context. Replace the in_interrupt() check with in_nmi() || in_hardirq().

Where it lives

The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.

mm/vmalloc.c

What this is
VMALLOCMAINTAINERS section matched on mm/vmalloc.c · linux-mm@kvack.org · Maintained
Show whether Debian builds this, per release

Not established. This site could not find the build rule for the affected file in the kernel trees Debian ships, so it has no answer about whether Debian compiles this code. Read that as unknown, never as absent.

  • bookworm, trixie, forky, sid?
?
not established - no Makefile entry for the affected file

Where a release above reads "not established", no build rule for the affected file was found in that release's kernel tree. That is a gap in this lookup, not a finding that the code is absent.

From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS

Signals

Published
2026-07-19 (3 months ago)source
CVSS
7.5 high
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:Hsource recompute it
Attack vector
network (AV:N)source
EPSS
0.49%, higher than 40.6% of all CVEssource
CISA KEV
not listedthe KEV catalogue
Debian urgency
unimportantsource
Subsystem
mm

Upstream fixes

The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source

IntroducedFixed inCommit
6.197.0.12ad7eff07b625
6.197.104aa71da5f35

Why the CNA scored it this way

Quoted from the kernel CNA's own scoring file, word for word. A highlighted metric carries the most severe value CVSS v3.1 defines for it, which is what pushes the score up. source

AV:NAttack vector, network
After kvmalloc gained GFP_ATOMIC vmalloc fallback, reachable rhashtable resize paths run from network packet handling (e.g. bridge FDB learning in RX softirq, VXLAN UDP receive/snoop) and can call __get_vm_area_node() while in_interrupt() is true.
AC:LAttack complexity, low
An attacker can reliably trigger the BUG by flooding a reachable bridge/VXLAN interface with many unique source MACs (or equivalent netlink admin operations) to force rhashtable growth and a large GFP_ATOMIC kvmalloc vmalloc fallback.
PR:NPrivileges required, none
The highest-impact path needs no kernel privileges: sending crafted L2/overlay packets to a learning bridge or VXLAN endpoint is sufficient; netlink-only paths additionally require CAP_NET_ADMIN but are not the ceiling.
UI:NUser interaction, none
Exploitation is fully attacker-driven packet or netlink traffic and does not require any victim user action beyond normal system operation.
S:UScope, unchanged
Impact is a host kernel BUG/panic from the mm/vmalloc path; it does not cross a VM, IOMMU, or sandbox security boundary for privilege escalation.
C:NConfidentiality impact, none
The failure mode is an intentional BUG_ON() kernel panic with no memory corruption, out-of-bounds access, or information disclosure primitive.
I:NIntegrity impact, none
No attacker-controlled memory is modified; the bug only aborts the kernel via BUG() rather than providing a write or code-execution primitive.
A:HAvailability impact, high
Hitting BUG_ON(in_interrupt()) in __get_vm_area_node() causes a kernel BUG/oops/panic, producing total loss of system availability.