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CVE-2026-63914

xfrm: route MIGRATE notifications to caller's netns

7.3 EPSS 0.2% AV:L

Published 2026-07-19 (3 months ago) by the Linux kernel CNA. Subsystem include/net. Debian urgency: not yet assigned.

What to do, per Debian release

Debian's own status for CVE-2026-63914 in every release this site tracks, and what each one means in practice. Every status below is the one the Debian Security Team publishes for this CVE. source

ReleaseStatus VersionWhat this means
Debian 12bookwormfixed6.1.176-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 6.1.176-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian 13trixiefixed6.12.94-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 6.12.94-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian 14forkyfixed7.0.12-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.0.12-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian unstablesidfixed7.0.12-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.0.12-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.

The vulnerability

What the bug is

xfrm_send_migrate() in net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c and pfkey_send_migrate() in net/key/af_key.c both hardcode &init_net for the multicast that announces a successful XFRM_MSG_MIGRATE / SADB_X_MIGRATE. XFRM_MSG_MIGRATE arrives on a per-netns NETLINK_XFRM socket, and the rest of the xfrm/af_key netlink path was made netns-aware in 2008. The other 14 multicast paths in xfrm_user.c route their event using xs_net(x), xp_net(xp) or sock_net(skb->sk); only the migrate path was missed. Two consequences of the init_net hardcoding: 1. The notification (selector, old/new endpoint addresses, and the km_address) is delivered to listeners on init_net's XFRMNLGRP_MIGRATE / pfkey BROADCAST_ALL groups rather than on the issuing netns. An IKE daemon running in init_net therefore receives migration notifications originating from any other netns on the host. 2. An IKE daemon running inside a non-init netns and subscribed to its own XFRMNLGRP_MIGRATE / pfkey groups never receives the notification of its own migration. IKEv2 MOBIKE / address-update handling inside a netns is silently broken. Thread struct net through km_migrate() and the xfrm_mgr.migrate function pointer, drop the &init_net override in xfrm_send_migrate() and pfkey_send_migrate(), and pass the caller's net (already in scope in xfrm_migrate() via sock_net(skb->sk)) all the way down. struct xfrm_mgr is in-tree only and not exported as a stable API, so the function-pointer signature change is internal. pfkey_broadcast() is already netns-aware via net_generic(net, pfkey_net_id) since the pernet conversion. The five other pfkey_broadcast() callers in af_key.c already pass xs_net(x), sock_net(sk) or a per-netns net, so this only removes the &init_net outlier.

Where it lives

The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.

include/net/xfrm.h
net/key/af_key.c
net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c
net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c

What this is
NETWORKING [IPSEC]MAINTAINERS section matched on include/net/xfrm.h · netdev@vger.kernel.org · Maintained
Kernel module
af_key

Check it on the machine

grep -w CONFIG_NET_KEY /boot/config-$(uname -r)

Reads the booted kernel's own configuration, on the machine and nowhere else. =y is built in, =m is a module, and an is not set line means the code is not there.

lsmod | grep -w af_key

Prints a line if that module is loaded right now, and nothing if it is not. One that is not loaded can still be loaded later by anything that needs it.

Show whether Debian builds this, per release

Debian builds this as a loadable module. Every release below compiles it as a module on every flavour, so whether the code is in the running kernel depends on whether that module is loaded.

  • bookworm, trixie, forky, sidm
m
a loadable module on every flavour - check lsmod, can be blacklisted
Build switch
CONFIG_NET_KEY

From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS kbuild Makefiles Debian linux-config packages

Signals

Published
2026-07-19 (3 months ago)source
CVSS
7.3 high
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:Lsource recompute it
Attack vector
local (AV:L)source
EPSS
0.16%, higher than 4.7% of all CVEssource
CISA KEV
not listedthe KEV catalogue
Debian urgency
not yet assignedsource
Subsystem
include/net

Upstream fixes

The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source

IntroducedFixed inCommit
2.6.215.10.259bafc7d0774b9
2.6.215.15.2106df815754734
2.6.216.1.176fe4637983433
2.6.216.6.14300f2c451e57d
2.6.216.12.93a306cf2ac884
2.6.216.18.35448bb92ca101
2.6.217.0.1226ce8dbf2e23
2.6.217.17e2a4f7ca095

Why the CNA scored it this way

Quoted from the kernel CNA's own scoring file, word for word. A highlighted metric carries the most severe value CVSS v3.1 defines for it, which is what pushes the score up. source

AV:LAttack vector, local
The vulnerable code is reached only through local NETLINK_XFRM or PF_KEY sockets (xfrm_do_migrate/pfkey_migrate); there is no network packet receive path to xfrm_migrate().
AC:LAttack complexity, low
Once IPsec policies and SAs exist (which a CAP_NET_ADMIN caller can create), a successful migrate reliably multicasts the notification; a listener in init_net receives cross-namespace events without winning a race or depending on attacker-uncontrollable state.
PR:LPrivileges required, low
Both triggering XFRM_MSG_MIGRATE/SADB_X_MIGRATE and subscribing to XFRMNLGRP_MIGRATE require CAP_NET_ADMIN, which is obtainable in a user namespace (e.g. unshare -U while remaining in init_net) without real root in the init user namespace.
UI:NUser interaction, none
Exploitation requires no victim user action beyond normal background IPsec/MOBIKE operation; the attacker passively listens for migrate notifications.
S:CScope, changed
The flaw breaks network-namespace isolation by delivering per-netns IPsec migration notifications to init_net listeners, crossing the security boundary between isolated network namespaces and the host namespace.
C:HConfidentiality impact, high
Successful exploitation discloses sensitive IPsec/MOBIKE data—traffic selectors, old/new tunnel endpoint addresses, and km_address negotiation endpoints—from victim network namespaces to unauthorized init_net listeners.
I:NIntegrity impact, none
The bug only misroutes multicast notifications; it does not modify kernel memory, IPsec state, or any data beyond the intended migration operation itself.
A:LAvailability impact, low
The complementary failure mode silently breaks IKEv2 MOBIKE address-update handling in non-init network namespaces because the issuing namespace never receives its own migration notification, degrading VPN availability without kernel crash.