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CVE-2026-63887
scsi: target: iscsi: Bound iscsi_encode_text_output() appends to rsp_buf
Published 2026-07-19 (3 months ago) by the Linux kernel CNA. Subsystem drivers/target. Debian urgency: not yet assigned.
What to do, per Debian release
Debian's own status for CVE-2026-63887 in every release this site tracks, and what each one means in practice. Every status below is the one the Debian Security Team publishes for this CVE. source
| Release | Status | Version | What this means |
|---|---|---|---|
| Debian 12bookworm | fixed | 6.1.176-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 6.1.176-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
| Debian 13trixie | fixed | 6.12.94-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 6.12.94-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
| Debian 14forky | fixed | 7.0.12-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.0.12-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
| Debian unstablesid | fixed | 7.0.12-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.0.12-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
The vulnerability
What the bug is
iscsi_encode_text_output() concatenates "key=value\0" records into login->rsp_buf, an 8192-byte kzalloc(MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS) buffer allocated in iscsit_alloc_login_setup_buffer(). The three sprintf() call sites in this function (lines 1398, 1411, 1424 in v7.1-rc2) never check the remaining buffer capacity: *length += sprintf(output_buf, "%s=%s", er->key, er->value); *length += 1; output_buf = textbuf + *length; The 8192-byte ceiling at iscsi_target_check_login_request() bounds the *input* Login PDU payload, but a single PDU can carry up to 2048 minimal four-byte "a=b\0" pairs, each unknown key expanding to a 16-byte "a=NotUnderstood\0" output record via iscsi_add_notunderstood_response(). 2048 * 16 = 32 KiB of output into an 8 KiB buffer, producing a ~24 KiB heap overrun in the kmalloc-8k slab. The fix introduces a static iscsi_encode_text_record() helper that uses snprintf() with a per-call bounds check against the remaining buffer, and threads a u32 textbuf_size parameter through iscsi_encode_text_output(). Both call sites in iscsi_target_handle_csg_zero() (PHASE_SECURITY) and iscsi_target_handle_csg_one() (PHASE_OPERATIONAL) pass MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS. On overflow the encoder logs the condition, calls iscsi_release_extra_responses() to drop queued records, and returns -1; both caller sites now emit ISCSI_STATUS_CLS_INITIATOR_ERR / ISCSI_LOGIN_STATUS_INIT_ERR via iscsit_tx_login_rsp() before returning, so the initiator sees an explicit failed-login response rather than a silent connection drop. (Prior to this patch only the PHASE_OPERATIONAL caller did that; the PHASE_SECURITY caller is converted to the same shape.)
Where it lives
The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.
drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_nego.c
drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_parameters.c
drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_parameters.h
- What this is
- SCSI TARGET SUBSYSTEMMAINTAINERS section matched on drivers/target/ · linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org · Supported
- Kernel module
- iscsi_target_mod
Check it on the machine
grep -wE 'CONFIG_ISCSI_TARGET|CONFIG_TARGET_CORE' /boot/config-$(uname -r)Reads the booted kernel's own configuration, on the machine and nowhere else. =y is built in, =m is a module, and an is not set line means the code is not there.
lsmod | grep -w iscsi_target_modPrints a line if that module is loaded right now, and nothing if it is not. One that is not loaded can still be loaded later by anything that needs it.
Show whether Debian builds this, per release
Debian builds this as a loadable module. Every release below compiles it as a module on every flavour, so whether the code is in the running kernel depends on whether that module is loaded.
- bookworm, trixie, forky, sidm
- m
- a loadable module on every flavour - check lsmod, can be blacklisted
- Build switches
- CONFIG_ISCSI_TARGET, CONFIG_TARGET_CORE
- Reads as
- all on means the file is compiled; any one off means it is not.
From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS kbuild Makefiles Debian linux-config packages
Signals
- Published
- 2026-07-19 (3 months ago)source
- CVSS
- 9.8 critical
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hsource recompute it - Attack vector
- network (AV:N)source
- EPSS
- 0.78%, higher than 55.0% of all CVEssource
- CISA KEV
- not listedthe KEV catalogue
- Debian urgency
- not yet assignedsource
- Subsystem
- drivers/target
Upstream fixes
The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source
| Introduced | Fixed in | Commit |
|---|---|---|
| 3.1 | 5.10.259 | cb84e974fb17 |
| 3.1 | 5.15.210 | b19382dfc6e7 |
| 3.1 | 6.1.176 | efe633e600a0 |
| 3.1 | 6.6.143 | 4e9f0c4a645c |
| 3.1 | 6.12.93 | 30bf335e8fe1 |
| 3.1 | 6.18.35 | 594a40360012 |
| 3.1 | 7.0.12 | 26e4a304b7e6 |
| 3.1 | 7.1 | bf33e01f8838 |
Why the CNA scored it this way
Quoted from the kernel CNA's own scoring file, word for word. A highlighted metric carries the most severe value CVSS v3.1 defines for it, which is what pushes the score up. source
- AV:NAttack vector, network
- The Linux iSCSI target (LIO) is an in-kernel SCSI target that accepts remote TCP connections on the iSCSI portal (typically port 3260); crafted Login PDUs reach the vulnerable encoder via the normal network receive and login-negotiation path.
- AC:LAttack complexity, low
- Once an iSCSI target portal is reachable, an attacker can reliably trigger the overflow by sending a single Login PDU packed with unknown key=value pairs; no races or victim-dependent timing are required.
- PR:NPrivileges required, none
- The heap overflow occurs during login negotiation before iSCSI authentication completes; a discovery-session login requires only InitiatorName and SessionType with no credentials, initiator ACL, or local privileges.
- UI:NUser interaction, none
- Exploitation requires only network packets sent by the attacker; no action from a legitimate user or administrator is needed beyond the target already exposing its iSCSI portal.
- S:UScope, unchanged
- The corruption is confined to kernel heap memory in the iSCSI target/login context and does not cross a VM, container, or IOMMU security boundary by itself.
- C:HConfidentiality impact, high
- A ~24 KiB out-of-bounds write into the kmalloc-8k slab can corrupt adjacent kernel objects and be leveraged for arbitrary memory disclosure, not merely a bounded leak.
- I:HIntegrity impact, high
- The unbounded sprintf heap overrun is a large out-of-bounds write that can corrupt adjacent heap metadata or objects to achieve arbitrary kernel memory modification and potential code execution.
- A:HAvailability impact, high
- Corrupting kmalloc-8k heap objects during login response encoding can cause kernel oops, BUG, or panic, and the attack can be repeated against an exposed iSCSI target.