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CVE-2026-63864
bpf: Propagate error from visit_tailcall_insn
Published 2026-07-19 (3 months ago) by the Linux kernel CNA. Subsystem kernel/bpf. Debian urgency: unimportant.
What to do, per Debian release
Debian's own status for CVE-2026-63864 in every release this site tracks, and what each one means in practice. Every status below is the one the Debian Security Team publishes for this CVE. source
| Release | Status | Version | What this means |
|---|---|---|---|
| Debian 12bookworm | not affected | 6.1.190-1 | Nothing to do. bookworm never shipped the vulnerable code. |
| Debian 13trixie | not affected | 6.12.113-1 | Nothing to do. trixie never shipped the vulnerable code. |
| Debian 14forky | fixed | 7.0.10-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.0.10-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
| Debian unstablesid | fixed | 7.0.10-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.0.10-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
The vulnerability
What the bug is
Commit e40f5a6bf88a ("bpf: correct stack liveness for tail calls") added visit_tailcall_insn() but did not check its return value.
Where it lives
The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.
kernel/bpf/verifier.c
- What this is
- BPF [CORE]MAINTAINERS section matched on kernel/bpf/verifier.c · bpf@vger.kernel.org · Maintained
Check it on the machine
grep -wE 'CONFIG_BPF|CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL' /boot/config-$(uname -r)Reads the booted kernel's own configuration, on the machine and nowhere else. =y is built in, =m is a module, and an is not set line means the code is not there.
Show whether Debian builds this, per release
Debian builds this code. Every release below compiles the affected file into the kernels it ships.
- bookworm, trixie, forky, sidy
- y
- built into the kernel image on every flavour - only a patch removes it
- Build switches
- CONFIG_BPF, CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
- Reads as
- all on means the file is compiled; any one off means it is not.
From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS kbuild Makefiles Debian linux-config packages
Signals
- Published
- 2026-07-19 (3 months ago)source
- CVSS
- 8.4 high
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hsource recompute it - Attack vector
- local (AV:L)source
- EPSS
- 0.18%, higher than 7.0% of all CVEssource
- CISA KEV
- not listedthe KEV catalogue
- Debian urgency
- unimportantsource
- Subsystem
- kernel/bpf
Upstream fixes
The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source
| Introduced | Fixed in | Commit |
|---|---|---|
| 6.19 | 7.0.10 | 945816e63c86 |
| 6.19 | 7.1 | 6bd96e40f31d |
Why the CNA scored it this way
Quoted from the kernel CNA's own scoring file, word for word. A highlighted metric carries the most severe value CVSS v3.1 defines for it, which is what pushes the score up. source
- AV:LAttack vector, local
- The bug is reached only through the bpf() syscall during BPF_PROG_LOAD verification (check_cfg/visit_insn), which is a local kernel interface per kernel CVSS guidance for BPF.
- AC:LAttack complexity, low
- An attacker can craft a BPF program using tail calls and subprograms to hit visit_tailcall_insn(), and can pressure kernel memory (parallel BPF loads/maps) to make the small jt allocation fail while verification continues.
- PR:NPrivileges required, none
- Exploitation occurs at BPF_PROG_LOAD time via bpf(); on systems with kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled=0, unprivileged users can load socket-filter programs with PROG_ARRAY maps and tail calls without CAP_BPF or root.
- UI:NUser interaction, none
- No victim interaction is required; the attacker triggers the flaw by loading a malicious BPF program through their own bpf() syscall.
- S:UScope, unchanged
- Impact is a BPF verifier bypass leading to kernel memory corruption and local privilege escalation within the same kernel security boundary, not a cross-authority escape such as VM guest-to-host.
- C:HConfidentiality impact, high
- Incorrect tail-call stack liveness lets verifier-approved programs perform out-of-bounds stack reads at runtime, exposing adjacent kernel stack memory and enabling arbitrary kernel memory disclosure primitives.
- I:HIntegrity impact, high
- The verifier bypass permits out-of-bounds stack writes and type confusion on stack slots, which can be leveraged for control-flow hijacking and arbitrary kernel code execution from BPF context.
- A:HAvailability impact, high
- Out-of-bounds BPF stack access can trigger kernel oops/panic during program execution, and repeated exploitation can be used for denial of service even when full exploitation is not attempted.