data built 2026-10-19T13:16:53Z

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CVE-2026-63831

mac802154: llsec: add skb_cow_data() before in-place crypto

8.8 EPSS 0.3% AV:A

Published 2026-07-19 (3 months ago) by the Linux kernel CNA. Subsystem net/mac802154. Debian urgency: not yet assigned.

What to do, per Debian release

Debian's own status for CVE-2026-63831 in every release this site tracks, and what each one means in practice. Every status below is the one the Debian Security Team publishes for this CVE. source

ReleaseStatus VersionWhat this means
Debian 12bookwormfixed6.1.177-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 6.1.177-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian 13trixiefixed6.12.95-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 6.12.95-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian 14forkyfixed7.1.3-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.1.3-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian unstablesidfixed7.1.3-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.1.3-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.

The vulnerability

What the bug is

llsec_do_encrypt_unauth(), llsec_do_encrypt_auth(), llsec_do_decrypt_unauth(), and llsec_do_decrypt_auth() all perform in-place cryptographic transformations on skb data. They build a scatterlist with sg_init_one() pointing into the skb's linear data area and then pass the same scatterlist as both src and dst to the crypto API (e.g. crypto_skcipher_encrypt/decrypt, crypto_aead_encrypt/decrypt). On the RX path, __ieee802154_rx_handle_packet() clones the received skb before handing it to each subscriber via ieee802154_subif_frame(). The cloned skb shares the same underlying data buffer via reference counting. When llsec_do_decrypt() subsequently modifies this shared buffer in place, it corrupts data that other clones -- potentially belonging to other sockets or subsystems -- still reference. On the TX path, similar data sharing can occur when an skb's head has been cloned (skb_cloned() returns true). The fix is to call skb_cow_data() before performing any in-place crypto operation. skb_cow_data() ensures that the skb's data area is not shared: if the skb head is cloned or the data spans multiple fragments, it copies the data into a private buffer that can be safely modified in place. This is the same pattern used by: - ESP (net/ipv4/esp4.c, net/ipv6/esp6.c) - MACsec (drivers/net/macsec.c) - WireGuard (drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c) - TIPC (net/tipc/crypto.c) Without this guard, in-place crypto on shared skb data leads to: - Silent data corruption of other skb clones - Use-after-free when the crypto API scatterwalk writes through a page that has already been freed by another clone's kfree_skb() - Kernel crashes under concurrent 802.15.4 traffic with security enabled (KASAN/KMSAN reports slab-use-after-free) Found by 0sec (https://0sec.ai) using automated source analysis.

Where it lives

The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.

net/mac802154/llsec.c

What this is
IEEE 802.15.4 SUBSYSTEMMAINTAINERS section matched on net/mac802154/ · linux-wpan@vger.kernel.org · Maintained
Kernel module
mac802154

Check it on the machine

grep -w CONFIG_MAC802154 /boot/config-$(uname -r)

Reads the booted kernel's own configuration, on the machine and nowhere else. =y is built in, =m is a module, and an is not set line means the code is not there.

lsmod | grep -w mac802154

Prints a line if that module is loaded right now, and nothing if it is not. One that is not loaded can still be loaded later by anything that needs it.

Show whether Debian builds this, per release

Debian builds this, but not on every flavour. At least one release below builds the code on some of its kernel flavours and not on others, so the answer depends on the architecture and flavour installed.

  • bookworm, trixie, forky, sidMnot built on amd64/cloud-amd64, arm64/cloud-arm64
M
a module where it is built at all; some flavours do not build it
Build switch
CONFIG_MAC802154

From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS kbuild Makefiles Debian linux-config packages

Signals

Published
2026-07-19 (3 months ago)source
CVSS
8.8 high
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hsource recompute it
Attack vector
adjacent network (AV:A)source
EPSS
0.25%, higher than 15.5% of all CVEssource
CISA KEV
not listedthe KEV catalogue
Debian urgency
not yet assignedsource
Subsystem
net/mac802154

Upstream fixes

The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source

IntroducedFixed inCommit
3.165.10.2603a2b378b3a9c
3.165.15.2117a831bcd0486
3.166.1.177ff976ef7c391
3.166.6.144e28e7fd34c44
3.166.12.95993fd674fe85
3.166.18.38bd968bdd568b
3.167.1.386d531337ea1
3.167.284a04eb5b210

Debian advisories

AdvisoryDateShipped toDebian
DLA-4717-12026-08-05bullseye 5.10.262-1tracker
DLA-4700-12026-07-26bullseye 6.1.177-1~deb11u1tracker

Why the CNA scored it this way

Quoted from the kernel CNA's own scoring file, word for word. A highlighted metric carries the most severe value CVSS v3.1 defines for it, which is what pushes the score up. source

AV:AAttack vector, adjacent network
The bug is reached when the kernel processes incoming IEEE 802.15.4 frames from a radio driver (ieee802154_rx → llsec_do_decrypt), which requires an attacker within WPAN radio range, analogous to Bluetooth/WiFi adjacent-segment attacks.
AC:LAttack complexity, low
An attacker can reliably trigger the flaw by transmitting valid LLSEC-protected 802.15.4 frames (including broadcast frames fanning out to multiple virtual interfaces) and controlling traffic timing; the skb_clone sharing is deterministic on the RX path.
PR:NPrivileges required, none
Exploitation requires no local privileges on the victim—only the ability to send 802.15.4 radio frames as a PAN participant with valid LLSEC credentials, which is a network-position requirement rather than elevated kernel access.
UI:NUser interaction, none
No end-user action is needed at exploitation time; triggering the bug only requires the target to already be running mac802154 with LLSEC enabled and receiving attacker-crafted wireless frames.
S:UScope, unchanged
Impact is confined to kernel memory/subsystems on the affected host (UAF, data corruption, crash); it does not inherently cross a VM, container, or IOMMU security boundary.
C:HConfidentiality impact, high
The commit and fix description confirm slab use-after-free from in-place crypto scatterwalk writes through skb data pages freed by sibling clones, enabling arbitrary kernel memory reads.
I:HIntegrity impact, high
Writing through freed/shared skb pages during in-place decrypt/encrypt corrupts kernel heap contents and provides a standard exploitable memory-corruption primitive for arbitrary modification or code execution.
A:HAvailability impact, high
Concurrent LLSEC-enabled 802.15.4 traffic can cause kernel oops/panic, and KASAN/KMSAN reports confirm slab-use-after-free crashes under the vulnerable code path.