data built 2026-10-19T13:16:53Z

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CVE-2026-63823

keys: Pin request_key_auth payload in instantiate paths

7.8 EPSS 0.1% AV:L

Published 2026-07-19 (3 months ago) by the Linux kernel CNA. Subsystem include/keys. Debian urgency: not yet assigned.

What to do, per Debian release

Debian's own status for CVE-2026-63823 in every release this site tracks, and what each one means in practice. Every status below is the one the Debian Security Team publishes for this CVE. source

ReleaseStatus VersionWhat this means
Debian 12bookwormfixed6.1.177-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 6.1.177-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian 13trixiefixed6.12.95-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 6.12.95-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian 14forkyfixed7.1.3-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.1.3-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian unstablesidfixed7.1.3-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.1.3-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.

The vulnerability

What the bug is

A: request_key() B: KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE_IOV ================ ========================= create auth key store rka in auth key wait for helper get auth key load rka from auth key copy user payload sleep on #PF helper completed detach and free rka destroy auth key wake up use rka->target_key **USE-AFTER-FREE** Give request_key_auth payloads a refcount. Take a payload reference while authkey->sem stabilizes the payload and revocation state. Hold that reference across the instantiate and reject paths. Drop the auth key owning reference from revoke and destroy. [jarkko: Replaced the first two paragraphs of text with an actual concurrency scenario.]

Where it lives

The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.

include/keys/request_key_auth-type.h
security/keys/internal.h
security/keys/keyctl.c
security/keys/request_key_auth.c

What this is
KEYS/KEYRINGSMAINTAINERS section matched on include/keys/ · keyrings@vger.kernel.org · Maintained

Check it on the machine

grep -w CONFIG_KEYS /boot/config-$(uname -r)

Reads the booted kernel's own configuration, on the machine and nowhere else. =y is built in, =m is a module, and an is not set line means the code is not there.

Show whether Debian builds this, per release

Debian builds this code. Every release below compiles the affected file into the kernels it ships.

  • bookworm, trixie, forky, sidy
y
built into the kernel image on every flavour - only a patch removes it
Build switch
CONFIG_KEYS

From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS kbuild Makefiles Debian linux-config packages

Signals

Published
2026-07-19 (3 months ago)source
CVSS
7.8 high
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hsource recompute it
Attack vector
local (AV:L)source
EPSS
0.12%, higher than 1.9% of all CVEssource
CISA KEV
not listedthe KEV catalogue
Debian urgency
not yet assignedsource
Subsystem
include/keys

Upstream fixes

The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source

IntroducedFixed inCommit
2.6.165.10.260d8274181b0f2
2.6.165.15.2114982bfabce6b
2.6.166.1.177708709c65a18
2.6.166.6.14435ab4db86774
2.6.166.12.95f9b68632ac93
2.6.166.18.387216ce8cb12f
2.6.167.1.383c0a1cb296d
2.6.167.2fd15b457a869

Debian advisories

AdvisoryDateShipped toDebian
DLA-4717-12026-08-05bullseye 5.10.262-1tracker
DLA-4700-12026-07-26bullseye 6.1.177-1~deb11u1tracker

Why the CNA scored it this way

Quoted from the kernel CNA's own scoring file, word for word. A highlighted metric carries the most severe value CVSS v3.1 defines for it, which is what pushes the score up. source

AV:LAttack vector, local
The bug is reached only through local `request_key()` and `keyctl()` syscalls (`KEYCTL_ASSUME_AUTHORITY`, `KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE`, `KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE_IOV`, `KEYCTL_REJECT`); there is no network, adjacent-radio, or physical-device entry path.
AC:LAttack complexity, low
Exploitation is a race the attacker orchestrates by calling `request_key()` and concurrently driving `KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE_IOV` with a user buffer that page-faults during `copy_from_iter_full()`, while a second helper thread or completion path revokes/frees the auth payload.
PR:LPrivileges required, low
Any unprivileged local user can invoke `request_key()` and the affected `keyctl` instantiate/reject operations in the spawned helper context; no real-root or non-userns capability is required.
UI:NUser interaction, none
Exploitation does not depend on a victim performing an action beyond the attacker’s own syscall activity and helper process setup.
S:UScope, unchanged
Impact is kernel memory corruption and local privilege escalation within the same kernel security domain, not a VM-guest-to-host or IOMMU boundary escape.
C:HConfidentiality impact, high
This is a heap use-after-free of `struct request_key_auth`; after free the code dereferences `rka->target_key` and related fields, enabling attacker-controlled reuse and arbitrary kernel memory disclosure.
I:HIntegrity impact, high
The UAF corrupts trusted kernel pointers (`target_key`, `dest_keyring`) used in `key_instantiate_and_link()`, which can be turned into arbitrary kernel writes and local privilege escalation.
A:HAvailability impact, high
Use-after-free of kernel heap objects can cause kernel oops/panic during post-fault dereferences, and is independently severe even before full exploitation.