data built 2026-10-19T13:16:53Z

Look up another CVE · open CVE-2026-63811 in the interactive tracker

CVE-2026-63811

f2fs: read COW data with the original inode during atomic write

EPSS 0.1%

Published 2026-07-19 (3 months ago) by the Linux kernel CNA. Subsystem fs/f2fs. Debian urgency: unimportant.

What to do, per Debian release

Debian's own status for CVE-2026-63811 in every release this site tracks, and what each one means in practice. Every status below is the one the Debian Security Team publishes for this CVE. source

ReleaseStatus VersionWhat this means
Debian 12bookwormnot affected6.1.190-1Nothing to do. bookworm never shipped the vulnerable code.
Debian 13trixievulnerable6.12.113-1No fix published anywhere yet, neither in Debian nor upstream for the series trixie tracks. Watch the Debian tracker page for this CVE. Advisories for trixie have historically landed a median of 11 days after publication.
Debian 14forkyfixed7.1.3-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.1.3-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian unstablesidfixed7.1.3-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.1.3-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.

The vulnerability

What the bug is

When updating an atomic-write file, f2fs_write_begin() may read the previously written data back from the COW inode: prepare_atomic_write_begin() locates the block in the COW inode and sets use_cow, and the read bio is then built with the COW inode: f2fs_submit_page_read(use_cow ? F2FS_I(inode)->cow_inode : inode, ...); and f2fs_grab_read_bio() decides whether to schedule fs-layer decryption (STEP_DECRYPT) for the bio based on that inode via fscrypt_inode_uses_fs_layer_crypto(). However, the folio being filled belongs to the original inode (folio->mapping->host == inode), and the data stored in the COW block was encrypted (or left as plaintext) using the original inode's context, not the COW inode's -- see f2fs_encrypt_one_page(), which keys off fio->page->mapping->host. fscrypt_decrypt_pagecache_blocks() likewise operates on folio->mapping->host. The COW inode is created as a tmpfile in the parent directory and inherits its encryption policy from there. With test_dummy_encryption the newly created COW inode gets the dummy policy and becomes encrypted, while a pre-existing regular file -- created before the policy applied, e.g. already present in the on-disk image -- stays unencrypted. The read path then sets STEP_DECRYPT based on the encrypted COW inode and calls fscrypt_decrypt_pagecache_blocks() on a folio whose host (the unencrypted original inode) has a NULL ->i_crypt_info, dereferencing it: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address ... KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000008-0x000000000000000f] RIP: 0010:fscrypt_decrypt_pagecache_blocks+0xa0/0x310 Workqueue: f2fs_post_read_wq f2fs_post_read_work Call Trace: fscrypt_decrypt_bio+0x1eb/0x340 f2fs_post_read_work+0xba/0x140 process_one_work+0x91c/0x1a40 worker_thread+0x677/0xe90 kthread+0x2bc/0x3a0 The COW inode is only needed to locate the on-disk block, and that block address is already resolved into @blkaddr by prepare_atomic_write_begin() via __find_data_block(cow_inode, ...); f2fs_submit_page_read() then reads from that physical @blkaddr directly, so the inode argument only selects the post-read crypto context, not which block is fetched. Reading with @inode therefore returns the same (latest, not-yet-committed) COW data, while making both the fs-layer decryption decision and the inline crypto path use the correct (original inode's) key. With the COW inode no longer used at the read site, the use_cow flag has no remaining consumer; drop it from f2fs_write_begin() and prepare_atomic_write_begin().

Where it lives

The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.

fs/f2fs/data.c

What this is
F2FS FILE SYSTEMMAINTAINERS section matched on fs/f2fs/ · linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net · Maintained
Kernel module
f2fs

Check it on the machine

grep -w CONFIG_F2FS_FS /boot/config-$(uname -r)

Reads the booted kernel's own configuration, on the machine and nowhere else. =y is built in, =m is a module, and an is not set line means the code is not there.

lsmod | grep -w f2fs

Prints a line if that module is loaded right now, and nothing if it is not. One that is not loaded can still be loaded later by anything that needs it.

Show whether Debian builds this, per release

Debian builds this, but not on every flavour. At least one release below builds the code on some of its kernel flavours and not on others, so the answer depends on the architecture and flavour installed.

  • bookworm, trixie, forky, sidMnot built on amd64/cloud-amd64, arm64/cloud-arm64
M
a module where it is built at all; some flavours do not build it
Build switch
CONFIG_F2FS_FS

From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS kbuild Makefiles Debian linux-config packages

Signals

Published
2026-07-19 (3 months ago)source
CVSS
no vector published, unrated
Attack vector
not published
EPSS
0.12%, higher than 1.5% of all CVEssource
CISA KEV
not listedthe KEV catalogue
Debian urgency
unimportantsource
Subsystem
fs/f2fs

Upstream fixes

The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source

IntroducedFixed inCommit
6.46.18.577e4ab3907f44
6.47.1.3a92332f32a8d
6.47.2a41075acde01

Why the CNA scored it this way

The kernel CNA published no CVSS vector and no reasoning for CVE-2026-63811, which is why it is shown as unrated rather than given an invented score. 6,405 of the 20,413 CVEs here carry reasoning; this is not one of them.