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CVE-2026-53383
ksmbd: reject non-VALID session in compound request branch
Published 2026-07-19 (3 months ago) by the Linux kernel CNA. Subsystem fs/smb. Debian urgency: not yet assigned.
What to do, per Debian release
Debian's own status for CVE-2026-53383 in every release this site tracks, and what each one means in practice. Every status below is the one the Debian Security Team publishes for this CVE. source
| Release | Status | Version | What this means |
|---|---|---|---|
| Debian 12bookworm | fixed | 6.1.177-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 6.1.177-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
| Debian 13trixie | fixed | 6.12.95-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 6.12.95-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
| Debian 14forky | fixed | 7.0.14-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.0.14-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
| Debian unstablesid | fixed | 7.0.14-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.0.14-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
The vulnerability
What the bug is
smb2_check_user_session() takes a shortcut for any operation that is not the first in a COMPOUND request: it reuses work->sess (the session bound by the first operation) and validates only the SessionId, then returns "valid". It never re-checks work->sess->state == SMB2_SESSION_VALID, and a SessionId of 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF (ULLONG_MAX, the MS-SMB2 related-operation value) skips even the id comparison. The standalone path (ksmbd_session_lookup_all() plus the SESSION_SETUP state machine) does enforce the VALID state; the compound branch bypasses all of it. A SESSION_SETUP carrying only an NTLM Type-1 (NtLmNegotiate) blob publishes a fresh SMB2_SESSION_IN_PROGRESS session whose sess->user is still NULL (->user is assigned later, by ntlm_authenticate()). Used as operation 1 of a COMPOUND with operation 2 = TREE_CONNECT (related, SessionId=ULLONG_MAX, \\host\IPC$), the tree-connect then runs on that IN_PROGRESS session and reaches ksmbd_ipc_tree_connect_request(), which dereferences user_name(sess->user) with sess->user == NULL (transport_ipc.c:687/701/704) -> remote NULL-pointer dereference and a kernel Oops that wedges the ksmbd worker for all clients. Reject any non-first compound operation that lands on a session which is not SMB2_SESSION_VALID, mirroring the validity the standalone lookup path enforces. SESSION_SETUP itself legitimately runs on an IN_PROGRESS session, but it is never carried as a non-first compound operation, so multi-leg authentication is unaffected by this check.
Where it lives
The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.
fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c
- What this is
- KERNEL SMB3 SERVER (KSMBD)MAINTAINERS section matched on fs/smb/server/ · linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org · Maintained
- Kernel module
- ksmbd
Check it on the machine
grep -wE 'CONFIG_SMBFS|CONFIG_SMB_SERVER' /boot/config-$(uname -r)Reads the booted kernel's own configuration, on the machine and nowhere else. =y is built in, =m is a module, and an is not set line means the code is not there.
lsmod | grep -w ksmbdPrints a line if that module is loaded right now, and nothing if it is not. One that is not loaded can still be loaded later by anything that needs it.
Show whether Debian builds this, per release
Debian builds this as a loadable module. Every release below compiles it as a module on every flavour, so whether the code is in the running kernel depends on whether that module is loaded.
- bookworm, trixie, forky, sidm
- m
- a loadable module on every flavour - check lsmod, can be blacklisted
- Build switches
- CONFIG_SMBFS, CONFIG_SMB_SERVER
- Reads as
- all on means the file is compiled; any one off means it is not.
From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS kbuild Makefiles Debian linux-config packages
Signals
- Published
- 2026-07-19 (3 months ago)source
- CVSS
- 7.5 high
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:Hsource recompute it - Attack vector
- network (AV:N)source
- EPSS
- 0.66%, higher than 50.7% of all CVEssource
- CISA KEV
- not listedthe KEV catalogue
- Debian urgency
- not yet assignedsource
- Subsystem
- fs/smb
Upstream fixes
The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source
| Introduced | Fixed in | Commit |
|---|---|---|
| 5.15.121 | 5.15.211 | 25ff12b82a37 |
| 6.1.36 | 6.1.177 | fc578523a72c |
| 6.4 | 6.6.144 | d2bbbb6c5581 |
| 6.4 | 6.12.95 | 8f0302fb6915 |
| 6.4 | 6.18.37 | 7cad3ceaf679 |
| 6.4 | 7.0.14 | 06e1f05a1dbe |
| 6.4 | 7.1.2 | 5f983b864d3d |
| 6.4 | 7.2 | 609ca17d869d |
| 6.3.10 | 0 | 0 |
Debian advisories
| Advisory | Date | Shipped to | Debian |
|---|---|---|---|
| DLA-4700-1 | 2026-07-26 | bullseye 6.1.177-1~deb11u1 | tracker |
Why the CNA scored it this way
Quoted from the kernel CNA's own scoring file, word for word. A highlighted metric carries the most severe value CVSS v3.1 defines for it, which is what pushes the score up. source
- AV:NAttack vector, network
- The bug is in ksmbd's SMB2 compound-request handler, reachable by any remote attacker who can send crafted SMB2 packets to TCP port 445 on a host running the in-kernel SMB server.
- AC:LAttack complexity, low
- An attacker can reliably trigger the bug by sending a compound SMB2 request with SESSION_SETUP (NTLM Type-1 only) as the first operation and TREE_CONNECT (SessionId=0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF, \\host\IPC$) as the second; no special timing, memory layout, or victim state is required.
- PR:NPrivileges required, none
- Exploitation requires only network access to ksmbd during the SMB2 authentication handshake, before sess->user is assigned; no Linux local account, capability, or prior authenticated OS session is needed.
- UI:NUser interaction, none
- No victim user action (opening files, mounting shares, clicking links) is required; the attacker triggers the crash solely by sending malicious SMB2 protocol traffic.
- S:UScope, unchanged
- The impact is a kernel oops and ksmbd worker disruption within the kernel/SMB server security authority; it does not cross a VM, container, or IOMMU boundary.
- C:NConfidentiality impact, none
- The failure is a NULL pointer dereference on sess->user in ksmbd_ipc_tree_connect_request() when user_name(sess->user) is called with sess->user == NULL; this is a pure crash with no information disclosure.
- I:NIntegrity impact, none
- The bug causes a NULL pointer dereference only; there is no memory corruption, arbitrary write, or code-execution primitive—only a kernel fault.
- A:HAvailability impact, high
- The NULL dereference causes a kernel oops that wedges the shared ksmbd-io workqueue worker, denying SMB service to all clients connected through that worker and potentially panicking the host if panic_on_oops is enabled.