data built 2026-10-19T13:16:53Z

Look up another CVE · open CVE-2026-53360 in the interactive tracker

CVE-2026-53360

KVM: SEV: Require in-GHCB scratch area if GHCB v2+ is in use

8.8 EPSS 0.2% AV:L

Published 2026-07-04 (4 months ago) by the Linux kernel CNA. Subsystem arch/x86. Debian urgency: unimportant.

What to do, per Debian release

Debian's own status for CVE-2026-53360 in every release this site tracks, and what each one means in practice. Every status below is the one the Debian Security Team publishes for this CVE. source

ReleaseStatus VersionWhat this means
Debian 12bookwormnot affected6.1.190-1Nothing to do. bookworm never shipped the vulnerable code.
Debian 13trixiefixed6.12.94-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 6.12.94-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian 14forkyfixed7.0.12-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.0.12-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian unstablesidfixed7.0.12-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.0.12-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.

The vulnerability

What the bug is

As per the GHCB spec, when using GHCB v2+ require the software scratch area to reside in the GHCB's shared buffer. Note, things like Page State Change (PSC) requests _rely_ on this behavior, as the guest can't provide a length when making the request, i.e. the size of the guest payload is bounded by the size of the shared buffer. Failure to force usage of the GHCB, and a slew of other flaws, lets a malicious SNP guest corrupt host kernel heap memory, and leak host heap layout information. setup_vmgexit_scratch() allocates a buffer via kvzalloc(exit_info_2), where exit_info_2 is guest-controlled. With exit_info_2=24, this yields a 24-byte allocation in kmalloc-cg-32 (32-byte slab objects). The buffer holds an 8-byte psc_hdr followed by 8-byte psc_entry structs, so only entries[0] and entries[1] are in-bounds. snp_begin_psc() validates end_entry against VMGEXIT_PSC_MAX_COUNT (253) but NOT against the actual buffer size: idx_end = hdr->end_entry; if (idx_end >= VMGEXIT_PSC_MAX_COUNT) { // checks 253, not buffer snp_complete_psc(svm, ...); return 1; } for (idx = idx_start; idx <= idx_end; idx++) { entry_start = entries[idx]; // OOB when idx >= 2 The guest sets end_entry=10+, causing the host to iterate entries[2+] which are OOB into adjacent slab objects. For each OOB entry: - The host reads 8 bytes (OOB READ / info leak oracle) - If the data passes PSC validation, __snp_complete_one_psc() writes cur_page = 1 or 512 into the entry (OOB WRITE, sev.c:3806) - If validation fails, the error response reveals whether adjacent memory is zero vs non-zero (information disclosure to guest) The guest controls allocation size (exit_info_2), entry range (cur_entry/end_entry), and can fire unlimited VMGEXITs to repeatedly hit different slab positions. By exploiting the variety of bugs, a malicious SEV-SNP guest can: - OOB read adjacent kmalloc-cg-32 objects (heap layout disclosure) - OOB write cur_page bits into adjacent objects (heap corruption) - Trigger use-after-free conditions across VMGEXITs E.g. with KASAN enabled, a single insmod of the PoC guest module produces 73 KASAN reports: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in snp_begin_psc+0x126/0x890 Read of size 8 at addr ffff888219ffb5e0 by task qemu-system-x86/2199 BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in snp_begin_psc+0x468/0x890 Write of size 8 at addr ffff888351566648 by task qemu-system-x86/2199 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888XXXXXXXXX which belongs to the cache kmalloc-cg-32 of size 32 The buggy address is located N bytes to the right of allocated 32-byte region [ffff888XXXXXXXXX, ffff888XXXXXXXXX) Breakdown: 62 slab-out-of-bounds (reads + writes past allocation) 7 slab-use-after-free 4 use-after-free All credit to Stan for the wonderful description and reproducer! [sean: write changelog]

Where it lives

The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.

arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c

What this is
KERNEL VIRTUAL MACHINE FOR X86 (KVM/x86)MAINTAINERS section matched on arch/x86/kvm/*/ · kvm@vger.kernel.org · Supported
Show whether Debian builds this, per release

Not established. This site could not find the build rule for the affected file in the kernel trees Debian ships, so it has no answer about whether Debian compiles this code. Read that as unknown, never as absent.

  • bookworm, trixie, forky, sid?
?
not established - no Makefile entry for the affected file

Where a release above reads "not established", no build rule for the affected file was found in that release's kernel tree. That is a gap in this lookup, not a finding that the code is absent.

From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS

Signals

Published
2026-07-04 (4 months ago)source
CVSS
8.8 high
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:Hsource recompute it
Attack vector
local (AV:L)source
EPSS
0.24%, higher than 14.4% of all CVEssource
CISA KEV
not listedthe KEV catalogue
Debian urgency
unimportantsource
Subsystem
arch/x86

Upstream fixes

The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source

IntroducedFixed inCommit
6.106.12.93bf9ba093fbb8
6.106.18.35c9b4198fbc6e
6.107.0.12b328ede59ac3
6.107.1db3f2195d293

Why the CNA scored it this way

Quoted from the kernel CNA's own scoring file, word for word. A highlighted metric carries the most severe value CVSS v3.1 defines for it, which is what pushes the score up. source

AV:LAttack vector, local
The vulnerable path is reached by running a SEV-SNP vCPU through KVM and issuing a guest-controlled VMGEXIT PSC request, not by remote packets or adjacent/physical access.
AC:LAttack complexity, low
The guest directly controls the scratch pointer/length and PSC entry bounds, and can repeatedly issue malformed VMGEXITs without needing external races or rare timing conditions.
PR:LPrivileges required, low
Exploitation requires the ability to run or control a SEV-SNP guest/KVM vCPU, which is a low-privilege local or tenant capability rather than real host root in the init namespace.
UI:NUser interaction, none
Once the attacker controls the malicious guest or VM process, no additional victim action is required to trigger the VMGEXIT handling path.
S:CScope, changed
The bug lets a malicious guest corrupt and disclose host kernel heap memory, crossing the guest-to-host virtualization security boundary.
C:HConfidentiality impact, high
The OOB reads and error oracle leak adjacent host heap contents/layout, and the associated memory corruption/UAF behavior is sufficient to treat confidentiality impact as high.
I:HIntegrity impact, high
The vulnerable path performs OOB writes into adjacent host slab objects and can trigger UAF conditions, making host kernel memory corruption and potential control-flow compromise defensible.
A:HAvailability impact, high
The bug produces host kernel slab OOB writes/reads and UAF reports and can crash or destabilize the host kernel, giving high availability impact.