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CVE-2026-53266

netfilter: bridge: make ebt_snat ARP rewrite writable

KEV 8.8 EPSS 0.8% AV:L

Published 2026-06-25 (4 months ago) by the Linux kernel CNA. Subsystem net/bridge. Debian urgency: not yet assigned.

What to do, per Debian release

Debian's own status for CVE-2026-53266 in every release this site tracks, and what each one means in practice. Every status below is the one the Debian Security Team publishes for this CVE. source

ReleaseStatus VersionWhat this means
Debian 12bookwormfixedDLA-4665-1 · 2026-07-03 · text6.1.176-1Update the kernel and reboot. DLA-4665-1 shipped the fix on 2026-07-03, in 6.1.176-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian 13trixiefixed6.12.94-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 6.12.94-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian 14forkyfixed7.0.13-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.0.13-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian unstablesidfixed7.0.13-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.0.13-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.

The vulnerability

What the bug is

The ebtables SNAT target keeps the Ethernet source address rewrite behind skb_ensure_writable(skb, 0). This is intentional: at the bridge ebtables hooks the Ethernet header is addressed through skb_mac_header()/eth_hdr(), while skb->data points at the Ethernet payload. Asking skb_ensure_writable() for ETH_HLEN bytes would check the payload, not the Ethernet header, and would reintroduce the small packet regression fixed by commit 63137bc5882a. However, the optional ARP sender hardware address rewrite is different. It writes through skb_store_bits() at an offset relative to skb->data: skb_store_bits(skb, sizeof(struct arphdr), info->mac, ETH_ALEN) skb_header_pointer() only safely reads the ARP header; it does not make the later sender hardware address range writable. If that range is still held in a nonlinear skb fragment backed by a splice-imported file page, skb_store_bits() maps the frag page and copies the new MAC address directly into it. Ensure the ARP SHA range is writable before reading the ARP header and before calling skb_store_bits().

Where it lives

The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.

net/bridge/netfilter/ebt_snat.c

What this is
NETFILTERMAINTAINERS section matched on net/*/netfilter/ · netfilter-devel@vger.kernel.org · Maintained
Kernel module
ebt_snat

Check it on the machine

grep -wE 'CONFIG_BRIDGE|CONFIG_BRIDGE_EBT_SNAT|CONFIG_NETFILTER' /boot/config-$(uname -r)

Reads the booted kernel's own configuration, on the machine and nowhere else. =y is built in, =m is a module, and an is not set line means the code is not there.

lsmod | grep -w ebt_snat

Prints a line if that module is loaded right now, and nothing if it is not. One that is not loaded can still be loaded later by anything that needs it.

Show whether Debian builds this, per release

Debian builds this as a loadable module. Every release below compiles it as a module on every flavour, so whether the code is in the running kernel depends on whether that module is loaded.

  • bookworm, trixie, forky, sidm
m
a loadable module on every flavour - check lsmod, can be blacklisted
Build switches
CONFIG_BRIDGE, CONFIG_BRIDGE_EBT_SNAT, CONFIG_NETFILTER
Reads as
all on means the file is compiled; any one off means it is not.

From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS kbuild Makefiles Debian linux-config packages

Known to be exploited in the wild

Added to KEV
2026-09-18
Federal due date
2026-09-21
Ransomware use
unknown
Required action
Apply mitigations in accordance with vendor instructions, ensuring compliance with CISA’s BOD 26-04 Prioritizing Security Updates Based on Risk (see URL in Notes) guidance and CISA’s “Forensics Triage Requirements” (see URL in Notes). Follow applicable BOD 26-04 guidance for cloud services or discontinue use of the product if mitigations are unavailable. Stakeholders are responsible for evaluating each asset's internet exposure and ensuring adherence to BOD 26-04 patching guidelines.

the KEV catalogue

Signals

Published
2026-06-25 (4 months ago)source
CVSS
8.8 high
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:Hsource recompute it
Attack vector
local (AV:L)source
EPSS
0.83%, higher than 56.7% of all CVEssource
CISA KEV
listedthe KEV catalogue
Debian urgency
not yet assignedsource
Subsystem
net/bridge

Upstream fixes

The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source

IntroducedFixed inCommit
5.105.10.259bf84ad7c7a9e
5.105.15.21076280b78cc9f
5.106.1.176b7e91939ba9b
5.106.6.143afd64b59c3de
5.106.12.94153ea96c806a
5.106.18.36b18675263db1
5.107.0.13c9b5ff59feff
5.107.167ba971ae025
5.4.7300
5.8.1700
5.9.200

Debian advisories

AdvisoryDateShipped toDebian
DLA-4671-12026-07-05bullseye 6.1.176-1~deb11u1tracker
DLA-4665-12026-07-03bookworm 6.1.176-1tracker
DLA-4664-12026-07-03bullseye 5.10.259-1tracker

Why the CNA scored it this way

Quoted from the kernel CNA's own scoring file, word for word. A highlighted metric carries the most severe value CVSS v3.1 defines for it, which is what pushes the score up. source

AV:LAttack vector, local
Exploitation requires local control of bridge/ebtables configuration and arranging an skb with shared non-linear backing memory; remote ARP traffic alone cannot create the splice-backed page condition.
AC:LAttack complexity, low
There is no race or rare external timing condition; the attacker can control the rule, ARP frame layout, and shared-frag setup needed to reach the write.
PR:LPrivileges required, low
The ebtables rule path requires CAP_NET_ADMIN, but this is reachable with namespace-local privileges via user/network namespaces rather than requiring init-namespace root.
UI:NUser interaction, none
No victim action is required once the attacker can configure the namespace and send the crafted traffic through the bridge path.
S:CScope, changed
The bug can let namespace-local network privileges corrupt file-backed/page-cache memory outside the bridge/netfilter security boundary, plausibly crossing a sandbox or namespace boundary.
C:HConfidentiality impact, high
The shared-page corruption can be leveraged toward privilege escalation or code execution, which can expose high-value system data.
I:HIntegrity impact, high
skb_store_bits() writes attacker-chosen MAC bytes into shared backing pages, giving a controlled corruption primitive against file-backed memory.
A:HAvailability impact, high
Controlled corruption of shared/file-backed pages can damage critical files or executable contents and can be repeated to cause severe system availability impact.