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CVE-2026-53264

net/sched: act_api: use RCU with deferred freeing for action lifecycle

7.8 EPSS 0.2% AV:L

Published 2026-06-25 (4 months ago) by the Linux kernel CNA. Subsystem include/net. Debian urgency: not yet assigned.

What to do, per Debian release

Debian's own status for CVE-2026-53264 in every release this site tracks, and what each one means in practice. Every status below is the one the Debian Security Team publishes for this CVE. source

ReleaseStatus VersionWhat this means
Debian 12bookwormfixedDLA-4665-1 · 2026-07-03 · text6.1.176-1Update the kernel and reboot. DLA-4665-1 shipped the fix on 2026-07-03, in 6.1.176-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian 13trixiefixed6.12.94-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 6.12.94-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian 14forkyfixed7.0.13-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.0.13-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian unstablesidfixed7.0.13-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.0.13-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.

The vulnerability

What the bug is

When NEWTFILTER and DELFILTER are run concurrently it is possible to create a race with an associated action. Let's illustrate with CPU0 running NEWTFILTER and CPU1 running DELFILTER: 0: mutex_lock() <-- holds the idr lock 0: rcu_read_lock() 0: p = idr_find(idr, index) <-- action p is valid (RCU protects IDR) 0: mutex_unlock() <-- releases the idr lock 1: refcount_dec_and_mutex_lock() <-- refcnt 1->0, mutex held 1: idr_remove(idr, index) <-- Action removed from IDR 1: mutex_unlock() <-- mutex released allowing us to delete the action 1: tcf_action_cleanup(p); kfree(p) <-- Kfrees p immediately, no deferral 0: refcount_inc_not_zero(&p->tcfa_refcnt) <-- ouch, UAF p points to freed memory This patch fixes the race condition between NEWTFILTER and DELFILTER by adding struct rcu_head to tc_action used in the deferral and introducing a call_rcu() in the delete path to defer the final kfree(). Note: this is a revert of commit d7fb60b9cafb ("net_sched: get rid of tcfa_rcu") but also modernization/simplification to directly use kfree_rcu(). Let's illustrate the new restored code path: 0: rcu_read_lock() 1: refcount_dec_and_mutex_lock() <-- refcnt 1->0, mutex held 1: idr_remove(idr, index) 1: mutex_unlock() 1: call_rcu(&p->tcfa_rcu, tcf_action_rcu_free) <-- defer kfree after grace period 0: p = idr_find(idr, index) 0: refcount_inc_not_zero(&p->tcfa_refcnt) <-- fails, refcnt already 0 1: rcu_read_unlock() <-- release so freeing can run after grace period After CPU1 calls idr_remove(), the object is no longer reachable through the IDR. CPU0's subsequent idr_find() will return NULL, and even if it still held a stale pointer, the immediate kfree() is now deferred until after the RCU grace period, so no UAF can occur.

Where it lives

The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.

include/net/act_api.h
net/sched/act_api.c

What this is
NETWORKING [GENERAL]MAINTAINERS section matched on include/net/ · netdev@vger.kernel.org · Maintained

Check it on the machine

grep -w CONFIG_NET_CLS_ACT /boot/config-$(uname -r)

Reads the booted kernel's own configuration, on the machine and nowhere else. =y is built in, =m is a module, and an is not set line means the code is not there.

Show whether Debian builds this, per release

Debian builds this code. Every release below compiles the affected file into the kernels it ships.

  • bookworm, trixie, forky, sidy
y
built into the kernel image on every flavour - only a patch removes it
Build switch
CONFIG_NET_CLS_ACT

From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS kbuild Makefiles Debian linux-config packages

Signals

Published
2026-06-25 (4 months ago)source
CVSS
7.8 high
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hsource recompute it
Attack vector
local (AV:L)source
EPSS
0.25%, higher than 15.0% of all CVEssource
CISA KEV
not listedthe KEV catalogue
Debian urgency
not yet assignedsource
Subsystem
include/net

Upstream fixes

The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source

IntroducedFixed inCommit
4.145.10.25998b2e40879ab
4.145.15.21018af5d2ef0c4
4.146.1.1761f1b98fea6b9
4.146.6.1438b136f18ac4b
4.146.12.945dd51e09020c
4.146.18.36b60e9391142e
4.147.0.1391d105d2cbe0
4.147.15057e1aca011

Debian advisories

AdvisoryDateShipped toDebian
DLA-4671-12026-07-05bullseye 6.1.176-1~deb11u1tracker
DLA-4665-12026-07-03bookworm 6.1.176-1tracker
DLA-4664-12026-07-03bullseye 5.10.259-1tracker

Why the CNA scored it this way

Quoted from the kernel CNA's own scoring file, word for word. A highlighted metric carries the most severe value CVSS v3.1 defines for it, which is what pushes the score up. source

AV:LAttack vector, local
The vulnerable path is reached through local rtnetlink `RTM_NEWTFILTER`/`RTM_DELTFILTER` traffic-control netlink messages, not by remote packet input.
AC:LAttack complexity, low
The race is attacker-controlled because the same local actor can issue concurrent filter creation and deletion operations against the same action index. No external victim timing or rare environmental condition is required.
PR:LPrivileges required, low
The operations require `CAP_NET_ADMIN` for non-GET rtnetlink messages, but traffic control is reachable with `CAP_NET_ADMIN` inside a user-created network namespace. Under the provided kernel guidance, this is Low privileges rather than High.
UI:NUser interaction, none
No victim interaction is needed; exploitation consists of the attacker sending crafted concurrent rtnetlink requests.
S:UScope, unchanged
The impact is within the kernel security authority and is a standard local kernel memory-corruption/privilege-escalation class issue. It does not cross a VM, IOMMU, or separate authorization scope boundary.
C:HConfidentiality impact, high
The bug is a use-after-free of a `tc_action` object during action lookup/refcounting. A kernel heap UAF can be shaped into disclosure primitives, so confidentiality impact is High.
I:HIntegrity impact, high
The stale freed action pointer can be reused after heap reallocation and then modified/dereferenced through refcount, bind count, ops, and action lifecycle fields. This is memory corruption that can plausibly support arbitrary write or code execution, so integrity impact is High.
A:HAvailability impact, high
Even without full exploitation, the UAF can dereference or mutate freed/reused kernel memory and can crash or oops the kernel. Availability impact is therefore High.