Look up another CVE · open CVE-2026-53225 in the interactive tracker
CVE-2026-53225
sctp: fix uninit-value in __sctp_rcv_asconf_lookup()
Published 2026-06-25 (4 months ago) by the Linux kernel CNA. Subsystem net/sctp. Debian urgency: not yet assigned.
What to do, per Debian release
Debian's own status for CVE-2026-53225 in every release this site tracks, and what each one means in practice. Every status below is the one the Debian Security Team publishes for this CVE. source
| Release | Status | Version | What this means |
|---|---|---|---|
| Debian 12bookworm | fixedDLA-4665-1 · 2026-07-03 · text | 6.1.176-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. DLA-4665-1 shipped the fix on 2026-07-03, in 6.1.176-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
| Debian 13trixie | fixed | 6.12.94-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 6.12.94-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
| Debian 14forky | fixed | 7.0.13-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.0.13-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
| Debian unstablesid | fixed | 7.0.13-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.0.13-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
The vulnerability
What the bug is
__sctp_rcv_asconf_lookup() in net/sctp/input.c only checks that the ASCONF chunk can hold the ADDIP header and a parameter header, then calls af->from_addr_param(), which reads the full address (16 bytes for IPv6) trusting the parameter's declared length. An unauthenticated peer can send a truncated trailing ASCONF chunk that declares an IPv6 address parameter but stops after the 4-byte parameter header; reached from the no-association lookup path, from_addr_param() then reads uninitialized bytes past the parameter. Impact: an unauthenticated SCTP peer makes the receive path read up to 16 bytes of uninitialized memory past a truncated ASCONF address parameter. The sibling __sctp_rcv_init_lookup() bounds parameters with sctp_walk_params(); this path open-codes the fetch and omits the bound. Verify the whole address parameter lies within the chunk before from_addr_param() reads it, the same class of fix as commit 51e5ad549c43 ("net: sctp: fix KMSAN uninit-value in sctp_inq_pop").
Where it lives
The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.
net/sctp/input.c
- What this is
- SCTP PROTOCOLMAINTAINERS section matched on net/sctp/ · linux-sctp@vger.kernel.org · Maintained
- Kernel module
- sctp
Check it on the machine
grep -w CONFIG_IP_SCTP /boot/config-$(uname -r)Reads the booted kernel's own configuration, on the machine and nowhere else. =y is built in, =m is a module, and an is not set line means the code is not there.
lsmod | grep -w sctpPrints a line if that module is loaded right now, and nothing if it is not. One that is not loaded can still be loaded later by anything that needs it.
Show whether Debian builds this, per release
Debian builds this as a loadable module. Every release below compiles it as a module on every flavour, so whether the code is in the running kernel depends on whether that module is loaded.
- bookworm, trixie, forky, sidm
- m
- a loadable module on every flavour - check lsmod, can be blacklisted
- Build switch
- CONFIG_IP_SCTP
From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS kbuild Makefiles Debian linux-config packages
Signals
- Published
- 2026-06-25 (4 months ago)source
- CVSS
- 9.1 critical
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:Hsource recompute it - Attack vector
- network (AV:N)source
- EPSS
- 0.58%, higher than 46.3% of all CVEssource
- CISA KEV
- not listedthe KEV catalogue
- Debian urgency
- not yet assignedsource
- Subsystem
- net/sctp
Upstream fixes
The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source
| Introduced | Fixed in | Commit |
|---|---|---|
| 2.6.25 | 5.10.259 | 446e0ecd845a |
| 2.6.25 | 5.15.210 | 928dd94db23e |
| 2.6.25 | 6.1.176 | d796cfd06074 |
| 2.6.25 | 6.6.143 | 8ce96f118264 |
| 2.6.25 | 6.12.94 | d6bd0bb7697e |
| 2.6.25 | 6.18.36 | f76a8b323e28 |
| 2.6.25 | 7.0.13 | 8e86817b8af4 |
| 2.6.25 | 7.1 | f8373d7090b7 |
Debian advisories
| Advisory | Date | Shipped to | Debian |
|---|---|---|---|
| DLA-4671-1 | 2026-07-05 | bullseye 6.1.176-1~deb11u1 | tracker |
| DLA-4665-1 | 2026-07-03 | bookworm 6.1.176-1 | tracker |
| DLA-4664-1 | 2026-07-03 | bullseye 5.10.259-1 | tracker |
Why the CNA scored it this way
Quoted from the kernel CNA's own scoring file, word for word. A highlighted metric carries the most severe value CVSS v3.1 defines for it, which is what pushes the score up. source
- AV:NAttack vector, network
- The vulnerable code is reached from the SCTP packet receive path via IP/IPv6 or SCTP-over-UDP encapsulation. A remote peer can send the malformed AUTH-bundled ASCONF packet over the network.
- AC:LAttack complexity, low
- Triggering only requires a syntactically valid SCTP packet with an AUTH chunk before a truncated ASCONF chunk declaring an IPv6 address parameter. There is no race or condition outside attacker control.
- PR:NPrivileges required, none
- The association lookup path only checks that an AUTH chunk was seen before ASCONF; it does not validate the AUTH HMAC before the vulnerable read. The commit explicitly describes an unauthenticated peer reaching the bug.
- UI:NUser interaction, none
- No victim action is required after SCTP is reachable on the target. The attacker sends network packets directly to the kernel receive path.
- S:UScope, unchanged
- The vulnerability affects the kernel SCTP networking stack within the same operating-system security authority. It does not cross a VM, IOMMU, or sandbox boundary.
- C:HConfidentiality impact, high
- The bug causes an unauthenticated out-of-bounds/uninitialized read of up to a full IPv6 address worth of bytes past a truncated ASCONF parameter. Under the provided guidance, this is scored High because it is an OOB read not strictly limited to a few harmless bytes.
- I:NIntegrity impact, none
- The vulnerable operation reads bytes into a temporary SCTP address used for lookup and does not write attacker data to kernel structures. No direct integrity modification or control-flow overwrite is present.
- A:HAvailability impact, high
- The malformed packet can repeatedly trigger an invalid kernel receive-path read, and such out-of-bounds reads can fault or panic on hardened/sanitized deployments. With uncertainty resolved upward, availability impact is High.