data built 2026-10-19T13:16:53Z

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CVE-2026-53091

net: pull headers in qdisc_pkt_len_segs_init()

8.4 EPSS 0.1% AV:L

Published 2026-06-24 (4 months ago) by the Linux kernel CNA. Subsystem include/net. Debian urgency: not yet assigned.

What to do, per Debian release

Debian's own status for CVE-2026-53091 in every release this site tracks, and what each one means in practice. Every status below is the one the Debian Security Team publishes for this CVE. source

ReleaseStatus VersionWhat this means
Debian 12bookwormvulnerable6.1.190-1No fix published anywhere yet, neither in Debian nor upstream for the series bookworm tracks. Watch the Debian tracker page for this CVE. Advisories for bookworm have historically landed a median of 23 days after publication.
Debian 13trixievulnerable6.12.113-1No fix published anywhere yet, neither in Debian nor upstream for the series trixie tracks. Watch the Debian tracker page for this CVE. Advisories for trixie have historically landed a median of 11 days after publication.
Debian 14forkyfixed7.0.10-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.0.10-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian unstablesidfixed7.0.10-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.0.10-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.

The vulnerability

What the bug is

Most ndo_start_xmit() methods expects headers of gso packets to be already in skb->head. net/core/tso.c users are particularly at risk, because tso_build_hdr() does a memcpy(hdr, skb->data, hdr_len); qdisc_pkt_len_segs_init() already does a dissection of gso packets. Use pskb_may_pull() instead of skb_header_pointer() to make sure drivers do not have to reimplement this. Some malicious packets could be fed, detect them so that we can drop them sooner with a new SKB_DROP_REASON_SKB_BAD_GSO drop_reason.

Where it lives

The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.

include/net/dropreason-core.h
net/core/dev.c

What this is
NETWORKING [GENERAL]MAINTAINERS section matched on include/net/ · netdev@vger.kernel.org · Maintained
Show whether Debian builds this, per release

Debian builds this code. Every release below compiles the affected file into the kernels it ships.

  • bookworm, trixie, forky, sidy
y
built into the kernel image on every flavour - only a patch removes it

From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS Debian linux-config packages

Signals

Published
2026-06-24 (4 months ago)source
CVSS
8.4 high
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:Hsource recompute it
Attack vector
local (AV:L)source
EPSS
0.14%, higher than 2.6% of all CVEssource
CISA KEV
not listedthe KEV catalogue
Debian urgency
not yet assignedsource
Subsystem
include/net

Upstream fixes

The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source

IntroducedFixed inCommit
3.167.0.109d4f5c68f5ad
3.167.17fb4c1967011

Why the CNA scored it this way

Quoted from the kernel CNA's own scoring file, word for word. A highlighted metric carries the most severe value CVSS v3.1 defines for it, which is what pushes the score up. source

AV:LAttack vector, local
The vulnerable code is reached through local transmit paths such as AF_PACKET, TUN/TAP, or guest virtio/tap injection where an attacker can supply GSO metadata. Ordinary remote packets do not carry this malformed skb/GSO state on the wire.
AC:LAttack complexity, low
No race or external timing condition is required. The attacker controls the GSO header metadata and packet layout needed to make qdisc accept a header that later TX code expects to be linear.
PR:LPrivileges required, low
AF_PACKET requires CAP_NET_RAW in the target network namespace, and TUN/TAP style paths require CAP_NET_ADMIN or access to an existing tap/tun file descriptor. These are reachable as low privilege in user-namespace or guest/tap deployments rather than requiring init-namespace root in the highest reasonable scenario.
UI:NUser interaction, none
No victim user action is needed once the attacker can inject the crafted local/guest packet. The transmit path processes the skb automatically.
S:CScope, changed
In virtualization deployments, a guest-controlled GSO packet can be processed by the host kernel tap/vhost transmit path and affect host kernel memory or availability. That crosses the guest-to-host security boundary.
C:HConfidentiality impact, high
TSO helpers copy header bytes directly from skb->data, so a header accepted via skb_header_pointer() but not pulled into skb->head can leak adjacent kernel memory into transmitted segment headers. This is an out-of-bounds kernel read and is scored High.
I:NIntegrity impact, none
The investigated primitive is incorrect header linearity causing out-of-bounds reads and crashes, not a demonstrated attacker-controlled write or protected data modification. I did not find a reliable integrity-impacting write primitive from this fix.
A:HAvailability impact, high
Malformed GSO packets can trigger kernel faults or invalid driver/TSO behavior during transmit, including panics reported for this issue. Repeated local injection can therefore cause high availability impact.