CVE-2026-52946

What the bug is

A SOFTIRQ-safe to SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock order deadlock can occur in send_sigio() and send_sigurg() when a process group receives a signal. When FASYNC is configured for a process group (PIDTYPE_PGID), both functions use read_lock(&tasklist_lock) to traverse the task list. However, they are frequently called from softirq context: - send_sigio() via input_inject_event -> kill_fasync - send_sigurg() via tcp_check_urg -> sk_send_sigurg (NET_RX_SOFTIRQ) The deadlock is caused by the rwlock writer fairness mechanism: 1. CPU 0 (process context) holds read_lock(&tasklist_lock) in do_wait(). 2. CPU 1 (process context) attempts write_lock(&tasklist_lock) in fork() or exit() and spins, which blocks all new readers. 3. CPU 0 is interrupted by a softirq (e.g., TCP URG packet reception). 4. The softirq calls send_sigurg() and attempts to acquire read_lock(&tasklist_lock), deadlocking because CPU 1 is waiting. Since PID hashing and do_each_pid_task() traversals are already RCU-protected, the read_lock on tasklist_lock is no longer strictly required for safe traversal. Fix this by replacing tasklist_lock with rcu_read_lock(), aligning the process group signaling path with the single-PID path. This also mitigates a potential remote denial of service vector via TCP URG packets. Lockdep splat: ===================================================== WARNING: SOFTIRQ-safe -> SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock order detected [...] Chain exists of: &dev->event_lock --> &f_owner->lock --> tasklist_lock Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(tasklist_lock); local_irq_disable(); lock(&dev->event_lock); lock(&f_owner->lock); <Interrupt> lock(&dev->event_lock); *** DEADLOCK ***

Where it lives

The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.

fs/fcntl.c

What this is

FILE LOCKING (flock() and fcntl()/lockf())MAINTAINERS section matched on fs/fcntl.c · linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org · Maintained

Show whether Debian builds this, per release

Debian builds this code. Every release below compiles the affected file into the kernels it ships.

• bookworm, trixie, forky, sidy

y

built into the kernel image on every flavour - only a patch removes it

From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS Debian linux-config packages

Signals

Published

2026-06-24 (4 months ago)source

CVSS

7.5 high
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:Hsource recompute it

Attack vector

network (AV:N)source

EPSS

0.47%, higher than 39.0% of all CVEssource

CISA KEV

not listedthe KEV catalogue

Debian urgency

not yet assignedsource

Subsystem

fs

Upstream fixes

The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source

Introduced	Fixed in	Commit
2.6.12	5.10.259	54626335ea41
2.6.12	5.15.210	897d6a724773
2.6.12	6.1.176	32dbd5ce4be3
2.6.12	6.6.143	b5fa9e32fb67
2.6.12	6.12.94	1bee417678f1
2.6.12	6.18.36	20a93e397abe
2.6.12	7.0.13	bfcc8e8d8a49
2.6.12	7.1.1	36c1b57b2ecf
2.6.12	7.2	00633c468382

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