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CVE-2026-52927
netfilter: ebtables: fix OOB read in compat_mtw_from_user
Published 2026-06-24 (4 months ago) by the Linux kernel CNA. Subsystem net/bridge. Debian urgency: not yet assigned.
What to do, per Debian release
Debian's own status for CVE-2026-52927 in every release this site tracks, and what each one means in practice. Every status below is the one the Debian Security Team publishes for this CVE. source
| Release | Status | Version | What this means |
|---|---|---|---|
| Debian 12bookworm | fixedDLA-4665-1 · 2026-07-03 · text | 6.1.176-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. DLA-4665-1 shipped the fix on 2026-07-03, in 6.1.176-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
| Debian 13trixie | fixed | 6.12.94-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 6.12.94-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
| Debian 14forky | fixed | 7.0.12-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.0.12-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
| Debian unstablesid | fixed | 7.0.12-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.0.12-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
The vulnerability
What the bug is
Luxiao Xu says: The function compat_mtw_from_user() converts ebtables extensions from 32-bit user structures to kernel native structures. However, it lacks proper validation of the user-supplied match_size/target_size. When certain extensions are processed, the kernel-side translation logic may perform memory accesses based on the extension's expected size. If the user provides a size smaller than what the extension requires, it results in an out-of-bounds read as reported by KASAN. This fix introduces a check to ensure match_size is at least as large as the extension's required compatsize. This covers matches, watchers, and targets, while maintaining compatibility with standard targets. AFAIU this is relevant for matches that need to go though match->compat_from_user() call. Those that use plain memcpy with the user-provided size are ok because the caller checks that size vs the start of the next rule entry offset (which itself is checked vs. total size copied from userspace). The ->compat_from_user() callbacks assume they can read compatsize bytes, so they need this extra check. Based on an earlier patch from Luxiao Xu.
Where it lives
The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.
net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c
- What this is
- NETFILTERMAINTAINERS section matched on net/*/netfilter/ · netfilter-devel@vger.kernel.org · Maintained
- Kernel module
- ebtables
Check it on the machine
grep -wE 'CONFIG_BRIDGE|CONFIG_BRIDGE_NF_EBTABLES|CONFIG_BRIDGE_NF_EBTABLES_LEGACY|CONFIG_NETFILTER' /boot/config-$(uname -r)Reads the booted kernel's own configuration, on the machine and nowhere else. =y is built in, =m is a module, and an is not set line means the code is not there.
lsmod | grep -w ebtablesPrints a line if that module is loaded right now, and nothing if it is not. One that is not loaded can still be loaded later by anything that needs it.
Show whether Debian builds this, per release
Debian does not build this code in 2 releases. It does build it in 2 releases, so the answer depends on which release the machine runs.
- bookworm, trixiem
- forky, sidn
- m
- a loadable module on every flavour - check lsmod, can be blacklisted
- n
- not enabled on any flavour - this release does not build the code
- Build switches
- CONFIG_BRIDGE, CONFIG_BRIDGE_NF_EBTABLES, CONFIG_BRIDGE_NF_EBTABLES_LEGACY, CONFIG_NETFILTER
- Reads as
- all on means the file is compiled; any one off means it is not.
From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS kbuild Makefiles Debian linux-config packages
Signals
- Published
- 2026-06-24 (4 months ago)source
- CVSS
- 7.8 high
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hsource recompute it - Attack vector
- local (AV:L)source
- EPSS
- 0.12%, higher than 1.7% of all CVEssource
- CISA KEV
- not listedthe KEV catalogue
- Debian urgency
- not yet assignedsource
- Subsystem
- net/bridge
Upstream fixes
The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source
| Introduced | Fixed in | Commit |
|---|---|---|
| 2.6.34 | 5.10.259 | d7a8fb6f10d5 |
| 2.6.34 | 5.15.210 | 21af4c030567 |
| 2.6.34 | 6.1.176 | dad9ebf81079 |
| 2.6.34 | 6.6.143 | a27cb7325a6c |
| 2.6.34 | 6.12.93 | 7ad0e463fc7e |
| 2.6.34 | 6.18.35 | bf8e8eac7ede |
| 2.6.34 | 7.0.12 | fcc4c043d137 |
| 2.6.34 | 7.1 | f438d1786d65 |
Debian advisories
| Advisory | Date | Shipped to | Debian |
|---|---|---|---|
| DLA-4671-1 | 2026-07-05 | bullseye 6.1.176-1~deb11u1 | tracker |
| DLA-4665-1 | 2026-07-03 | bookworm 6.1.176-1 | tracker |
| DLA-4664-1 | 2026-07-03 | bullseye 5.10.259-1 | tracker |
Why the CNA scored it this way
Quoted from the kernel CNA's own scoring file, word for word. A highlighted metric carries the most severe value CVSS v3.1 defines for it, which is what pushes the score up. source
- AV:LAttack vector, local
- The vulnerable ebtables compat translation path is reached through a local `setsockopt(SOL_IP, EBT_SO_SET_ENTRIES, ...)` call, not by received network traffic.
- AC:LAttack complexity, low
- An attacker who can call the compat sockopt path controls the submitted table blob, extension name, and undersized match/target length directly; no race or external state is required.
- PR:LPrivileges required, low
- The path checks `ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN)`, which is reachable by an unprivileged local user in a new user and network namespace on affected configurations.
- UI:NUser interaction, none
- No victim action is needed beyond the attacker invoking the local syscall with a crafted ebtables replacement blob.
- S:UScope, unchanged
- The impact remains within the kernel/security authority of the local system; this is not a VM, IOMMU, or other cross-scope escape boundary.
- C:HConfidentiality impact, high
- The bug is an out-of-bounds read during kernel compat translation, and the read can pull kernel memory adjacent to the copied rule blob into kernel extension data.
- I:HIntegrity impact, high
- The undersized length can also leave the destination translation buffer too small for callbacks that write native extension structures, making kernel memory corruption a defensible worst-case impact.
- A:HAvailability impact, high
- The malformed compat translation can trigger KASAN reports or kernel faults/oopses, and can be repeatedly triggered by a local attacker.