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CVE-2026-52927

netfilter: ebtables: fix OOB read in compat_mtw_from_user

7.8 EPSS 0.1% AV:L

Published 2026-06-24 (4 months ago) by the Linux kernel CNA. Subsystem net/bridge. Debian urgency: not yet assigned.

What to do, per Debian release

Debian's own status for CVE-2026-52927 in every release this site tracks, and what each one means in practice. Every status below is the one the Debian Security Team publishes for this CVE. source

ReleaseStatus VersionWhat this means
Debian 12bookwormfixedDLA-4665-1 · 2026-07-03 · text6.1.176-1Update the kernel and reboot. DLA-4665-1 shipped the fix on 2026-07-03, in 6.1.176-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian 13trixiefixed6.12.94-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 6.12.94-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian 14forkyfixed7.0.12-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.0.12-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian unstablesidfixed7.0.12-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 7.0.12-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.

The vulnerability

What the bug is

Luxiao Xu says: The function compat_mtw_from_user() converts ebtables extensions from 32-bit user structures to kernel native structures. However, it lacks proper validation of the user-supplied match_size/target_size. When certain extensions are processed, the kernel-side translation logic may perform memory accesses based on the extension's expected size. If the user provides a size smaller than what the extension requires, it results in an out-of-bounds read as reported by KASAN. This fix introduces a check to ensure match_size is at least as large as the extension's required compatsize. This covers matches, watchers, and targets, while maintaining compatibility with standard targets. AFAIU this is relevant for matches that need to go though match->compat_from_user() call. Those that use plain memcpy with the user-provided size are ok because the caller checks that size vs the start of the next rule entry offset (which itself is checked vs. total size copied from userspace). The ->compat_from_user() callbacks assume they can read compatsize bytes, so they need this extra check. Based on an earlier patch from Luxiao Xu.

Where it lives

The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.

net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c

What this is
NETFILTERMAINTAINERS section matched on net/*/netfilter/ · netfilter-devel@vger.kernel.org · Maintained
Kernel module
ebtables

Check it on the machine

grep -wE 'CONFIG_BRIDGE|CONFIG_BRIDGE_NF_EBTABLES|CONFIG_BRIDGE_NF_EBTABLES_LEGACY|CONFIG_NETFILTER' /boot/config-$(uname -r)

Reads the booted kernel's own configuration, on the machine and nowhere else. =y is built in, =m is a module, and an is not set line means the code is not there.

lsmod | grep -w ebtables

Prints a line if that module is loaded right now, and nothing if it is not. One that is not loaded can still be loaded later by anything that needs it.

Show whether Debian builds this, per release

Debian does not build this code in 2 releases. It does build it in 2 releases, so the answer depends on which release the machine runs.

  • bookworm, trixiem
  • forky, sidn
m
a loadable module on every flavour - check lsmod, can be blacklisted
n
not enabled on any flavour - this release does not build the code
Build switches
CONFIG_BRIDGE, CONFIG_BRIDGE_NF_EBTABLES, CONFIG_BRIDGE_NF_EBTABLES_LEGACY, CONFIG_NETFILTER
Reads as
all on means the file is compiled; any one off means it is not.

From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS kbuild Makefiles Debian linux-config packages

Signals

Published
2026-06-24 (4 months ago)source
CVSS
7.8 high
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hsource recompute it
Attack vector
local (AV:L)source
EPSS
0.12%, higher than 1.7% of all CVEssource
CISA KEV
not listedthe KEV catalogue
Debian urgency
not yet assignedsource
Subsystem
net/bridge

Upstream fixes

The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source

IntroducedFixed inCommit
2.6.345.10.259d7a8fb6f10d5
2.6.345.15.21021af4c030567
2.6.346.1.176dad9ebf81079
2.6.346.6.143a27cb7325a6c
2.6.346.12.937ad0e463fc7e
2.6.346.18.35bf8e8eac7ede
2.6.347.0.12fcc4c043d137
2.6.347.1f438d1786d65

Debian advisories

AdvisoryDateShipped toDebian
DLA-4671-12026-07-05bullseye 6.1.176-1~deb11u1tracker
DLA-4665-12026-07-03bookworm 6.1.176-1tracker
DLA-4664-12026-07-03bullseye 5.10.259-1tracker

Why the CNA scored it this way

Quoted from the kernel CNA's own scoring file, word for word. A highlighted metric carries the most severe value CVSS v3.1 defines for it, which is what pushes the score up. source

AV:LAttack vector, local
The vulnerable ebtables compat translation path is reached through a local `setsockopt(SOL_IP, EBT_SO_SET_ENTRIES, ...)` call, not by received network traffic.
AC:LAttack complexity, low
An attacker who can call the compat sockopt path controls the submitted table blob, extension name, and undersized match/target length directly; no race or external state is required.
PR:LPrivileges required, low
The path checks `ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN)`, which is reachable by an unprivileged local user in a new user and network namespace on affected configurations.
UI:NUser interaction, none
No victim action is needed beyond the attacker invoking the local syscall with a crafted ebtables replacement blob.
S:UScope, unchanged
The impact remains within the kernel/security authority of the local system; this is not a VM, IOMMU, or other cross-scope escape boundary.
C:HConfidentiality impact, high
The bug is an out-of-bounds read during kernel compat translation, and the read can pull kernel memory adjacent to the copied rule blob into kernel extension data.
I:HIntegrity impact, high
The undersized length can also leave the destination translation buffer too small for callbacks that write native extension structures, making kernel memory corruption a defensible worst-case impact.
A:HAvailability impact, high
The malformed compat translation can trigger KASAN reports or kernel faults/oopses, and can be repeatedly triggered by a local attacker.