CVE-2026-46130

What the bug is

fec_decode_bufs() assumes that the parity bytes of the first RS codeword it decodes are never split across parity blocks. This assumption is false. Consider v->fec->block_size == 4096 && v->fec->roots == 17 && fio->nbufs == 1, for example. In that case, each call to fec_decode_bufs() consumes v->fec->roots * (fio->nbufs << DM_VERITY_FEC_BUF_RS_BITS) = 272 parity bytes. Considering that the parity data for each message block starts on a block boundary, the byte alignment in the parity data will iterate through 272*i mod 4096 until the 3 parity blocks have been consumed. On the 16th call (i=15), the alignment will be 4080 bytes into the first block. Only 16 bytes remain in that block, but 17 parity bytes will be needed. The code reads out-of-bounds from the parity block buffer. Fortunately this doesn't normally happen, since it can occur only for certain non-default values of fec_roots *and* when the maximum number of buffers couldn't be allocated due to low memory. For example with block_size=4096 only the following cases are affected: fec_roots=17: nbufs in [1, 3, 5, 15] fec_roots=19: nbufs in [1, 229] fec_roots=21: nbufs in [1, 3, 5, 13, 15, 39, 65, 195] fec_roots=23: nbufs in [1, 89] Regardless, fix it by refactoring how the parity blocks are read.

Where it lives

The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.

drivers/md/dm-verity-fec.c

What this is

DEVICE-MAPPER (LVM)MAINTAINERS section matched on drivers/md/dm* · dm-devel@lists.linux.dev · Maintained

Kernel module

dm_verity

Check it on the machine

grep -wE 'CONFIG_DM_VERITY|CONFIG_DM_VERITY_FEC|CONFIG_MD' /boot/config-$(uname -r)

Reads the booted kernel's own configuration, on the machine and nowhere else. =y is built in, =m is a module, and an is not set line means the code is not there.

lsmod | grep -w dm_verity

Prints a line if that module is loaded right now, and nothing if it is not. One that is not loaded can still be loaded later by anything that needs it.

Show whether Debian builds this, per release

Debian builds this as a loadable module. Every release below compiles it as a module on every flavour, so whether the code is in the running kernel depends on whether that module is loaded.

• bookworm, trixie, forky, sidm

m

a loadable module on every flavour - check lsmod, can be blacklisted

Build switches

CONFIG_DM_VERITY, CONFIG_DM_VERITY_FEC, CONFIG_MD

Reads as

all on means the file is compiled; any one off means it is not.

From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS kbuild Makefiles Debian linux-config packages

Signals

Published

2026-05-28 (5 months ago)source

CVSS

no vector published, unrated

Attack vector

not published

EPSS

0.16%, higher than 5.3% of all CVEssource

CISA KEV

not listedthe KEV catalogue

Debian urgency

not yet assignedsource

Subsystem

drivers/md

Upstream fixes

The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source

Introduced	Fixed in	Commit
6.13	6.18.42	d47281b9a447
6.13	7.0.7	3d1b4e2d8ac0
6.13	7.1	430a05cb926f
6.1.125	0	0
6.6.72	0	0
6.12.10	0	0