CVE-2026-45949

What the bug is

Currently, hwrng_fill is not cleared until the hwrng_fillfn() thread exits. Since hwrng_unregister() reads hwrng_fill outside the rng_mutex lock, a concurrent hwrng_unregister() may call kthread_stop() again on the same task. Additionally, if hwrng_unregister() is called immediately after hwrng_register(), the stopped thread may have never been executed. Thus, hwrng_fill remains dirty even after hwrng_unregister() returns. In this case, subsequent calls to hwrng_register() will fail to start new threads, and hwrng_unregister() will call kthread_stop() on the same freed task. In both cases, a use-after-free occurs: refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free. WARNING: ... at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0xec/0x1c0 Call Trace: kthread_stop+0x181/0x360 hwrng_unregister+0x288/0x380 virtrng_remove+0xe3/0x200 This patch fixes the race by protecting the global hwrng_fill pointer inside the rng_mutex lock, so that hwrng_fillfn() thread is stopped only once, and calls to kthread_run() and kthread_stop() are serialized with the lock held. To avoid deadlock in hwrng_fillfn() while being stopped with the lock held, we convert current_rng to RCU, so that get_current_rng() can read current_rng without holding the lock. To remove the lock from put_rng(), we also delay the actual cleanup into a work_struct. Since get_current_rng() no longer returns ERR_PTR values, the IS_ERR() checks are removed from its callers. With hwrng_fill protected by the rng_mutex lock, hwrng_fillfn() can no longer clear hwrng_fill itself. Therefore, if hwrng_fillfn() returns directly after current_rng is dropped, kthread_stop() would be called on a freed task_struct later. To fix this, hwrng_fillfn() calls schedule() now to keep the task alive until being stopped. The kthread_stop() call is also moved from hwrng_unregister() to drop_current_rng(), ensuring kthread_stop() is called on all possible paths where current_rng becomes NULL, so that the thread would not wait forever.

Where it lives

The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.

drivers/char/hw_random/core.c
include/linux/hw_random.h

What this is

HARDWARE RANDOM NUMBER GENERATOR COREMAINTAINERS section matched on drivers/char/hw_random/ · linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org · Odd fixes

Check it on the machine

grep -w CONFIG_HW_RANDOM /boot/config-$(uname -r)

Reads the booted kernel's own configuration, on the machine and nowhere else. =y is built in, =m is a module, and an is not set line means the code is not there.

Show whether Debian builds this, per release

Debian builds this code. Every release below compiles the affected file into the kernels it ships.

• bookworm, trixie, forky, sidy

y

built into the kernel image on every flavour - only a patch removes it

Build switch

CONFIG_HW_RANDOM

From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS kbuild Makefiles Debian linux-config packages

Signals

Published

2026-05-27 (5 months ago)source

CVSS

no vector published, unrated

Attack vector

not published

EPSS

0.11%, higher than 1.1% of all CVEssource

CISA KEV

not listedthe KEV catalogue

Debian urgency

not yet assignedsource

Subsystem

drivers/char

Upstream fixes

The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source

Introduced	Fixed in	Commit
3.17	6.12.75	d5b7730f0699
3.17	6.18.14	dcf416eb88ea
3.17	6.19.4	ad38f2cdfef9
3.17	7.0	cc2f39d6ac48