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CVE-2026-31502
team: fix header_ops type confusion with non-Ethernet ports
Published 2026-04-22 (6 months ago) by the Linux kernel CNA. Subsystem drivers/net. Debian urgency: not yet assigned.
What to do, per Debian release
Debian's own status for CVE-2026-31502 in every release this site tracks, and what each one means in practice. Every status below is the one the Debian Security Team publishes for this CVE. source
| Release | Status | Version | What this means |
|---|---|---|---|
| Debian 12bookworm | vulnerable | 6.1.190-1 | No fix published anywhere yet, neither in Debian nor upstream for the series bookworm tracks. Watch the Debian tracker page for this CVE. Advisories for bookworm have historically landed a median of 23 days after publication. |
| Debian 13trixie | fixedDSA-6238-1 · 2026-04-30 · text | 6.12.85-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. DSA-6238-1 shipped the fix on 2026-04-30, in 6.12.85-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
| Debian 14forky | fixed | 6.19.11-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 6.19.11-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
| Debian unstablesid | fixed | 6.19.11-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 6.19.11-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
The vulnerability
What the bug is
Similar to commit 950803f72547 ("bonding: fix type confusion in bond_setup_by_slave()") team has the same class of header_ops type confusion. For non-Ethernet ports, team_setup_by_port() copies port_dev->header_ops directly. When the team device later calls dev_hard_header() or dev_parse_header(), these callbacks can run with the team net_device instead of the real lower device, so netdev_priv(dev) is interpreted as the wrong private type and can crash. The syzbot report shows a crash in bond_header_create(), but the root cause is in team: the topology is gre -> bond -> team, and team calls the inherited header_ops with its own net_device instead of the lower device, so bond_header_create() receives a team device and interprets netdev_priv() as bonding private data, causing a type confusion crash. Fix this by introducing team header_ops wrappers for create/parse, selecting a team port under RCU, and calling the lower device callbacks with port->dev, so each callback always sees the correct net_device context. Also pass the selected lower device to the lower parse callback, so recursion is bounded in stacked non-Ethernet topologies and parse callbacks always run with the correct device context.
Where it lives
The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.
drivers/net/team/team_core.c
- What this is
- TEAM DRIVERMAINTAINERS section matched on drivers/net/team/ · netdev@vger.kernel.org · Supported
- Kernel module
- team
Check it on the machine
grep -w CONFIG_NET_TEAM /boot/config-$(uname -r)Reads the booted kernel's own configuration, on the machine and nowhere else. =y is built in, =m is a module, and an is not set line means the code is not there.
lsmod | grep -w teamPrints a line if that module is loaded right now, and nothing if it is not. One that is not loaded can still be loaded later by anything that needs it.
Show whether Debian builds this, per release
Debian builds this as a loadable module. Every release with an answer below compiles it as a module on every flavour, so whether the code is in the running kernel depends on whether that module is loaded. The build rule could not be established for 1 release, so nothing is claimed about those.
- bookworm?
- trixie, forky, sidm
- ?
- not established - no Makefile entry for the affected file
- m
- a loadable module on every flavour - check lsmod, can be blacklisted
Where a release above reads "not established", no build rule for the affected file was found in that release's kernel tree. That is a gap in this lookup, not a finding that the code is absent.
- Build switch
- CONFIG_NET_TEAM
From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS kbuild Makefiles Debian linux-config packages
Signals
- Published
- 2026-04-22 (6 months ago)source
- CVSS
- 7.8 high
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hsource recompute it - Attack vector
- local (AV:L)source
- EPSS
- 0.13%, higher than 2.2% of all CVEssource
- CISA KEV
- not listedthe KEV catalogue
- Debian urgency
- not yet assignedsource
- Subsystem
- drivers/net
Upstream fixes
The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source
| Introduced | Fixed in | Commit |
|---|---|---|
| 3.7 | 6.6.145 | 420e5aad7ba8 |
| 3.7 | 6.12.80 | 6d3161fa3eee |
| 3.7 | 6.18.21 | 0a7468ed49a6 |
| 3.7 | 6.19.11 | 20491d384d97 |
| 3.7 | 7.0 | 425000dbf173 |
Debian advisories
| Advisory | Date | Shipped to | Debian |
|---|---|---|---|
| DSA-6238-1 | 2026-04-30 | trixie 6.12.85-1 | tracker |
Why the CNA scored it this way
Quoted from the kernel CNA's own scoring file, word for word. A highlighted metric carries the most severe value CVSS v3.1 defines for it, which is what pushes the score up. source
- AV:LAttack vector, local
- An attacker reaches the vulnerable team header_ops path by locally creating/enslaving network devices through rtnetlink and then triggering dev_hard_header()/dev_parse_header() via local packet/socket or network-stack activity on the malformed team device. The required setup is a local kernel networking configuration path rather than an unauthenticated packet-processing path.
- AC:LAttack complexity, low
- The vulnerable topology, such as GRE -> bond -> team, is fully attacker-controlled once the required namespace capabilities are available, and triggering the bad callback is deterministic. There is no race or external timing condition required.
- PR:LPrivileges required, low
- Creating team/bond/GRE devices and enslaving them requires CAP_NET_ADMIN, and packet sockets require CAP_NET_RAW, but both are available to an unprivileged user inside a user and network namespace on systems permitting unprivileged user namespaces. This is therefore low privileges, not real init-namespace root.
- UI:NUser interaction, none
- No victim interaction is required after the attacker has local access and namespace capabilities. The attacker can configure the devices and trigger the callback directly.
- S:UScope, unchanged
- The impact is within the same kernel security authority. This is a kernel crash/type-confusion or privilege-impact issue, not a VM escape or cross-scope boundary violation.
- C:HConfidentiality impact, high
- The bug is a header_ops type confusion where callbacks interpret team private data as another subsystem's private structure, causing attacker-influenced kernel pointer dereferences and potential kernel memory exposure. Following the higher-severity rule for type confusion, confidentiality impact is high.
- I:HIntegrity impact, high
- Type confusion in kernel callback dispatch can lead to misinterpreted object pointers and potentially control-flow or write-primitive exploitation beyond the observed crash. Kernel type confusion is scored as high integrity impact.
- A:HAvailability impact, high
- The reported and expected failure mode is a kernel oops/BUG/crash when the inherited callback uses the wrong net_device private layout. This gives high availability impact.