CVE-2025-39797

What the bug is

The issue originates when Strongswan initiates an XFRM_MSG_ALLOCSPI Netlink message, which triggers the kernel function xfrm_alloc_spi(). This function is expected to ensure uniqueness of the Security Parameter Index (SPI) for inbound Security Associations (SAs). However, it can return success even when the requested SPI is already in use, leading to duplicate SPIs assigned to multiple inbound SAs, differentiated only by their destination addresses. This behavior causes inconsistencies during SPI lookups for inbound packets. Since the lookup may return an arbitrary SA among those with the same SPI, packet processing can fail, resulting in packet drops. According to RFC 4301 section 4.4.2 , for inbound processing a unicast SA is uniquely identified by the SPI and optionally protocol. Reproducing the Issue Reliably: To consistently reproduce the problem, restrict the available SPI range in charon.conf : spi_min = 0x10000000 spi_max = 0x10000002 This limits the system to only 2 usable SPI values. Next, create more than 2 Child SA. each using unique pair of src/dst address. As soon as the 3rd Child SA is initiated, it will be assigned a duplicate SPI, since the SPI pool is already exhausted. With a narrow SPI range, the issue is consistently reproducible. With a broader/default range, it becomes rare and unpredictable. Current implementation: xfrm_spi_hash() lookup function computes hash using daddr, proto, and family. So if two SAs have the same SPI but different destination addresses, then they will: a. Hash into different buckets b. Be stored in different linked lists (byspi + h) c. Not be seen in the same hlist_for_each_entry_rcu() iteration. As a result, the lookup will result in NULL and kernel allows that Duplicate SPI Proposed Change: xfrm_state_lookup_spi_proto() does a truly global search - across all states, regardless of hash bucket and matches SPI and proto.

Where it lives

The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.

net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c

What this is

NETWORKING [IPSEC]MAINTAINERS section matched on net/xfrm/ · netdev@vger.kernel.org · Maintained

Check it on the machine

grep -w CONFIG_XFRM /boot/config-$(uname -r)

Reads the booted kernel's own configuration, on the machine and nowhere else. =y is built in, =m is a module, and an is not set line means the code is not there.

Show whether Debian builds this, per release

Debian builds this code. Every release below compiles the affected file into the kernels it ships.

• bookworm, trixie, forky, sidy

y

built into the kernel image on every flavour - only a patch removes it

Build switch

CONFIG_XFRM

From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS kbuild Makefiles Debian linux-config packages

Signals

Published

2025-09-12 (13 months ago)source

CVSS

no vector published, unrated

Attack vector

not published

EPSS

0.16%, higher than 4.8% of all CVEssource

CISA KEV

not listedthe KEV catalogue

Debian urgency

not yet assignedsource

Subsystem

net/xfrm

Upstream fixes

The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source

Introduced	Fixed in	Commit
2.6.12	6.6.103	3d8090bb5342
2.6.12	6.12.43	2fc5b54368a1
2.6.12	6.15.11	c67d4e7a8f90
2.6.12	6.16.2	29e9158f91f9
2.6.12	6.17	94f39804d891