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CVE-2024-58053

rxrpc: Fix handling of received connection abort

7.5 EPSS 0.5% AV:N

Published 2025-03-06 (19 months ago) by the Linux kernel CNA. Subsystem include/trace. Debian urgency: not yet assigned.

What to do, per Debian release

Debian's own status for CVE-2024-58053 in every release this site tracks, and what each one means in practice. Every status below is the one the Debian Security Team publishes for this CVE. source

ReleaseStatus VersionWhat this means
Debian 12bookwormvulnerable6.1.190-1No fix published anywhere yet, neither in Debian nor upstream for the series bookworm tracks. Watch the Debian tracker page for this CVE. Advisories for bookworm have historically landed a median of 23 days after publication.
Debian 13trixiefixed6.12.13-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 6.12.13-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian 14forkyfixed6.12.13-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 6.12.13-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian unstablesidfixed6.12.13-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 6.12.13-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.

The vulnerability

What the bug is

Fix the handling of a connection abort that we've received. Though the abort is at the connection level, it needs propagating to the calls on that connection. Whilst the propagation bit is performed, the calls aren't then woken up to go and process their termination, and as no further input is forthcoming, they just hang. Also add some tracing for the logging of connection aborts.

Where it lives

The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.

include/trace/events/rxrpc.h
net/rxrpc/conn_event.c

What this is
RXRPC SOCKETS (AF_RXRPC)MAINTAINERS section matched on include/trace/events/rxrpc.h · linux-afs@lists.infradead.org · Supported
Kernel module
rxrpc

Check it on the machine

grep -w CONFIG_AF_RXRPC /boot/config-$(uname -r)

Reads the booted kernel's own configuration, on the machine and nowhere else. =y is built in, =m is a module, and an is not set line means the code is not there.

lsmod | grep -w rxrpc

Prints a line if that module is loaded right now, and nothing if it is not. One that is not loaded can still be loaded later by anything that needs it.

Show whether Debian builds this, per release

Debian builds this, but not on every flavour. At least one release below builds the code on some of its kernel flavours and not on others, so the answer depends on the architecture and flavour installed.

  • bookworm, trixie, forky, sidMnot built on amd64/cloud-amd64, arm64/cloud-arm64
M
a module where it is built at all; some flavours do not build it
Build switch
CONFIG_AF_RXRPC

From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS kbuild Makefiles Debian linux-config packages

Signals

Published
2025-03-06 (19 months ago)source
CVSS
7.5 high
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:Hsource recompute it
Attack vector
network (AV:N)source
EPSS
0.46%, higher than 38.7% of all CVEssource
CISA KEV
not listedthe KEV catalogue
Debian urgency
not yet assignedsource
Subsystem
include/trace

Upstream fixes

The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source

IntroducedFixed inCommit
4.96.6.769c6702260557
4.96.12.135842ce7b120c
4.96.13.296d1d927c4d0
4.96.140e56ebde245e

Why the CNA scored it this way

Quoted from the kernel CNA's own scoring file, word for word. A highlighted metric carries the most severe value CVSS v3.1 defines for it, which is what pushes the score up. source

AV:NAttack vector, network
The trigger is an unauthenticated rxrpc ABORT packet delivered over UDP to an AF_RXRPC endpoint (kafs binds its callback-manager service to [::]:7001, and client connections accept aborts from the peer), handled entirely in net/rxrpc/io_thread.c → conn_event.c.
AC:LAttack complexity, low
The attacker fully controls both steps — send a DATA packet to instantiate a service call on a channel, then send a connection-level ABORT — with no race, no memory-layout dependence, and no reliance on victim state.
PR:NPrivileges required, none
The service call is created and attached to conn->channels[] before the rxrpc security challenge/response completes (state SERVICE_UNSECURED/CHALLENGING), and ABORT packets are never authenticated or encrypted, so no credentials of any kind are required.
UI:NUser interaction, none
Exploitation is entirely packet-driven against a listening rxrpc service or an in-flight connection; no action by any local user is needed.
S:UScope, unchanged
The leaked calls, hung RPCs and wedged cleanup path all remain within the kernel's own security authority; no VM, IOMMU or sandbox boundary is crossed.
C:NConfidentiality impact, none
The defect is a missing rxrpc_poke_call() wake-up; no out-of-bounds read, freed-object read, or pointer disclosure occurs.
I:NIntegrity impact, none
No memory is corrupted and no attacker-controlled data is written anywhere — the only effect is that termination processing never runs.
A:HAvailability impact, high
In-flight calls hang indefinitely, each aborted connection permanently leaks up to four rxrpc_call objects (plus conn/peer/local refs and queued skbs) that can be accumulated remotely at packet rate until OOM, and rxrpc_destroy_all_calls()'s wait_var_event() then blocks cleanup_net forever, permanently preventing all network-namespace teardown on the host.